Fighting in the Pacific will present the same difficulties. Instead of freezing temperatures, forces will suffer sweltering heat, disease, and tropical storm systems. They will occupy islands that are hundreds or even thousands of miles away, which will strain communications networks and will demand decentralized command and control. Doctrinal thinking about mutual support will be severely tested, well beyond this country’s recent experience in ground combat environments.

The Navy-Marine Corps team is already looking for new methods of addressing these issues and has begun with the concept of sea-based logistics. However, sea-basing will require its own separate survivability component. Furthermore, any logistics system or network will depend on at least localized air and surface/subsurface superiority. To achieve this, planners will need to creatively map out the sea, air, and space considerations (e.g., combat air patrols, refueling, airborne command and control, surveillance, and naval patrols). Ultimately, for logistics systems to succeed, organic capabilities of each service component will need to be extended in order to provide the necessary early warning detection and defense capabilities. It will require anticipation by commanders and the permissive authority to adjust to changing conditions brought on by climate and attacks by Chinese regular forces or merchant militia. As was the case for General Smith, today’s leaders will need to develop and train these skills in order to sustain combat forces in the region.

The Marines in particular will also need to adapt to a new client: the Navy. Under its previous Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) model, the focus was on maneuver warfare in support of the ground combat element. However, now the MAGTF must shift to supporting the Navy’s combat operations. A critical question is whether Marines can scale their warfighting functions to provide meaningful support to the fleet. Force Design seeks to accomplish this while enhancing certain organic capabilities. For example, the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) has tested and fielded the multifunction air operations center (MAOC) concept to consolidate aviation command and control and be prepared to deploy smaller units across a disaggregated force and support a broader set of air, land, and sea operations.

Ultimately, if the surface fleet fails, survivability of stand-in ground forces becomes impossible. Planners must shift focus from the ground to the sea and adapt to the changing circumstances with the same sense of urgency that face Marines in Chosin. In order to push beyond previous operational capabilities and ensure relevance in the Pacific, planners must continue to challenge prior assumptions and innovate in terms of force design and tactics.

Acting on the Five Percent – Heavily Decentralized Command & Control

General MacArthur once stated, “Expect only five percent of an intelligence report to be accurate.” He described the art of operating on limited information. Tokyo headquarters often failed to take decisive action or adapt to new information during the push to the Yalu. MacArthur’s lieutenants were nearsighted, hubristic, and driven by arbitrary deadlines and press releases rather than reporting and assessments from the field. Field commanders were wholly neglected in favor of the rosy projections. Major General Almond’s ambition and ego led him to ignore or downplay X Corps’ situation when briefing Tokyo. X Corps staff never had a complete operational picture and its delays in decision-making caused significant casualties.

The pitfalls of X Corps arose from competition within the UNC to impress General MacArthur and gain favor for higher ambitions. This is not uncommon of any military at any time. Strong opinions that are loosely held can foster productive and thorough discussion on many issues. However, a rigid, centralized command and control environment is fatal; planners must recognize this futility in an area as large as Pacific Command, which is the largest geographic combatant command, encompassing about half the earth’s physical surface, with over 30,000 islands and atolls and only 300,000 square miles of land mass. Decentralized command and control is imperative for success.

Units will be scattered across the Pacific, occupying tiny islands, tasked with supporting the larger force by securing and defending vital shipping lanes and reinforcing key positions. This will require units to operate independently hundreds or even thousands of miles from their parent commands, sometimes degraded or no communication. Subordinate commands and leaders must be empowered with clear, broad intent and permissive authorities to respond to changing circumstances at tactical and operational levels. The normal orders process can take days and such delay may result in tactical defeats, any number of which could cascade and become critical to the entire force. Marines are inherently prepared for this operating environment—well-trained to act confidently with limited information and the trust of their commands. The entire force must train to the standard and be prepared to act on the “five percent.”

There is No Breakout in the WEZ

Korea was the Marines’ first use of modern-era tactics; their experience and the larger experience of X Corps and the UNC are instructive as the US pivots to the Pacific. Revisiting those lessons learned and the critical decision points that those units faced throughout the war can help current planners innovate and prepare for combat operations in this region. To achieve the Commandant’s intent of deploying a force with the “virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration,” immense pressure is placed on logistics, aviation, and command and control. This is where the force must innovate the most and adapt training and preparations. Taiwan is the flashpoint; failing to prepare for its defense and for broader conflict in the region will be catastrophic. There will likely be no second opportunities in this kinetic conflict. Unlike Chromite and Chosin, there is no breakout in the WEZ.

Richard Protzmann is a recovering litigator and in-house counsel for an e-commerce company in California. He is also an executive officer and former company commander in the Marine Corps Reserve and frequently writes for publications such as Task & Purpose, The Marine Corps Gazette, Washington Times, Real Clear Policy/Defense/Energy, 19FortyFive, the Daily Caller, and The American Spectator. Follow him on Twitter @rw1699​.

Image: DVIDS.