The U.S. government can underscore the significance of China’s Maritime Militia by linking the behavior and activities of all three of China’s major sea forces to American interaction with them. The PLAN should not simply be allowed to bear-hug the U.S. Navy for prestige and best practices as the “good cop” of naval diplomacy, while China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia “bad cops” (some of which the PLAN itself trains) do the dirty work of bullying neighbors and threatening openness and stability in the East and South China Seas. In the interest of safety and accident prevention, for instance, China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia should be expected to adhere to the same Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to which the PLAN has explicitly committed itself. The United States should likewise call on Vietnam to require its own Maritime Militia to adhere to CUES so that proper rules and norms can govern all irregular forces’ activities in the region.

Any Chinese failure to cooperate in this area should trigger an explicit review of activities that the PLAN itself values, such as participation in the next U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. To the extent that Beijing continues to obfuscate concerning the nature of its Maritime Militia, American interlocutors should declare explicitly that any vessels clearly engaged in unsafe behavior on behalf of China in areas where international law permits U.S. vessels’ operation will be dealt with as necessary to ensure self-defense and unobstructed mission accomplishment.

The Bottom Line

The United States must “call out” China’s Maritime Militia in peacetime, raise public awareness and share information with neighboring countries, and impose consequences for its employment—while preparing to address a full range of “Gray Zone” and kinetic contingencies with relevant allies and security partners. Only then can Washington get out ahead of the serious problems and risks that are only likely to intensify after the PCA hands down its verdict on July 12, likely angering Beijing and prompting it to assert its claims by nonlegal means. As storm clouds gather increasingly over the South China Sea, strong and effective American leadership in addressing China’s third sea force is long overdue. Fortunately, there’s a logical place to start.

Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. He runs www.andrewerickson.com and co-manages www.ChinaSignPost.com. Conor M. Kennedy is a research assistant at CMSI. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors. They in no way represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government. The authors thank Ryan Martinson for invaluable inputs.

Image: Flag of the People’s Republic of China. Wikimedia Commons/@Oskarp