After Iran’s second direct missile attack on Israel in less than six months, all eyes are on Israel’s next move. Reports suggest that Jerusalem plans a massive revenge that might include striking Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities and other strategic sites. Tehran has said that in that sort of development, it will retaliate in kind. If so, a soft landing out of this latest crisis might not be possible. In April, the last time Iran and Israel engaged in a high-risk round of tit-for-tat, both sides quickly opted to stand down, perhaps motivated by President Biden, who urged Israel to “take the win” and move on. It remains to be seen if de-escalation will be possible on this occasion.

But one thing is clear. The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is putting pressure on Tehran to choose between its ideological resistance to Israel’s right to exist and the core national interests of Iran, which are not linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But Israel does not expect Tehran to stand down. In his latest message to the Iranian people, Netanyahu vowed that Iran will be free from the Islamist regime “sooner than people think,” a statement that the Iranian leadership will interpret as Israel preparing to go for the regime’s jugular. In short, since October of last year, Tehran has wanted to stick its long game of squeezing Israel to exhaustion through a protracted war of attrition with Iran’s Arab proxies. Still, the Israelis are throwing a spanner in the works and hope to derail Tehran’s plans.

Why Iran Struck Again

During the one year since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Iran and Israel engaged in a cycle of tactical escalation in the hope of de-escalating on a strategic level. Among other things, Iran’s top proxy ally, Hezbollah in Lebanon, began to fire missiles at northern Israel. To stop its attacks, Hezbollah demanded Israel end its operations against Hamas in Gaza. The masterminds in Iran, the chief sponsor of both militant groups, were using one member of the Axis of Resistance to save another. But Israel opted not to play.

Not only has Jerusalem refused to link its military operations in Gaza to its demand that Hezbollah cease firing missiles at Israel, but it opted to go on the offensive that took Tehran by surprise. From the April attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July to the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah last week, Jerusalem crossed one Iranian red line after another. As was the case in Iran’s retaliation in April, a reluctant Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei felt compelled to respond despite his deep misgivings about engaging the Israelis in a direct conflict.

In Khamenei’s mind, Jerusalem has set a trap for Tehran to force retaliation in the hope that it would broaden the conflict and drag in the United States, an outcome Tehran wants to avoid. And yet, Khamenei approved the second volley of missiles at Israel. A number of factors played a role. Iran needed to regain the respect of Arab militant groups—most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon—within the Axis of Resistance and answer the call of hardliners in Tehran for revenge. After all, Israel has killed thousands of members of the Axis of Resistance in the last few years, including dozens of senior members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.

But Tehran’s main objective in the latest missile strike is precisely what Iran claims it to be: re-create deterrence and give Jerusalem reason to think twice before contemplating a strike at the Iranian homeland. This is what officials in Tehran consider the natural trajectory of events as Israel heaps pressure on Iran. Only time and events will show if Iran has managed to deter Israel.  

Tehran Can’t Have It Both Ways

There are two main reasons why Iran is hoping to have deterred Israel for now, even as the world anticipates Israel’s response. In the short term, the Iranian leadership needs to put its house in order. The Israelis have proven again and again that they have intelligence superiority and have infiltrated not only Iran but also its proxy groups of Iran across the Middle East. To figure out how Israel manages to pull off one pinpointed strike after another requires time for Iranian authorities to first do some serious weeding out of Israeli agents.

In this rapidly expanding conflict with Israel, there is not much space for error by Tehran. The Islamic Republic spent billions of dollars to build up Hezbollah’s military capabilities, only to see the organization badly wrecked after a few weeks of intense Israeli action. The lesson for Tehran is to avoid overreach at any cost, at least in the short term.

The second reason for Iran to avoid war relates to the elephant in the room; the regime in Tehran, by most accounts, faces stiff opposition from the Iranian public. They hold the regime in Tehran responsible for bringing the country to the brink of a new war. Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have followed a foreign policy agenda that has isolated Iran and decimated its economy over the last three decades.

Admitting these facts and promising to change course was the motto of the new Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on his recent visit to New York. It is hardly a secret that Khamenei supported Pezeshkian’s bid for the presidency with the hope that he could reduce tensions with the West, negotiate a new nuclear agreement, and achieve sanctions relief, which Iran’s economy badly needs.

But what Khamenei has never accepted in practice is that any Iranian olive branch in the nuclear arena is unlikely to result in meaningful détente with the West as long as Tehran continues to see the end of Israel as a core item on its regional agenda. This is the painful choice the regime in Tehran faces, and it will not go away even if the latest round of tensions somehow miraculously wraps up without a wider regional conflict.

About the Author

Alex Vatanka is the director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute. His most recent book is The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran: The United States, Foreign Policy, and Political Rivalry Since 1979.

Image: Creative Commons.