Today, Iraq holds its most important elections since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The elections could mark a fresh start for Iraq, or could plunge the country deeper into dysfunction and conflict. The likely outcome of the elections—that no single party will win enough seats to form a new government—provides the United States with an opportunity to engage Iraq’s leaders and catalyze an agreement on a program of reform that results in greater stability and advances U.S. interests in the region.

Vital American interests are at stake. Iraq stands at the nexus of the central conflict defining the Middle East: the clash between Shias, led by Iran, and the Sunnis, led by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Tensions in Iraq are part of this broader sectarian clash, which, left unchecked, could merge into the civil war in neighboring Syria and fan extremist threats against the United States’ security interests in the region and beyond.

The most important question in the election is whether incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will win a third term. Maliki showed signs of a genuine democratic leader during his first term. He cracked down on extremists regardless of their sectarian affiliations and advanced a unifying, nationalist vision for Iraq, vowing that sectarianism was a transitional phenomenon that would be replaced by equal citizenship before the law. Due in large part to Maliki’s efforts, violence decreased and nonsectarian and cross-sectarian parties gained in the 2010 elections.

Events in recent years, however, have pushed Maliki in an authoritarian and sectarian direction. Amid a resurgence of violence from Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents, Maliki has responded to pressure from his Shia base by arresting a number of Sunni politicians, who broke with extremists to join the political process. Maliki has also roiled relations with the Kurds by denying required budget allocation from the central government to the Kurdish regional government.

Maliki has taken these steps against the backdrop of volatile regional dynamics. The raging war-next-door in Syria has drawn Iraq’s communities to different sides of the conflict. Iraqis are being pulled apart as regional powers fill the vacuum left by the premature U.S. withdrawal of forces from Iraq in 2011.

Current projections suggest that one of three scenarios is likely to emerge from the elections.

Maliki’s State of Law coalition could win upward of one hundred of the parliament’s 328 seats. Maliki could then form a majority government with token representation from smaller Sunni and Kurdish parties. Unless Maliki subsequently returned to the inclusive approach of his first-term, Sunni-Shia tensions would escalate and the Kurds would push for greater autonomy and sovereignty. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria would become even more intertwined and external powers supporting warring factions would be pulled deeper into the fire.

More likely is an outcome in which State of Law wins between sixty and ninety seats. Maliki would enjoy greater support than any other individual Shia parties—such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar bloc or the Islamic Supreme Council, led by Ammar al-Hakim—but would not have a decisive edge over his rivals. Encouraged by the Prime Minister’s lackluster performance, a coalition of rival Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish parties would band together behind their own candidate for the premiership. Replacing Maliki would be difficult. Iran has consistently opposed a fracturing of Shia unity. And there are serious questions regarding the opposition’s ability to reach consensus on a candidate, government program, and power-sharing formula. Yet the strong desire of these parties for a new Prime Minister, and the imperative of tempering Sunni-Shia hostilities and Kurdish moves toward sovereignty, may be enough to make this a credible scenario. Indeed, influential Shia clerics are forcefully calling for change. Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi—one of Iraq’s four most senior Ayatollahs—has issued a fatwa against voting for Maliki, comparing him to Saddam Hussein, and endorsing Ammar al-Hakim instead. Maliki will face much stiffer resistance than he did in 2010.

Prolonged stalemate is the third scenario. Maliki’s coalition may win just enough seats to prevail over other Shia parties and block rival efforts to nominate an alternative Prime Ministerial candidate. If neither side succeeds in tipping the balance in its favor, Iraq could face a period of political deadlock in which Maliki leads a caretaker government. If the anti-Maliki camp remains unified, Maliki may decide, after a protracted period, to let another candidate form the government. As a condition for stepping down, Maliki is likely to insist that the new Prime Minister come from the ranks of his Da’wa Party.

A new leader, untainted by a record of distrust and broken deals, could offer Iraq a promising way forward. A U.S. push to oust Maliki, however, would be risky. Relations between Washington and Kabul deteriorated sharply after Afghan president Hamid Karzai won re-election over the Obama Administration’s opposition. The experience with Maliki, moreover, shows that U.S. support for the winning candidate does not necessarily translate into reliable governance. In exchange for remaining Prime Minister after the 2010 elections, Maliki committed to the Erbil Agreement, which called for reform on issues such as de-Baathification, oil revenues, corruption, and federalism. In the absence of sustained U.S. engagement, however, Maliki failed to deliver on his promises. The same situation could evolve with Maliki’s successor if Washington lacks the influence or the sustained will to steer the new Prime Minister in the direction of reform.

Instead of relying on preferred Iraqi leaders, the Obama Administration should clearly articulate the program of reform it wants implemented during the process of government formation. Iraq’s constitution, which emphasizes federalism and decentralization of power, provides a roadmap for reform. Continued effort at monopolization of power by a majoritarian central government could incite a Kurdish push for sovereignty, as well as increased violence among Iraq’s Sunni population. Some Sunni leaders, after opposing federalism in the years after Saddam’s overthrow, now seek recognition of its provinces as federal regions.

Five specific reforms would tamp down ethnosectarian tensions and facilitate democratic consolidation over time. These reforms are all necessary for lasting stability in Iraq, but some, namely those regarding territorial control, represent more difficult challenges than others.

· Elimination of discriminatory laws such as de-Baathification, which are being implemented in a sectarian manner.

· Passage of a balanced revenue-sharing and hydrocarbon law that allows companies to export oil from regions and provinces and that distributes funds based on an agreed formula.

· Creation, as mandated by the Iraqi constitution, of a Federation Council that would provide for regional representation in the national government.

· Movement against Shia militias alongside counterterrorism operations directed at Sunni extremists.

· Resolving territorial disputes—produced by the forcible demographic changes under former regimes—in accordance with the constitutionally mandated frameworks.

Washington can help ensure that these reforms are implemented by conditioning U.S. security assistance and diplomatic support for concrete actions by Baghdad, regardless of which coalition or Prime Minister comes to power. The United States cannot rely on promises alone, as it did with the Erbil Agreement. The disbursement of U.S. assistance should be sequenced based on practical steps, such as the introduction of legislation on needed reforms.

Navigating Iraqi politics in the coming months will require a level of deftness, balance, and steadfastness that has eluded the Obama Administration’s Iraq policy to date. However, given the strong relationships that Washington has with key Iraqi leaders and factions, the United States still possesses sufficient leverage in Iraq for securing a government that is beneficial for Iraqis and friendly with the United States.

Zalmay Khalilzad is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2007 to 2009, he served as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. He has also previously served as U.S. ambassador to Iraq, as well as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and also as special presidential envoy to Afghanistan. He is a member of The National Interest's advisory council.

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