The upcoming decade will continue to test democracies, particularly in developing countries. Their resilience, as Ukraine has demonstrated amid a full-scale invasion, depends on the potential of civil society.

In May 2024, the streets of Tbilisi, Georgia, echoed with the voices of thousands of protesters. People took to the streets to oppose a controversial “foreign influence” bill. The bill mandates that NGOs and independent media, receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from foreign donors, register as entities that “promote” the interests of a foreign power.

Twenty years ago, Georgia was similarly shaken by civil protests. Those days’ movement demanded a break from the corrupt post-Soviet regime and to steer the country toward EU membership. Reformist forces emerged victorious. Georgia achieved significant economic and political progress, turning into a Caucasian Tiger. The signing of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in 2014 became a milestone. However, the influence of neighboring Russia was underestimated. A staunch opponent of EU expansion, Moscow attacked Georgia militarily in 2008. Then, they launched a series of trade wars, lavishly financing Euroscepticist powers inside the country. 

Two decades later, the current Georgian Parliament voted on the “foreign agent” bill. Many Georgians refer to this legislation as “Russian” since it mirrors similar laws in Russia that target civil society. European officials have already stated that the bill undermines Georgia’s EU integration efforts. Meanwhile, politicians have ignored warnings and widespread public opposition.

The war in Ukraine, the search for foreign influence in Georgia, and Russia's gas blackmailing of Moldova are not isolated incidents. Moscow aims to expand its sphere of influence, subjugate neighboring countries, and use them as footholds to spread instability across the continent.

But it’s not just Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova in the Kremlin’s crosshairs. The 2021 coup d’etat in Mali, France’s expulsion from Niger in 2023, the arrival of Russian mercenaries, and the fraudulent elections in Venezuela in 2024 are all part of a larger pattern of Kremlin interference, often in collaboration with other authoritarian regimes.

Autocratic Regimes on the March 

The 2023 Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit paints a grim picture. Democracy is under severe strain, with average global scores hitting their lowest point since the index began in 2006. Less than 8 percent of the world’s population lives in a full democratic political system, and nearly 40 percent are subject to authoritarian rule.

Each new edition of the EIU’s report appears more disheartening than the last. Many countries are drifting into the gray zone between democracy and authoritarianism, becoming “hybrid regimes” or “flawed democracies.” The trends indicate democratic stagnation and regression rather than advancement.

Over the last decade, propaganda has succeeded in framing global tensions as a contradiction between the “rich” West and the “poor” Global South. But the true divide is not geographic. It is ideological, between democracy and authoritarianism.

Economic growth is often linked to democratic institutions. But prosperity does not instantly follow the establishment of democracy. It takes time and effort to reshape state policies to combat the corruption, nepotism, oligarchy, and revanchism of former elites.

Developing countries often lack democratic institutional continuity or free-market experience. Thus, they become easy prey for those offering quick fixes in exchange for authoritarian leaders. When such leaders receive financial backing from autocratic allies, such support is rarely labeled as “promoting the interests of a foreign power.” Nonetheless, aid from these corners always comes with strings attached.

In the coming decade, global tensions between democracies and authoritarians will only intensify. Developing countries, many rich in natural resources and with large populations, will be the primary battlegrounds. The authoritarian axis seeks to encircle democracies with burning zones of instability. In pursuit of this goal, dictators have a broad arsenal at their disposal—propaganda, bribery, blackmail, and even military intervention. These are tools that democracies cannot use as they contradict core democratic values and principles.

Ukraine: Setting a Positive Model

In February 2022, few experts or politicians outside Ukraine believed the country could withstand Russia’s brutal invasion. In September 2024, there are few who doubt Ukraine’s resilience. The country has proven far stronger than even its staunchest allies anticipated.

It is no exaggeration to say that a capable civil society has been the backbone of Ukraine’s resilience, backing heroic military efforts. Civil society contributed to evacuation routes, supplying food and medicine to blockaded regions. Ukrainians directly donated to the army provided essential goods to defense forces, and helped keep the government functioning. Today, this social energy is focused on increasing state efficiency through digitalization, supervising anti-corruption efforts, and maintaining effective democratic institutions amid the ongoing war.

Ukraine’s example shows that investments in its civil sector over the past fifteen to twenty years have resulted in a strong ecosystem for democracy. This ecosystem is now shielding the continent against the war’s spread, a likely outcome if Ukraine had fallen. East Europe Foundation (EEF), one of the country’s oldest non-government organizations, also contributed to bolstering the Ukrainian civil grassroots.

Democracy cannot be built like infrastructure. Attempts to transplant institutions and legislation from developed countries to developing ones often fail. Democracy needs time and effort to grow. It gradually spreads its values in local contexts, traditions, mindsets, and even historical traumas. This growth starts from the bottom up through capable local communities that realize and are willing to protect their rights. Since 2008, when the East Europe Foundation became an independent entity, we have provided approximately $17 million to local Ukrainian NGOs, fueling their development.

The EEF’s network now includes over 500 organizations, a powerful support system for democratic institutions and Ukraine’s effective postwar recovery. No one understands the local context better than these NGOs, and no one is better equipped to address local needs and challenges.

Our support extends beyond grants (we recently surpassed the 1,000-grant milestone) to include training, mentoring, and organizational capacity assessments. The core idea behind all our grassroots projects is to strengthen the Ukrainian civil sector, encouraging small NGOs to operate independently. This is another key difference between an ecosystem and infrastructure: while infrastructure requires ongoing maintenance, an ecosystem, once it reaches a certain level of maturity, becomes self-sustaining.

In the decade ahead, EEF will continue to focus on strengthening the ecosystem we have built in Ukraine with the help of our partners and donors. After the war is won, Ukraine should serve as a model of success for other countries seeking to transition from hybrid or flawed regimes to fully democratic ones.

The notion that “democracies do not fight each other” may be debated. Meanwhile, research indicates a correlation between democracy and peace. Given this, the best way to ensure global security is to continue nurturing national ecosystems of democracy, leaving no room for autocracies to regain ground.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of East Europe Foundation. From 2005 to 2008, he was executive director of the Child Well-Being Fund Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Ukrainian State Center for Social Services for Youth (1996–2001) and for UNICEF (2000–2001). Follow him on X @LiakhVictor or LinkedIn.

Image: Monticello / Shutterstock.com.