Israel’s decision to assassinate Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh, although not yet claimed by Tel Aviv, and Lebanese Hezbollah senior commander Fuad Shukr on July 30 and 31 is sending shockwaves throughout the Middle East. The twin assassinations mark another dangerous inflection point for the region as Iran and Israel continue to escalate their shadow war increasingly into open military exchanges. Yet the assassinations, alongside broader violence, will not end what is already a regional war or the conflict in Gaza. Instead, these actions will likely produce more instability while expanding opportunities for miscalculation.

Israel assassinated Shukr in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahieh, a Hezbollah stronghold. The strike targeted his high-rise residence, killing at least seven people and injuring roughly seventy. Although Israel has not claimed it, a bomb that it planted weeks prior in a guesthouse for foreign dignitaries and Iranian allies in northern Tehran likely killed Haniyeh and his bodyguard. The latter attack aims to pigeonhole Iran while embarrassing it by killing a major figure in Iran’s capital following the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian—hardly a coincidence considering his reformist platform calling for talks with the West.

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” leaders pledged revenge against Israel for the assassinations, with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declaring that war with Israel has now entered a “new phase.” The United States continues to claim that it was “not aware” of the strike in Tehran, although it has remained relatively quiet about the Beirut strike while arguing Israel has a right to defend itself.

While the U.S. messaging is likely designed to avoid attacks for its bear-hug approach to Israel and support for many of its military operations, the reality is that U.S. rivals and the broader regional population believe the United States works in lockstep with Israel. Washington’s same-day strikes on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq do little to alleviate such perspectives—as an Iranian letter to the UN highlights.

As such, the coming response to the Israel assassinations risks a broader Middle East conflict. This conflict has been underway for some time, with Israel conducting military operations in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, alongside the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Iran and its aligned forces have conducted similar operations against Israel in each of these theaters. Importantly, hostilities span well beyond the events of October 7, defining the long-running shadow war that is emerging into the open between Israel and Iran.

The struggle between these arch-rivals ultimately helped produce the events of October 7 while continuing to hamper ceasefire talks designed to end the war in Gaza. While some argue that military pressure on Hamas will produce a better deal for Israel, killing the lead negotiator and leader of the other negotiating party complicates conditions for that party to accept any deal. When considering Haniyeh’s role as a pragmatist in the group relative to Hamas’s military leader, Yahya Sinwar, and its broader military wing will now hold even more relative internal power, it is difficult to see a deal in the near term.

To be sure, Iran likely does not have a veto over Hamas in negotiations with Israel. Rather, the assassination on its territory during a presidential inauguration will require a response—one that Israel could use to avoid cutting a ceasefire deal with Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s likely hopes for this outcome given his lack of interest in a ceasefire with Hamas, which would likely cause the collapse of his far-right government and result in elections that polling suggests he would lose.

Thus, all signs point to a regional escalation along multiple fronts, suggesting a similar tough Israeli response that hardens the positions of the negotiating parties, barring outside influence that tempers actions. Hezbollah is likely to respond more harshly, given Shukr’s long-running senior role in the organization. All are red lines for the group that could prompt a major response—possibly a strike on military sites in northern Israel previously highlighted in Hezbollah drone footage.

Iran is likely to also focus on military sites, possibly through other proxies in Iraq and Syria, although it has pledged a “special” response that could indicate something more intense. Scattered U.S. bases in these countries could be the target, especially if Hezbollah takes on the brunt of the response to Israel.

Ultimately, Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” do not want to provide Israel with any pretense to conduct a broader war that would likely draw in the United States as this is a conflict they would lose. Tehran values the deterrence effect of its friendly militias across the region more than a war it can avoid, especially as Israel faces a strategic defeat in Gaza.

Indeed, this network is a forward defense strategy. Losing Hezbollah would be a worst-case scenario in this regard because Iran needs the group to deter direct strikes on Iranian territory and other domestic deterrence infrastructure like its nuclear sites.

Regardless, the assassinations do not make the region safer for any actor. Equally concerning, U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan remain exposed to violence. While no one should mourn the deaths of two individuals with innocent blood on their hands, it is crucial to understand that the groups they led insulate their command structures to mitigate against such leadership decapitations.

Instead, the likely result of such assassinations is not a weakened “Axis of Resistance” but an angrier, harder-to-predict coalition of actors prepared to use expanded violence to achieve their goals and establish deterrence. This will only produce another escalatory step that further shifts deterrence understandings in ways that could have short and long-term consequences should anyone miscalculate and produce a brutal regional war in the process.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

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