On October 4, the Israeli military announced that two of its soldiers were killed in a drone attack on the Golan Heights by Iraqi armed factions. This attack reverberated across Iraq, marking the first lethal strike by these groups against Israel. According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, since the Gaza conflict erupted in early October 2023, various pro-Iran Iraqi militia groups have launched over 200 attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets stationed in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for perceived U.S. support of Israel’s military operations in Gaza.

Before the death of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in late September, the militias’ claims of attacks on Israel were often met with skepticism in Iraqi and regional media due to the lack of credible evidence of any impacts. Following Nasrallah’s death in late September, Iraqi factions shifted their focus almost entirely to Israel, significantly increasing the frequency, pace, and intensity of their attacks, launching at least six dozen drone and missile strikes against Israeli targets. Following recent Israeli strikes on Iranian targets on October 26, Iraqi groups continued their attacks on Israeli sites, while it remains unclear whether Iran will retaliate directly against Israel. Through these actions, the Iraqi armed groups, organized under the banner of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” have positioned themselves as important belligerents in the intensifying confrontation between the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and Israel.

These groups operate in a dual capacity: they are formally part of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a key component of the state’s military-security apparatus established during the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) in the mid-2010s. They also exist in a gray zone as transnational movements aligned with Iran’s regional ambitions. Notably, many of these Shia groups within the PMF were initially founded and supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), positioning them as important actors in Tehran’s network of regional influence.

The escalation of violence by these militias, which operate outside of Iraq’s official state policy, threatens to drag the country into a broader regional conflict, jeopardizing its already fragile stability. The shift in focus toward Israel is particularly noteworthy, as it aligns with a call from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on October 4, urging the pro-Iran front to “tighten… the defense belt” in the confrontation against Israel. It was on this very day that these militias launched the deadly drone attack on the Golan Heights, underscoring the synchronization between the militias’ actions and Tehran’s strategic objectives. These groups are a critical part of Iran’s broader strategy of “unifying fronts” across the region to counter Israel, a strategy that includes proxy forces in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

The Iraqi government has been largely ineffective in curbing the activities of these militias. Despite repeated promises of security sector reform from Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and his predecessors, groups within the PMF that receive state funding and weaponry continue to operate independently of the Iraqi government’s control. For instance, the groups under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have been actively involved in the Syrian Civil War despite the fact that Iraq’s government has never officially sanctioned the deployment of Iraqi troops to Syria. 

In his recent letter to world leaders on the anniversary of the October 7 attacks, Prime Minister Sudani called for international pressure on Israel to halt its military operations in Gaza and Lebanon. He also said his government had “worked hard to shield Iraq from the effects of this escalation,” perhaps as a way of subtly indicating that the actions of the militias are beyond his control. While Iraq has taken steps to provide humanitarian aid to displaced Palestinians and Lebanese and has engaged in commendable diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, many Iraqis recognize that their country has no genuine interest in becoming a battlefield in the Iran-Israel confrontation.

The activation of Iraq’s militias as part of the Axis of Resistance is driven not by Iraqi national interests but by Iran’s regional strategy. Tehran uses these groups as tools to project its power, protect its nuclear program, and pursue its expansionist ambitions while maintaining plausible deniability. Iran can claim that these militias act autonomously, thus absolving itself of responsibility for their actions. However, this strategy, while advantageous for Tehran, poses serious risks for Iraq. As these militias become more deeply involved in the regional conflict, they increase the likelihood of Iraq becoming a target for Israeli retaliation.

Since 2003, and particularly following the PMF’s emergence in 2014, Iraq has grappled with an internal paradox regarding its military structure and governance. The duality of some PMF groups has led to ongoing instability. If the Iraqi government fails to assert control over these militias, the country risks becoming embroiled in a conflict that could have devastating consequences for its internal security. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Prime Minister Sudani must leverage the state’s provision of funds and arms to dictate the agenda of these groups, ensuring that they act in alignment with Iraq’s national interests, not Iran’s. 

The reckless behavior of the armed factions has sparked a debate in Iraq over who holds the authority to declare war. In a recent interview with Iraqi media, Ali al-Assadi, a senior leader of Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba—a pro-Iranian militia—asserted that it is the armed factions, not the state, that hold the primary authority to declare war or peace, as they view Iraq as a country under U.S. occupation. This stance directly contradicts statements by Prime Minister Sudani, who has affirmed that only official state institutions hold this authority. Indeed, Article 61, Paragraph 9, of the Iraqi Constitution mandates that a declaration of war must be initiated jointly by the president and prime minister and approved by two-thirds of the parliament.

The recent escalation by the militias heightens the danger of Iraq becoming a new front in the broader regional conflict. Although there have yet to be any Israeli strikes on Iraqi soil, Israel’s forceful retaliation against Houthi attacks from Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon suggests that Iraq could soon find itself in the crosshairs. Should Israeli strikes occur, they would likely trigger significant instability in Iraq, which is still recovering from decades of internal and external conflicts. Such strikes could also create opportunities for a resurgent ISIS and other extremist groups to exploit the resulting chaos, further entangling Iraq in both internal and regional turmoil. The interconnected nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, as demonstrated by the rise of ISIS and other Sunni and Shia jihadi groups in the last couple of decades, underscores the potential for destabilization should Iraq become a theater for Israeli military operations.

Moreover, the actions of the Iraqi militias could have far-reaching implications beyond Iraq’s borders. Militia leaders have repeatedly threatened to target Saudi and Emirati oil infrastructure if Israel strikes Iraq or Iranian territories. This would have a profound impact on global energy markets and could destabilize the region further, putting pressure on international actors to intervene in various ways. Given the militias’ history of attacking Gulf targets and their reckless behavior, these threats should be taken seriously. 

Without decisive action domestically, Iraq risks becoming the focal point of a regional maelstrom once again, with grave consequences for the country’s infrastructure and stability. Iraqis have suffered from decades of internal and external warfare and should not be plunged into a new conflict.

Mohammed Salih is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute and serves as an independent consultant. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania and has written extensively on Iraqi and regional affairs for international media outlets and think tanks for nearly two decades. Follow him on X: @MohammedASalih.

Image: Tasnim News Agency.