With Donald Trump and Kamala Harris functionally tied in the polls, it is high time to ask: What would a Harris foreign policy look like?

First, let’s dismiss the idea that Harris has little foreign policy experience and, therefore, will likely rely heavily on veterans of the Biden, Obama, and Clinton administrations. This view is comforting to the alumni of previous Democratic administrations and suggests continuity. It is also convenient for partisans and pundits on both sides of the Blue-Red divide, allowing them to defend or attack Harris based on the Biden record.

But this is a false premise. Harris actually has far more executive-branch foreign-policy experience than Trump did in 2016 and more than Republican challengers in 2012 and 2008. Harris has visited twenty-one countries on seventeen foreign trips as a representative of the president and met with more than 150 leaders of allied or independent nations, including the leaders of China and Russia. Significantly, she led the U.S. delegation at three Munich Security Conferences, where NATO leaders gathered to debate and discuss global threats. These meetings include prime ministers, defense ministers, foreign ministers, generals, admirals, and diplomats.

And Harris sharpened her foreign policy views inside the White House by attending “almost every National Security Council meeting and, more important still, almost every President’s Daily Brief,” according to Fred Kaplan in Slate. The Daily Briefs draw on the most complete information that U.S. intelligence can offer, and the meaning of various developments is dissected by subject-matter experts and the president’s senior staff. It’s far more than a daily graduate-level seminar; it is a real-time laboratory of how information is assimilated and how executive decisions are made.

Finally, she has had years of regularly scheduled one-on-one meetings with Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. In these settings, views were crafted, tested, sharpened, discarded, or re-forged.

So, the idea Harris has no foreign-policy views of her own is laughable. No one with that level of experience and access is a blank slate to be scribbled on by aides.

Some point to the “high turnover” among her vice-presidential staff to suggest that her views are erratic or ephemeral. This “evidence” also does not deliver the conclusion it suggests.

In reality, there has been very little turnover among her core national security team. Her first foreign policy adviser, Nancy McEldowney, served until March 2022, and that advisor’s deputy, Philip Gordon, was promoted and has stayed in the job ever since. Most of Harris’ other foreign policy advisers have served for years. The turnover statistics that critics cite refer to twenty-somethings who work in the media and scheduling functions—positions where turnover is always high. In truth, her foreign policy team has seen very little turnover, and therefore, they respect her views and share her policy ideas.

So, what are those policy ideas? On the campaign trail, Harris is unlikely to announce a comprehensive national-security statement or issue a “Harris doctrine.” Specifics would win no votes and likely chip away at her fragile coalition. It pays for a candidate to be vague.

Still, her public statements, as both a U.S. senator and as vice president, do indicate that she is willing to make some sharp breaks with the past—especially with respect to Iran and Israel.

As a senator, Harris advocated for rejoining the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a deal with Iran to ease sanctions in exchange for slowing its nuclear buildup, which Israel’s prime minister vocally opposed, and the Trump administration ended.

And Harris, as Politico notes, “condemned a January 2020 military strike against top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and co-sponsored unsuccessful legislation to block further military actions against Iranian leaders and targets.” Soleimani was directly linked to the murder of U.S. citizens, including uniformed servicemen. And U.S. military strikes have proven to shift, at least temporarily, Iran’s use of proxy forces to carry out attacks against Israel and other U.S. allies. So, Harris’ stance on the use of military force against America’s main adversary in the Middle East marks a stark departure from the pattern of the past five presidents.

Harris was also in favor of disrupting the longstanding relationship with Saudi Arabia. Angered by the Saudi air attacks on Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, she voted for a resolution to limit arms sales and military assistance to the oil kingdom.

Foreign Policy cites what it calls Harris’ “mantra” of favoring “what can be, unburdened by what has been.” In practice, this “mantra” and her public statements show a pronounced indulgence toward Iran and a hostility to Israeli efforts to ensure its own survival.

Now, let’s apply Harris’ perspectives to the current situation in the Near East.

Iran, both directly and through its proxies, is already encircling Israel with a boa constrictor’s resolve. Hamas is at war in Israel’s west, and Hezbollah is attacking from its north. The West Bank is a constant threat. And, to Israel’s south, Iran’s proxies are dominating both sides of the mouth of the Red Sea: On the east side of the Red Sea, in Yemen, the Houthis rebels’ rockets and drones attack civilian vessels and even U.S. warships. On the west side, Sudan’s new Al Burhan regime is close with Iran, Russia, and China.

Based on past statements, Harris would be more concerned about Israel’s response to Iran’s attacks than to the attacks themselves. Expect no sustained military strikes on the Houthis or other Iranian proxies.

Regarding Sudan, the situation is even more dire. Civil war and genocide are fomenting a refugee crisis, perhaps at the scale of Ethiopia in the 1980s. Iran and Russia may soon control most of the African coast of the Red Sea—imperiling a key route for the world’s trade. Harris may reluctantly consider economic and political sanctions on Sudan and likely only yield after considerable and consistent pressure from Congress. As for putting the Sudanese malefactors on trial at The Hague for war crimes and genocide, forget about it.

Instead, expect Harris officials to search for a “grand bargain” with Iran. Peace talks with Tehran will commence to stop the rocket and drone attacks in exchange for lifting sanctions and freeing trade. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, negotiations will be as surreal and pointless as the talks conducted with North Korea over the three decades.

As for Israel? It will have to make do with even less support than it has received under President Biden. If its people vote out Netanyahu’s party and elect a center-left party leader, the transition away from U.S. support might be eased somewhat.

America’s allies already see the signs. Zelensky has sent Ukrainian forces into Russia itself. It will need Russian territory to trade away in any Harris-convened “peace conference” with Russia. Israel’s focus on total victory in Gaza and, perhaps, in Lebanon is with the tacit understanding that it may lose access to U.S. weapons and intelligence in a Harris administration. The world is becoming more dangerous as allies position themselves for America’s departure. They know that Afghanistan, Cambodia, and South Vietnam were allies once and do not wish to share their fate.

A Harris foreign policy promises genuine departure—“what can be, unburdened by what has been”—acknowledging a multipolar world by retreating from its friends in the face of its enemies.

Richard Miniter is the author of Losing Bin Laden and other books.

Image: DT Phots1 / Shutterstock.com.