Yemen’s Houthis began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea in mid-November 2023, asserting that their attacks aim to end the war in Gaza. These assaults have disrupted global shipping, prompting firms to reroute their vessels and undertake longer, more expensive journeys around southern Africa. In retaliation for the Houthis’ offensives in the Red Sea, the United States and the United Kingdom began striking Houthi infrastructure and weaponry in January to degrade their military capability. Since then, the Houthis have vowed to target ships associated with the United States and the UK (and Israel).

More and more reports are confirming that the Iranian-backed Houthis are engaging in extortion activities in the Red Sea, which contradicts their claim that their maritime campaign on international commercial shipping is in solidarity with the Palestinians amid the Israel-Hamas war. Besides the significant costs the Houthis’ attacks are inflicting on global commerce, conducting piracy and accepting ransom money are negative developments and pose an additional threat to commercial shipping in the area. This also suggests that the Houthis might continue their assault campaign on commercial shipping in the Red Sea even after the Gaza war eventually ends. 

A powerful case in point evidencing the Houthis’ involvement in financial extortion as part of their ongoing assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea is their recent assault on the Rubymar ship and the circumstances surrounding its sinking. Several days ago, veteran Lebanese journalist Ali Hamade revealed in a podcast episode that the owners of the Rubymar’s cargo, who are Lebanese, told him they have been negotiating with the Houthis since the attack on the Rubymar to prevent it from sinking in exchange for paying ransom money. Hamade explained he would not disclose the names of the Lebanese merchants at their request because they are concerned that publicizing their names would affect anticipated negotiations with the Houthis regarding future shipping business in the Red Sea.  

The Rubymar was transiting the Red Sea heading to Bulgaria from the United Arab Emirates on February 18 when the Houthis hit it with an anti-ship ballistic missile. The Rubymar sank in the Red Sea on March 2 after nearly two weeks of taking on water, having suffered extensive damage from the Houthi strike. Its sinking made headlines given that it was the first ship to sink in the Gulf of Aden in the Red Sea as a result of Houthi strikes—unlike most Houthi-targeted ships, which incurred minimal damage—and more seriously considering its sinking cargo consisted of 21,000 metric tons of hazardous fertilizer, with catastrophic consequences for the environment and marine ecosystem. 

The Rubymar’s targeting became a contentious matter due to its nationality because the Houthis claimed they are currently launching attacks at ships linked to Israel, the United States, and the UK. Particularly, the Houthis announced that the attack on the Rubymar was also in retaliation for recent U.S. and UK strikes against Houthi military targets. They claimed that the Rubymar was a British-owned vessel, apparently based on incorrect data, while the Washington Post cited a spokesperson with the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office stating it was managed by a Lebanese company and owned by an entity registered in the Marshall Islands. However, while the issue of the Rubymar’s nationality garnered substantial media coverage, Lloyd’s List revealed that the Rubymar’s only UK link was its insurance by a UK company, which was based on outdated ownership records in public databases linking the Rubymar to a residential flat in Southampton, England. According to Lloyd’s List, the Rubymar was ultimately owned and controlled by the Chahadah family from Lebanon. However, most analyses by the media or intelligence companies did not elaborate on the ownership of the fertilizer cargo itself, which Hamade revealed while not naming the merchants.

In attestation to Hamade’s account and further indication of Houthi piracy, there have been various reports that the Rubymar was involved in another incident that inflicted further damage on the ship. According to a statement by the Yemeni Foreign Ministry on March 1, as Yemeni authorities were working to rescue the affected the Rubymar, a boat carrying Yemeni fishermen was hit by airstrikes on February 29, which killed two fishermen and disappeared several others, in addition to additionally damaging the Rubymar. Relatedly, the British maritime security firm Ambrey, stated it had received several reports of another incident pertaining to the Rubymar where multiple Yemenis were reportedly harmed. While these reports did not name the perpetrators of the strikes against the fishermen and the Rubymar, they strongly suggest that the Houthis may have been involved in precipitating its sinking. 

More blatantly, it is worth mentioning that the head of the Houthi revolutionary committee, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, sought to deflect any blame from the Houthis for the Rubymar’s imminent sinking. Instead, he blamed British prime minister Rishi Sunak and the UK government for the disaster because of their support for the war on Gaza. In two consecutive posts, al-Houthi conditioned the permission for rescue efforts to recover the Rubymar on Britain’s allowing aid trucks to Gaza, while dubiously framing it as an ongoing offer. By restricting any rescue operation from entering the area, such statements corroborate the likelihood that the Houthis sunk the Rubymar. Very tellingly, while a search through al-Houthi’s posts on X (formerly Twitter) did not identify such a post, a Yemeni journalist reported that al-Houthi posted on X prior to the Rubymar’s sinking: “pay and we will let you rescue the ship before sinking it.”  

Suspicions have also arisen regarding a possible alliance between Somali pirates and the Houthis amid a resurgence in Somali piracy on Africa’s east coast in the wake of the Houthis’ ongoing disruption of maritime security. Media reports indicate that several Somali pirates hijacked a Maltese-flagged cargo ship in December in the Arabian Sea, which was en route from Singapore to Turkey. Subsequently, vessel tracking showed the ship heading toward the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, leading into the Red Sea, prompting experts to suspect collaboration between Somali pirates and Houthi militants. Generally, Somalia has witnessed several piracy assaults off its coast since the Houthis initiated their attacks in November 2023. Should this potential alliance prove true, it is likely the Houthis would receive a share of the ransom money from the Somali pirates in exchange for providing protection. 

The body-camera-footage-style imagery of the Houthi helicopter raid on the Japanese-owned, Israeli-linked Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea in November 2023 is the earliest undeniable instance of sophisticated piracy. The Houthis continue to hold the ship’s crew captive.

In February, the U.S. Department of State condemned the Houthis’ attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, labeling these actions as piracy and specifically referencing the continued detainment of the Galaxy Leader’s crew as hostages by the Houthis. Legally, under international law, the Houthis’ attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea could be classified as piracy.

While Hamade reported that the Houthis had demanded extortion money from other ships affected by their maritime assault campaign, noting these piracy attempts targeted vessels of all nationalities, he did not provide further details, such as the names of the affected vessels or information about their owners or operators.

On a final note, as observed by many maritime experts, establishing a ship’s ownership and nationality is complex, as a vessel may sail under one country’s flag, be operated by an entity based in another, and be owned by a different country’s entity. The Houthis are likely aware of this complexity and could exploit it to their advantage.

Rany Ballout is a New York-based political risk and due diligence analyst with extensive experience in the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Montreal in Canada and a bachelor’s degree in Linguistics from Uppsala University in Sweden.

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