Analysis of Russian media confirms that Patrushev’s clout is circumscribed. In transcripts of Kremlin meetings, Nikolai Patrushev’s name comes towards the end. An arch-conservative, Nikolai Patrushev possesses none of the charisma of politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Dmitry Rogozin. His limited media presence serves to diminish his stature further. On TV, viewers know Patrushev only from sporadic statements uttered in a curt, dour tone. Nikolai Patrushev is habitually seen isolated, reading his announcements from paper. Importantly, his utterances are rarely integrated into the main messaging of TV coverage.

This contrasts sharply with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin or Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Several times a week, fawning TV news coverage portrays these figures as tackling day-to-day issues in stage-managed settings. As opposed to Putin, Anna Putina, Sobyanin, Mishustin, Kirienko, Kadyrov, and many other figures, Patrushev has no media persona. After over twenty years, little is known about the man and his private life. Among the public, he has no fans or followers.

Despite (and assuredly because of) his lack of charisma, Patrushev has amassed substantial power—a power that derives exclusively from Putin’s personal trust. Putin was confident enough to step down as president in 2007 in part because he knew Patrushev would rein in any attempt by Medvedev to become a genuine, independent president. During medical operations, COVID isolation, and wartime personal security fears, Putin entrusted Patrushev with the reins of power. Since Putin and Patrushev are rarely seen in physical proximity, it can be assumed that Patrushev functions as a “designated survivor” in case of catastrophe. Due to the Russian military’s poor performance and the paramilitary groups’ uncertain loyalties, Patrushev has probably accumulated more authority. Yet, whether this power—a power so intimately connected to the person of the president—can survive his death and succession is an open and perhaps fatal question.

Dmitry Patrushev: The Kremlin’s Whipping Boy

In Putin’s early years, Dmitry (Dima) Patrushev followed the path of other service princelings. Instead of studying abroad, he attended closed institutions like the State Management University, the Diplomatic Academy, and the FSB Academy. Perhaps due to the “Three Whales” scandal, Nikolai Patrushev was unable to open a career for his son at the FSB. Instead, Patrushev Jr. had a clumsy doctoral dissertation defended under his name. Full of plagiarism, misspellings, and improper citations, his dissertation was completed at the Saint Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance, a bastion of the Yeltsin-era oligarch Peter Aven. Patrushev Jr.’s work soon appeared online, where it was widely mocked. 

Dmitry (along with his brother Andrei) soon assumed cushy and lucrative “management” posts at various banks, as well as at Gazprom and Lukoil. During this time, Patrushev had a limited domestic and international profile. In 2015, he was named “Banker of the Year” despite the agricultural bank accumulating record debts. How he obtained the initial capital to become a dominant investor in such endeavors has never been explained, but its parameters are not hard to imagine.

When Putin came to power, it was assumed that oil and gas would be Russia’s geopolitical ace in the hole. Putin made no secret that he could crush “color revolutions” with this natural-resource bat. But under the management of Patrushev, Fradkov, Sechin, and other Putin cronies and their offspring, Russia missed out on the fracking revolution and the switch to renewable energy. This turned out to be an enormous blunder.

In the meantime, far from the scrutiny of the FSB, Russia’s freewheeling agriculture was flourishing, especially in 2014 when, in response to Western sanctions, Russia imposed a ban on European food imports. This boosted domestic agriculture by providing significant tax breaks and state investments. As opposed to the fracking blunder, the Russian agricultural sector has been a significant revenue generator for the Russian economy for the last ten years, not to mention food for its citizens.

In the Soviet era, an appointment as Minister of Agriculture was a kind of domestic exile for Kremlin elites. Mikhail Gorbachev was a notable exception as he was brought to Moscow from his native Krasnodar in 1978 to Moscow as Minister of Agriculture. Nor was it his job performance there that impressed some of his Kremlin colleagues as food production continued to worsen despite huge investments. 

Dmitry Patrushev became Minister of Agriculture in 2018. Besides VTB Bank, in 2010, Patrushev assumed management of the Russian Agricultural Bank. Among his first acts was dealing harshly with transport worker strikes. He rapidly moved to centralize agricultural exports, which had the potential to replace oil and gas as sources of foreign cash and geopolitical influence. Patrushev, together with local elites, focused on creating a new political base for Putin. Dmitry proclaimed: “The village should become a new economic center of Russia, a “place of power for entrepreneurs, an area where investments and advanced technologies are concentrated.” According to Patrushev, the state should make the central decisions on grain production: the United Grain Company must not be privatized. 

From 2017 until the present, the Russian media (usually towards the end of daily news broadcasts) occasionally covers short pronouncements from the Agricultural Minister. Awkwardly, he makes no mention of his father. In 2017, in a widely mocked speech, Patrushev gave a rambling promise to return the agricultural bank to profit. In 2018, Patrushev promised that he would “rationalize” grain exports so that a “sufficient” amount could remain for domestic consumption. Echoing Lenin, Dmitry Patrushev proclaimed that Agricultural cooperatives must work hand-in-hand with the state. In 2019, Patrushev tried to institute a system of strict state monitoring “from raw production to the store shelf.” 

During Covid, Patrushev began to appear slightly more often in the media. On July 7, 2020, he assured the public that even with self-isolation measures, agricultural enterprises “will not stop their work even for a day.” Patrushev has engaged in fleeting attempts to create his own PR base, for example, working with the obscure regional media firm TiumenMedia.

Being Minister of Agriculture has many downsides. Frequently, Dmitry is forced to explain the rising prices of potatoes, chicken, and eggs. As minister, he banned the fishing of threatened species, a move sure to alienate provincial sentiment. Another headache has been the inability of farmers to receive specialized seeds from Western companies. During the war, in 2022, Patrushev was “requesting” that farmers “voluntarily” lower their prices to deal with the effects of Western sanctions. On TV, viewers usually see Patrushev alone and isolated. 

His closest connection seems to be with the Don Region. One of the few friendly figures he is seen with is Veniamin Kondratyev, governor of Krasnodar Krai.

In one rare exception to this apparent isolation, Patrushev played the part of an anointed prince. On May 12, 2023, Russian TV viewers saw Dmitry Patrushev and Ramzan Kadyrov open a new fish hatchery in Chechnya. Presumably, Patrushev was dispatched to conduct off-line talks with the fearsome Chechen strongman during a tumultuous time for the “special operation” in Ukraine. 

This version of events is supported by a subsequent Vesti news report aired on May 18, 2023, when TV viewers glimpsed Vladimir Putin meeting alone with Dmitry Patrushev while conducting a state meeting by video conference. This unusual scene suggests that Putin trusts Dmitry over others and entrusts him with special assignments, such as conveying confidential messages from Kadyrov. 

Nonetheless, Dmitry’s clout seems limited. In cabinet meetings, Dmitry Patrushev is usually seated at the far end of the table, in the twenty-first place. From body language, it’s clear others do not like him. Indeed, for an agricultural minister, he cuts an awkward figure. He is stiff, wears a business suit, and has a passing resemblance to Hunter Biden, a bête noire of Russian propaganda. Even the heavily censored Russian press notes that he lacks experience in agriculture. Officially, he is a bachelor and has an unusually high declared income. According to media leaks, he supports two wives and lives in a baronial mansion. Since this kompromat appears on top of a Yandex search, it’s safe to assume he has enemies in the Kremlin. This animosity boiled onto the parliamentary floor when the matronly Senate chair, Valentina Matvienko, cut him off during a meeting. It was a savage takedown demonstrating the power and wrath of Matvienko, who has not been shy in her open criticism. The timing of this Federation Council was significant as it was just after Putin had called for the partial mobilization and the recognition of the four Ukrainian Oblasts as territory of the Russian Federation. Why criticize Patrushev, then? It is hard to say for sure, but as Russia was entering winter during a war, politicians wanted to be viewed as especially attentive to the population’s food needs. Judging by this ham-handed media rollout, it’s hard to see Dmitry Patrushev as an anointed successor.

Bad Blood

Over the decades, Nikolai Partushev has accumulated bad blood among the elites. Indeed, it’s doubtful that the Patrushev clan could unite even the intelligence services, the warriors, and the traders. But even if Nikolai could, Russia’s oligarchs would fear a vindictive Patrushev in the highest position of power and able to go after anybody whom he wants. This would cause a split (Roskol) among the elite. In particular, it’s not clear why regional kingpins, notably Ramzan Kadyrov, would fall in line behind Patrushev. Moreover, neither Nikolai nor Dmitry Patrushev has a media presence or popular following. Finally, a Patrushev succession would face blowback from the technical and financial cadres.