Since 1988, Khamenei has given Raisi ample opportunities to build up his credentials in a way that would make him a viable successor. Raisi has served as prosecutor general, chief justice of the judiciary, head of the multibillion-dollar Astan-e Quds Razavi charitable foundation in eastern Iran, and member of the Assembly of Experts: all positions of high importance, which have made him the target of speculation as a potential leader-in-waiting for years. When Raisi lost the 2017 presidential election to Hasan Rouhani, some analysts began to write off his succession. However, now that he made it to the presidency, his status as a frontrunner for the supreme leader’s job will only increase.

To be sure, there are other hardliners with both ideologically strong backgrounds and a high degree of clerical legitimacy, notably ayatollahs Ahmad Khatami and Ahmad Jannati. Both have served as Friday prayer leaders, as well as high-profile members of the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. Yet neither has the strong bureaucratic leadership resume of Raisi. Importantly, during the 2021 presidential election Raisi embraced some social reformist concepts, including the loosening of morality enforcement on the streets, and a commitment to fight domestic violence, positions that would make him more appealing to more moderates than many other well-known hardliners in the regime.

Yet even if Raisi ascends to the leadership role; and even if the United States manages to begin some relationship with his administration, it does not mean that Iran will change its tone or policy toward the United States. In fact, it is easy to interpret Raisi’s rise as the regime’s doubling-down on its brand of “principlist” anti-Americanism.

There is reason to believe, however, that a new supreme leader could pivot in ways that Khamenei could not, due to path dependence and fear of being proven wrong, or of being compared unfavorably to his predecessor, Khomeini. It is possible the third supreme leader will be far enough away from the founding leader that he will have some ability to pivot, especially in the face of mounting and unsustainable structural pressures.

Why Iran Needs to Pivot Soon

The next supreme leader’s personality notwithstanding, there are structural reasons to claim that now, more than ever, Iran needs to pivot. The political conditions on the ground following the Arab Spring have shifted regional attitudes about Iranian influence in the region, and this has made the country the most vulnerable of any time since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

During the period immediately following the 2000 Palestinian uprising (intifada) and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran had been able to harness rampant anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment for its own benefit. While many Arab regimes had been wary of Iran, especially since the 1979 revolution, the Arab publics were generally warm toward Iran’s expansion of influence, so long as this influence was used to oppose the United States and Israel. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad over the last three decades, and historically, this had been a source of popularity.

A culmination of Iran’s power projection efforts was the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, which saw Iranian-made missiles rain down on Israel from Hezbollah-controlled parts of Lebanon in a manner than made many Arabs feel pride in what had otherwise been a largely one-sided history of Arab-Israeli military conflicts.

By 2008, a Zogby poll showed that, among Arabs, the three most admired political leaders at the time were Hasan Nasrallah (the leader of Hezbollah), Bashar al-Assad (the president of Syria), and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (then president of Iran). What all three leaders had in common was their association with Iranian power, and their use of this power to fight Israel.

Popular support for Iran even translated into overall Arab acquiescence to Iran’s nuclear program—a nightmare for neighboring regimes that were not keen to see Iran become a nuclear state.

This all changed during the Arab Spring protests of 2011, and the brutality that Assad—flush with billions of dollars of aid and credit from Iran—showed toward his own people. As a result, Arab views on Iran soured. A 2019-2020 Zogby poll found that a majority of respondents now had an unfavorable view of Iran and its policies in the region. With Israel recently opening up relations with the United Arab Emirates and moving toward a closer relationship to Iran’s biggest enemy—Saudi Arabia—the Islamic Republic’s insecurity will only increase.

Domestically, Iran must also face down its economic malaise. The country is in dire need of foreign direct investment, the kind which can only come with better relations with the rest of the world. Iran’s average GDP growth over the last forty years has only been 2 percent—far below the 8 percent and up it would need to bring down endemic youth unemployment, which threatens internal political stability.

Iran’s first entrance into the JCPOA, back in 2015, had also been fueled by a need to alleviate the pain of sanctions, which had “cost Iran $160 billion in oil revenues [from 2012 to 2015], and reduced its GDP by 9 percent in the two years ending in March 2014.” Even after some sanctions were lifted, Iran’s precarious economic state led to widespread economic protests in 2017-2018, and then again in 2019, in response to fuel subsidy cuts.

Despite the current supreme leader’s consolidated anti-American stance, he has allowed elected presidents to strike a deal with America and the other great powers. A new supreme leader will have fewer structural constraints to deal with America, and much more to gain from opening up.

Conclusion

As many analysts stress, Iran has repeatedly put ideology over pragmatism, given the Islamic identity that props up the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Yet commitment to ideology need not mean an unwillingness to make concessions or work with a stated enemy, as Mao Zedong showed in his normalization of diplomatic relations with America in 1972.

Iran, too, understands the limits of its own ideology, as well as the strategic opportunities that diplomacy can offer. Khomeini famously pronounced that government is “one of the primary rulings of Islam” (ehkaam-e avaliye), and as such can do what it must to carry out its duties—including demolishing mosques, suspending prayer, or preventing pilgrimage, and other essential Muslim duties. Arguably, the Islamic Republic’s willingness to negotiate with America during its important moments in its history—from the release of hostages in 1981, to the Iran-Contra Affair, to the JCPOA—is a testament to Iran’s recognition of the limits of its own power and ideology.

The United States and the other great powers working to strike a deal with Iran must not lose sight of the most important element of the process: establishing a channel of communication with what very well could be the next supreme leader of Iran; one whose time in power could begin soon and last several decades. If the United States and the international community focus too much on the technical aspects of the agreement, and not enough on paving the way for future cooperation, an opportunity of generational proportions will have been lost.

Dr. Nathan Gonzalez is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the Global College of Professional Military Education. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Image: Reuters.