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Red Cell

The chances that the Ukraine War will wind down are increasing, but how this might occur remains unclear. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently told the BBC that 2024 may see the end of “the hot stage” of the war. He added, “It doesn’t mean that all territories are won back by force. I think the power of diplomacy can help.” 

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has also vowed to end the Ukraine War within twenty-four hours if he is elected, while Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have reaffirmed Russian interest in negotiations so long as Russia’s territorial claims are recognized. Ukraine's top diplomat told his Chinese counterpart on a July 24 visit to Guangzhou on Wednesday that Kyiv was open to talks with Russia if Moscow was prepared to negotiate in good faith, obviously wanting Beijing to pressure Russia into dropping its preconditions. 

In a previous Red Cell, we outlined four potential endings for the Russo-Ukraine War: 

1) A frozen conflict would pose the highest risk for a sudden, new outbreak of fighting. 

2) A negotiated ceasefire would reduce the chances of fighting reoccurring, but it would require the endorsement of outside powers, international peacekeepers, and a demilitarized zone. If the ceasefire holds, it would become a basis for an armistice. 

3) A Korean-style armistice would likely take years to secure and would require the attainment of a ceasefire.

4) General peace settlements have been rare for conflicts since 1950 and would necessitate a wider settlement of Russia-NATO differences.

In all cases, Europe would need to step up to the plate quickly to ensure any lull or ceasefire is sustained, particularly if the United States under Trump distanced itself from playing a dominant role. Not since 1945 has the outlook for European security been so precarious. 

Frozen Conflict

Historically, a frozen conflict has been a preferred Russian tactic for preventing the spread of Western influence into areas of Russian power projection, particularly in places where Russian minorities have resided. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, Russians’ support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was a classic example of a frozen conflict. Low-level fighting never stopped, but the amount of territory conquered after the initial incursion slowed. 

In this scenario, a war of attrition would persist with reduced fighting and neither side gaining nor losing territory. At the same time, both would not be serious about negotiating a ceasefire because for Ukraine, such an agreement could de facto legitimize Russian gains, and for Russia, settling the conflict would increase the risk of Ukraine’s acquiring NATO membership. 

A frozen conflict could be fraught with the most risk for European security. A conflict seemingly without end would make it hard for European leaders to sustain their commitment to backing Ukraine militarily. According to a recent survey, most Europeans believe Ukraine is set to lose the war, and majorities in Greece, Hungary, and Italy believe that Kyiv should start negotiating with Moscow now. 

Many military analysts, including NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, are skeptical that the Europeans could fill the gap despite recent efforts to boost the capacity of European defense industries. The lack of reliable U.S. help would increase the urgency for Europeans to develop a common defense. However, integrating defense industrial bases to improve Europe’s military readiness in the future and reach needed capabilities would probably take a decade. 

Negotiated Ceasefire

Ukraine could feel forced to negotiate a formal ceasefire if any counteroffensive fails and/or Western military support diminishes. Should Ukraine be able to regain the upper hand, perhaps with more attacks inside Russia, Moscow might be more amenable to stopping the war, particularly if Putin thinks he must undertake more unpopular mobilizations and/or the economy tanks. 

Almost 50 percent of interstate conflicts end through a negotiated settlement, according to an academic survey of all conflicts that occurred from 1946 to 2005 by Joakim Kreutz. Most of these negotiated settlements are ceasefires. Only one-fifth of interstate conflicts end with one party being the victor. 

Ceasefires run the gamut between those that break down—sometimes in a matter of hours or days—and others that are more durable. One academic, Virgina Page Fortna, who used a database created in the Kreutz survey, has warned that for a ceasefire to endure, the following conditions must be in place: (1) sufficient incentives for adhering to the ceasefire; (2) a reduction of the uncertainty about the actions and intentions of others; and (3) means of controlling accidental violations. 

Fortna’s findings indicate that it is much harder for ceasefires to endure in cases where there is no clear victor, the two sides have a history of violence, and the very existence of one side is at stake. Although Fortna’s study was completed and published in 2003, her description of the biggest obstacles to peace delineates the major stumbling blocks to a Russo-Ukrainian ceasefire today. 

The Russian peace plan, which emanated from the Russo-Ukrainian talks held in Turkey during the early months of the war, suggests possible Russian terms for a ceasefire. The draft treaty declared Ukraine to be a permanent, neutral non-nuclear state. Ukraine would renounce its intention to join NATO, not allowing foreign military bases or troops on its soil. However, if Ukraine came under attack and requested assistance, all P-5 and other guarantor states would be obliged, following consultations with Ukraine and among themselves, to help Ukraine. Remarkably, these obligations were spelled out with much greater precision than NATO’s Article 5: “imposing a no-fly zone, supplying weapons, or directly intervening with the guarantor state’s own military force.” Russia would most likely require a U.S. and NATO agreement on these terms. 

Back in 2022, Russia was not necessarily opposed to Ukraine becoming an EU member and even made a significant concession: to discuss the status of Crimea with Kyiv in ten to fifteen years. Although territorial disputes are notoriously difficult to resolve, Russia’s willingness in this case indicates that some negotiation over Russian-held Ukrainian territory may not be out of the question. However, Putin would need to show the Russian people that his government was victorious, making major territorial concessions unlikely. 

Should Ukraine have to implore for ceasefire talks, Western powers could help mitigate the severity of Russian terms through concessions, such as removing some sanctions. As in the frozen conflict scenario, Ukraine and its supporters would worry that Russia would exploit a pause to reorganize its forces and restart its offensive. In Syria, Russia and the Bashar al-Assad regime did this repeatedly to “freeze the front when they needed an operational pause.” 

Should Russia break the ceasefire, NATO allies would need to be clear about their commitment to Ukraine’s defense. There are few cases of peace failing when an outside state(s) has explicitly underwritten the ceasefire, according to Fortna’s academic research. 

Peacekeepers from neutral, third-party countries, such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates, would need to monitor the peace and arbitrate disputes between Ukraine and Russia. In the Fortna study, there was a large and statistically significant difference between ceasefires overseen by a fresh set of international peacekeepers and those without the benefit of peacekeeping operations. The study demonstrated that the presence of monitors lengthens the duration of the peace. The creation of a fully demilitarized zone at least two kilometers wide or more running the full length of the ceasefire line also reduces the risk of any renewed conflict. 

Beyond a durable peace, Ukraine would need help from Bretton Woods institutions on reconstruction. For this, the ceasefire agreement would have to guarantee Ukraine’s and others’ access to shipping lanes in the Black Sea. For its part, Beijing has offered to provide substantial help once peace occurs. Not including China in a global reconstruction coalition would risk Beijing’s undermining conditionality with Belt and Road Initiative-type investment. 

To the extent that peace is secured over several years, it would give European states time to develop more strategic defense capabilities to stem further Russian aggression against Ukraine or other European countries and become less dependent on the United States. Beyond Trump and his weak support for NATO, recent Gallup polling shows a significant drop in the number of Americans wanting the U.S. to take a major role in world affairs. 

Armistice and Peace Settlement

If a ceasefire holds for a few years, it could set the stage for a formal armistice. In the Korean case, the Armistice talks began in July 1951 and were only concluded with an agreement two years later. According to the Fortna study, formalizing an already effective ceasefire agreement with an armistice by itself does not have any advantages for ensuring a durable peace. As with a peace treaty, neither Ukraine nor its Western backers would likely negotiate an armistice so long as Putin remains the leader of Russia.