A Quad Approach to Strategic Ambiguity

America’s position of “strategic ambiguity” has been improbably effective at deterring cross-strait violence for decades. While the policy has long been criticized for its failure to reassure Taiwan of America’s unequivocal commitment to its independence, it has prevented Beijing from acting on its incessant desire to wrest control of the island.

As the China threat to Taiwan has grown more menacing, numerous calls have come domestically for America to shed its opaque policy in favor of “strategic clarity.” That would be a colossal mistake. Such a move would force Beijing into a corner: either order the PLA to reunify Taiwan with the mainland or accept American efforts to shore up Taiwanese sovereignty incrementally. If the CCP chooses the former, then America becomes caught in a Catch-22: if it intervenes militarily, then it will likely fail; if it fails to intervene, then it will lose all credibility in the region, with allies and adversaries alike. Strategic clarity will not keep Taiwan free and open for long. The solution lies in a heightened form of ambiguity.

In place of an existing position on Taiwan, the Quad’s heads of state should consider adopting America’s position of strategic ambiguity. A communal consensus on strategic ambiguity would raise the stakes for Beijing while maintaining the status quo across the strait. Defining its common stance on Taiwan by an ill-defined military response requires no commitment from the Quad but leaves China with the ultimate conundrum. The PLA has the far more complex task of seizing and controlling contested territory rather than simply denying it to an adversary. Increased uncertainty surrounding Japan, India, and Australia’s decision-making would complicate this task exponentially. Instead of planning for the known possibility that America would commit its military might, the PLA would have to contend with the prospect that up to three, or at minimum, one additional military force could enter the fight. This added layer of obscurity would undoubtedly give the CCP an unwelcome level of pause surrounding the PLA’s likelihood of success.

Nicholas Hanson is a Mission Leader at Vannevar Labs. He is a class of 2024 joint degree MPP and MBA candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the Harvard Business School. He is a former intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps and served the entirety of his military career in the United States Indo-Pacific Command.

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