A barrage of post-mortem analyses have sought to investigate the stunning collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. However, key details remain unreported, and misconceptions are beginning to circulate regarding the opposition forces involved and the timeline of events. Unlocking the black box of Syria’s information space is critical as international stakeholders work with local Syrian actors in support of a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned transition that stabilizes the country.

Who Participated in the Rebel Offensive?

For months, opposition forces designed a politico-military campaign to topple Assad and drive Iran-backed militias out of Syria. Thus far, international media has primarily focused on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), who is actively working toward rehabilitation and removal of his sanctions designations. Al-Sharaa is currently leading a caretaker government in Damascus for three months.

Multiple factions—including the opposition’s elite units—not only contributed to the offensive but spearheaded the operation. These forces, long mired in internal strife, were restructured multiple times and operate today in a decentralized but coordinated fashion with assigned “Areas of Responsibility.”

The attacking factions consisted of groups that may have been vetted, trained, and equipped between 2013 and 2017 under the Central Intelligence Agency’s Operation Timber Sycamore. These groups include the Zenki movement and Jaish al-Ezza, battle-hardened and experienced factions. Additionally, Jabha al-Shamiya (SNA’s third legion) led special operations, supervised drone attacks, and conducted peacekeeping efforts. Jabha al-Shamiya also embedded along the frontlines to secure liberated areas and deliver messages of peace to locals.

A Timeline Of Assad’s Final Days 

The “Deterrence of Aggression” offensive began on November 27 with the originally stated goal of deterring Russian airstrikes against civilians, expelling Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) proxies, and ending transnational criminal organizations. Ankara downplayed the situation ahead of the attack, arguing to Russia and Iran that military movements were part of normal training exercises and re-organizing efforts.

As the attack on Aleppo unfolded, many believed the strong Iranian presence in the governorate’s northwest would prevent Aleppo city’s fall. However, within the operation’s first twenty-four hours, attacking forces controlled the strategic 46th regiment in eastern Aleppo.

Assad flew to Moscow in response, reportedly to attend his son’s graduation, but probably with the intent to take his family to safety while searching for political support. Following talks, Russia chose to back emergency meetings at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—avoiding broader support actions.

Assad also called Arab leaders, searching for political cover under the Arab League Contact Group. Most leaders refused to publicize their calls due to his prior intransigence and the visible collapse of his army. Only Iraq offered support, quickly dispatching its defense minister to the Syrian border, signaling its readiness to interfere in Syria on anti-terrorism grounds. The Palestinian Authority supported an emergency Arab League meeting.

The speed of developments inside Syria stymied both efforts. Opposition forces took western Aleppo, capturing the military academy and forcing the regime rank-and-file to flee to the southeastern Aleppo stronghold in Sfeira. De facto IRGC-Quds Force head in Syria Abdullah Nizam ordered Iranian militias to evacuate in the same direction, subsequently fleeing through Khanaser-Damascus. Most of Aleppo city fell within forty-eight hours after the rebel operation began.

According to diplomatic sources who spoke on condition of anonymity, by December 1, Assad was advised to return to Damascus in the hope that his presence would halt his army’s collapse and opposition advances in Hama and Homs—both strategic logistics hubs for Russia and Hezbollah.

On December 3, Jordan’s King Abdullah II flew to Brussels to brief a NATO foreign ministers meeting, requesting urgent assistance. In parallel, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi lobbied to hold an extraordinary Arab League meeting in Cairo, to no avail. Meanwhile, Russia used its influence over UNSC non-permanent members to convene an emergency meeting intended to help the regime spread fears of terrorism through its disinformation campaign.

As December’s UNSC chair, the United States invited White Helmets Director Raed Al-Saleh under Rule 39 of the council’s procedure. Understanding the risk to their disinformation campaign, Moscow forced a failed pre-session vote to block Saleh’s testimony. While Russia and Syria attempted to push the usual terrorism lines using UNSC Resolutions 2170 and 2178, Al-Saleh pushed back, pronouncing, “the representatives of the chemical regime do not belong in the Security Council. They belong in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against the Syrian people over the past 14 years.” This deflated Russia’s efforts in the council, cutting any would-be support for Assad that could have stemmed from fear of destabilization in Syria.

Opposition forces captured the 87th Brigade in Hama on December 4, leading Assad to recognize his fate and begin evacuating his inner circle to Moscow, Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, Beirut, and Benghazi, according to informed local sources and corroborated with extensive signal analysis. However, he continued to insist on calls with local and external stakeholders, arguing the Syrian Army’s 25th and 11th divisions would hold for months. According to sources, the Jordanian, Egyptian, and Italian intelligence chiefs called Assad’s close advisor Ali Mamlouk and Syrian intelligence chief Hussam Louqa multiple times, who provided similar assurances until they could no longer be reached on December 6.

Eyes turned toward Doha, where key decision-makers were attending the Doha Forum. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s participation was only confirmed the night before, following a call with U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken. While the trilateral meeting drew considerable attention, the Astana process was dead, with key stakeholders understanding Assad’s fate. According to diplomatic sources with knowledge of the situation, Lavrov’s meetings with the Qatari emir and the Turkish foreign minister were meant to seek assurances that Russian forces would not be attacked and to “facilitate” Assad’s safe passage to Moscow.

Assad left Damascus for Khmeimim by December 7, according to multiple diplomatic sources. He was extracted to Moscow aboard a Russian airplane crossing Turkish airspace on December 8. His brother Maher reportedly boarded an IRGC plane for Baghdad and then Russia (although the Iraqi government has denied that he entered the country), with his escape marking the definitive end of the Assad family’s dynastic rule.

The Dictator Has Fallen 

The soft liberation of Syria—namely, the outspoken and widespread support for revolution as the opposition advanced—speaks to the former regime’s weakness and Assad’s shaky relationship with Syrian society. Ultimately, this timeline highlights that precarious position—one that increasingly became a liability for his international backers instead of a means of achieving their goals in Syria. The regime opted to bite the hand that fed it, alongside everyone else, for years to its downfall.

The opposition’s organization, coupled with the weakening of Assad’s partners inside and outside of Syria, appears to have broken the so-called “frozen” conflict. Russia could no longer project power amid its war on Ukraine. Iran’s proxies were rendered irrelevant due to Israel crippling their capacity to extend support to its Syrian ally.

As a result, Syrians have a rare opportunity to rebuild their country in line with UNSCR 2254. For this process to succeed, it must be Syrian-led and Syrian-owned—should international actors actually allow that to happen. Regional states, in particular, must end their zero-sum national security thinking and adopt pragmatic policies that support Syrian aspirations and not merely narrow, near-sighted national interests.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.

Image: John Wreford / Shutterstock.com.