After years of fighting a covert shadow war based on the use of proxies and clandestine operations, Israel and Iran are in a new phase of direct military conflict. This shift undermines the use of ambiguity, the possibility of denial or containment, brings the region closer to a boiling point, and increases the importance of diplomacy. The large scope and sophistication of Israel’s attack on October 25, alongside the nighttime targeting of multiple military sites throughout Iran, highlight a nuanced approach: a willingness to risk a wider confrontation while still facilitating de-escalation and aiming to avoid an all-out war.

The weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas and a desire to target what Jerusalem perceives as the “octopus’ head” rather than just its proxy “tentacles” drive Israel's recent actions. This approach is bolstered by public support, as Israeli society has radicalized and appears to have accepted the costs associated with regional fighting since the October 7 events. By taking direct responsibility and showcasing offensive independence, defense cooperation with the United States, operational superiority, and intelligence accuracy, Israel aims to deter further direct Iranian assaults and cut the sinews connecting Iran with its proxy network.

But Israel’s action had an additional strategic objective—to send a stern warning toward the Iranian nuclear program. By eliminating a great share of Iran’s air defense and hitting deep within the country, including an installation previously linked to the nuclear weapon program, Israel demonstrates its capability and readiness to conduct further sensitive strikes. This stance is particularly pointed given Israeli concerns that Iran maintains an advanced nuclear position or might potentially progress towards weaponization.

The Israeli maneuver signals Iran that in the future, Jerusalem might increasingly ignore calls for restraint, particularly during the presidential transition period or potentially with Donald Trump’s return to the White House, which could embolden Israel to initiate further offensive actions. This might include American involvement or support that extends beyond mere defensive collaboration. The recent U.S. strike on Houthi underground facilities, showcasing its capability and posing a direct threat to Iran and its nuclear ambitions, could further reinforce this message.

Broadcasting such a warning might intensify the ongoing internal discourse in Iran about the feasibility of a nuclear breakout. However, the Israeli government may view this as a calculated risk, one that could either help coerce Tehran into making concessions on its nuclear program or provoke it into acceleration, thereby justifying a broader international campaign.

The Israeli attack also serves to signal to the United States that Jerusalem is taking U.S. perspectives seriously and exercising self-restraint. Simultaneously, it projects readiness to adopt a more aggressive approach should it perceive a looming threat to its security.

By using this approach, Jerusalem aims to prompt Washington and the broader international community to adopt a more decisive stance against Iran’s advancing nuclear program. For Israel, this is particularly urgent as Iran is expected to be free from its last significant political restraints in less than a year. The ball is now in Tehran’s court. The regime’s initial downplaying of the attacks suggested that Iran might opt for a limited retaliatory action or even refrain from further direct military responses. Its increased vulnerability, highlighted by the destruction of its air defense systems, the Israeli threat of additional strikes, and the U.S. deployment of additional fighter jets to the Middle East, could also favor a cautious approach.

However, as the outcomes of the attack became clearer, more decisive voices within Iran began to surface, underscoring the significant dilemma that Tehran faces. Now, contrary to its restraint following Israel’s limited retaliation in April, decisionmakers in Tehran might feel compelled to continue the current military exchange to prevent further erosion of deterrence and counter domestic and regional perceptions of weakness.

In the long term, Tehran’s failure to deter Israel, whether through proxies or its missile capabilities and threshold nuclear program, might compel a fundamental change in its security doctrine. Are Iranian claims correct in suggesting that Israel aims to drag Tehran into a strategic trap? Does Israel’s agenda go beyond merely deterring Iran from its ongoing involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts? Might there also be an Israeli interest in creating conditions favorable for a larger-scale attack on Iranian oil facilities, government installations, or nuclear sites? These considerations are crucial for Iranian decisionmakers as they deliberate on their response, the course of continued engagements in the region, and the future trajectory of their nuclear program.

At the end of this exchange, especially if hostilities cease soon, there exists an opportunity to advance political initiatives that could, at least temporarily, freeze the current tensions. These efforts would foster quiet understanding designed to avert direct confrontations between the states. Regional countries with ties to both sides should facilitate the communication and assimilation of these critical messages.

Assaf Zoran is a research fellow at the Belfer Center’s Managing the Atom project. He has dedicated the past twenty-five years to research, policy shaping, operational planning, and strategic dialogue with decisionmakers in the government of Israel and abroad.

Image: Andreas Zeitler / Shutterstock.com.