Japan is also strengthening its historically strong economic ties with Southeast Asia, which researcher Malcolm Cook believes is a “Second Wave” of foreign direct investment in the region, due in part to concerns about overconcentration of overseas production in China. Violent anti-Japanese riots at Chinese factories in the wake of the Senkakus’ nationalization likely factors into investment decisions. Such investment and aid can serve multiple strategic purposes, such as a $6B aid and trade deal with Bangladesh. In addition to funding infrastructure, including a deep-sea terminal and industrial park exclusively for Japanese investors, the package also removed Bangladesh as a rival candidate for a temporary seat on the UN Security Council.

For their part, Southeast Asian nations have been driven into closer cooperation with the United States and Japan less as a result of actions in the East China Sea than China’s behavior closer to home. These have been exemplified by China’s parking of an oil rig in Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for two months this summer; its forcible tactics in contesting control over ownership of reefs, shoals and islands; and the capability buildup on those it already controls. Yet the tactics and actions China unveils in the East China Sea, such as the no-notice declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) last December and the threatened use of a flood of fishing vessels cannot help but have raised concern for their replication elsewhere.

A Measure of Success

While the nationalization of the Senkakus and Chinese response may have encouraged Japan’s embrace of certain rebalance initiatives, Japan has elsewhere been more reluctant, most notably in talks over the TPP, where its tariffs and market restrictions have been some of the greatest sticking points. Nor does Japan’s partnership on strategic aspects of the rebalance mean that the United States is succeeding in accomplishing its ultimate strategic objective: stability. As Carl Thayer argues, “territorial disputes in East Asia pose a risk for U.S. alliance management and the U.S. strategy of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific.” This is true not only of the Senkakus, but also Japan’s spat with South Korea over their control of the Dokdo islets (Takeshima to Japan) and with Russia over its control of the South Kuril Islands (Northern Territories to Japan). While the fallout from the Senkakus’ nationalization certainly didn’t cause these conflicts, some of the resultant nationalist fervor among Japan’s leaders has generated severe challenges in the country’s relations with its World War II victims, China and South Korea, through revisionist gestures.

The China analyst notes another trade-off: “On one hand, reinforcing alliances is a key pillar of the rebalance. On the other hand, a second key pillar is improving ties with China, and here the East China Sea problem has hurt the rebalance.” It is this second pillar that is the hardest to achieve without sacrificing the others.

As much as China has admonished the United States as the source of instability in the region, Washington has encouraged its partners and allies to use peaceful means of conflict resolution, with the decision to nationalize the Senkakus arguably an exception. China has meanwhile repeatedly engaged in unilateral and controversial actions, seeming at times to not care what its neighbors think.

But there are signs a ratcheting down of tension of the conflict in the East China Sea at least may be at hand. Japan, which has until now refused to acknowledge that the Senkakus are subject to an ongoing territorial dispute, has reportedly agreed to the concession, at least privately. In exchange for doing so, and thereby lending a modicum of legitimacy to China’s rights to press its claims, Abe will supposedly be able to meet with Xi on the sidelines of November’s APEC summit in another echo of U.S. action. Both sides may at last calculate that there is more to be gained by combating growing economic malaise than posturing at combating each other. A further indication that the timing is right is that despite a visit by three of his cabinet members and an offering sent on his behalf to the Yasukuni shrine, Abe was still able to meet Chinese premier Li Keqiang at an Asia-Europe summit in Milan, which augers well for the prospects of a Xi-Abe meeting.

While positive signs and first steps, a private acknowledgment and symbolic chat will not by themselves result in a permanent settlement or lasting defusing of regional tension. But Japan’s acknowledgment of the dispute does open one route to such a solution: submission of the dispute to an international tribunal. That China would not likely support adjudication of its claim in the East China Sea through a tribunal (it has not, after all, itself filed for arbitration) highlights the challenge of pursuing regional stability through cordial relations with a China that can appear to, but must not be allowed to, require the abandonment of respect for the rule of law as the price of friendship. Japan’s decision to so far not file may be a calculation that doing so would inflame the situation anew, although cynics can rightly say that this hasn’t been the government position.

While no firm verdict on the rebalance will be in by November, it’s clear that a set of decisions two years ago greatly impacted both its successes and challenges. Given the importance of the region for America’s national interest in the years to come, it’s also clear the rebalance is an effort worth the time and energy to help ensure its success. The flare-up of tensions over the Senkakus, not caused by the rebalance, should not be the most important shaper of its legacy.

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founder and president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. The views expressed in this article are his alone and are not official positions of any of his affiliated organizations.

[1] The difficulty is compounded by reports that the seller both wanted to sell to Ishihara for his nationalist views and financially needed to sell. Finding an alternative, less nationalistic “private” buyer—perhaps an ecological foundation—might have provided an option, but it too would have relied upon the owner’s willingness to sell to that buyer and the buyer’s willingness to foot the bill, and gambled on the Chinese response.

Image: Flickr/Al Jazeera English/CC by-sa 2.0