The specific objectives of the posture and investment decisions would be four-fold. First, create a credible ground force deterrence package that is a mix of forward stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces and prepositioned stocks sufficient to allow for a rapid employment of a U.S. Army corps during a crisis or contingency. Second, to create a more resilient force structure in Europe, by making forces more dispersible (especially air forces), developing hard and soft kill capabilities against Russian power projection forces and deploying sufficient capabilities to rapidly reconstitute and repair damaged air fields. Third, continue to acquire and demonstrate sufficient U.S. power projection weapons with the capability to penetrate Russia’s integrated air missile defense and the capacity to impose measurable cost that influence Russian decision making. Lastly, the United States should require NATO allies to follow its lead and build similar deterrence, resilience and power projection capabilities.

What Stuff to Buy

The investments in specific systems and weapons should emphasize land based air defense, artillery, long range precision guided munitions, electronic warfare, strategic mobility and undersea warfare. Much of these efforts need to be in place in the short term (one to three years) so they draw from existing U.S. or allied systems and not rely only on elaborate new program startups, although some of these will be welcomed.

With regard to air defenses, the United States has almost no ability to shoot down low altitude cruise missiles (of any speed) launched at land targets such as its critical air bases and logistics sites in Europe. The U.S. capability, which had been based on the “Hawk” system, atrophied following the fall of the Berlin Wall and suffered thru several significant acquisition failures. The air defense mission’s low priority in the conflicts in Afghanistan in Iraq allowed its absence to go unaddressed over the past two decades. A further complication was a fixation on the ballistic missile defense mission addressed by the Patriot and THAAD systems. The Army’s current cruise missile defense development effort (IFPC) is years delayed, significantly over-budget and has serious technical challenges. In August 2018 Congress directed the Army to develop and rapidly deploy a “gap-filler” air defense system, it will be critical that a serious investment effort is made in this gap-filler program in FY 2020.

Artillery represents another shortfall area. The United States suffers a significant “throw-weight” deficiency when facing Russian units. This encompasses both mass (in terms of size of rounds and number of launchers) and range, and this gap is enlarged when you consider that only a small percentage of U.S. artillery systems are on the ground in Europe (either deployed or in in prepositioned stocks). Although some ground force limitations can be “covered” by persistent U.S. air power, this is severely limited by Russian air defense capabilities and the challenge of targeting systems in a denied environment. The FY 2020 budget needs to accelerate efforts to increase the range of existing “Paladin” artillery systems, initiate a range extension program for the ATACMS long range missile system, increase the number of Paladins in service (so more can be pre–positioned in Europe) and increase the stocks of ATACMS munitions. This is the Army Chief’s top modernization priority and the budget ought to reflect significant increased investment.

Another area of concern is the prepositioning of heavy equipment n Europe. Following the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the Obama administration established a program to restore some of the U.S. prepositioned equipment in Europe. Thru the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) the United States spent $17 Billion between FY 2015 and 2019, with about half going towards prepositioned equipment (tanks, artillery, etc). This is coupled with U.S. and NATO funding to construct, or modernize existing, prepositioned facilities in Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Poland to allow for the eventual stowage of two Armored brigade combat teams (BCTs) and enabler (support) equipment for U.S. forces to fly over and join with in a contingency. The ERI was funded out of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) which is being compressed back into the base budget in FY 2020. It will be critical that the planned ERI expenditures, especially those in the prepositioned stock areas, are properly executed going forward and not “diverted” by the Services.

Logistics and engineering systems are also critical shortfalls that need to be addressed. Much of the infrastructure for moving tanks and heavy equipment thru Western Europe in the 1980s was abandoned and scrapped by the United States and its allies. Significant numbers of bridging equipment, tank-train cars and fueling gear must be procured and pre-positioned throughout the European continent. This procurement should be very carefully coordinated with NATO allies, especially Germany, who should be the lead (and principal bill payers) for this effort.

Another clear gap can be found in the United States’ stocks of long range precision strike munitions. Given the Russian capacity in integrated air missile defenses, and Russian investments in electronic warfare, the United States will need to maintain and accelerate procurement of existing high-end precision strike munitions, such as the JASSM-ER and ship-based prompt strike weapons. The United States must continue to rapidly develop the next generation of penetrating weapons to stay ahead of Russian developments, this includes both supersonic and hypersonic systems. His is another area for close coordination with Allied investments in similar ships.

Lastly, there is a growing need for investment in undersea warfare defenses in the North Atlantic. Russian investment in submarine capabilities could place U.S. strategic sealift and power projection forces at risk. The United States has invested heavily in surface towed array (SURTASS) systems to help limit the mobility of Chinese submarines forces in the Western Pacific. A similar effort should be made to procure SURTASS assets to help contain Russian submarine forces in the North Atlantic.

Posture, Or Where We Should Put Stuff

In parallel with these budgetary investments several key posture, or force deployment and basing decisions, and policy changes should be accomplished in 2019, with the goal of establishing sufficient forces and prepositioned capacity to deter Russia from initiating a crisis in the Baltics. The posture changes needed to create this credible ground force deterrence package include the mix of forces and prepositioned stocks sufficient to allow for the rapid employment of a of a U.S. Army corps, which includes two subordinate divisions and six BCTs, during a crisis or contingency.

To achieve this deterrent force most efficiently, the forward stationed forces permanently in Europe must grow to include the command and control elements (corps commander and his staff), the critical enablers (engineering, logistics, air defense, artillery, helicopter), while still maintaining the two BCTs that are already stationed in Europe (one Stryker and one Airborne). The rotationally deployed forces must continue to include an armored BCT and some enablers (which are already persistently deployed to Poland) and should expand to include additional artillery and engineering enablers who can exercise and maintain the prepositioned equipment. Pre-positioned forces should continue to grow (through the ERI) to include at least two armored BCT equipment sets (this is nearly 800 vehicles), enabler sets (additional air defense systems, artillery, rocket launchers, engineering gear, etc) and a great deal more munitions.

In a positive posture development in September 2018, the Army announced its intentions to forward station an additional 1,500 enablers in Germany, to include artillery brigade headquarters as well as rocket launcher and air defense battalions.

In 2019, the Army should continue this momentum and announce posture decisions that permanently establish a corps headquarters in Germany and provide additional enablers (engineers, artillery battalions, air defense battalions and brigade headquarters) forward stationed in Germany or rotationally deployed into Poland or Germany. There should also be a further breakdown of the intended prepositioned equipment force posture, with the intent to rapidly complete the two full armored BCT equipment sets and the equipment required for the remainder of the enablers associated with a Corps. These prepositioned stocks will be constant targets for the budgeteers scalpel.

Finally, the U.S. joint force must work to restore the strategic mobility exercise (Reforger) programs that were utilized in the 1980s to demonstrate the credibility of the United States’ rapid response capacity. These joint exercises have to be integrated with NATO allies and fully exercise the ability to rapidly draw, operationalize and maneuver the equipment in the prepositioned stocks. These exercises will also help to determine what the actual strategic lift capacity requirements are for mobilizing in a contested environment.

The strategic guidance and budget toplines are in place to support a force structure and policy that could deter Russian adventurism and assure U.S. allies. Investments made by both the Obama and Trump administrations, thru the ERI, have removed some of the more expensive prepositioning equipment challenges. Now with the proper investments in specific high end capabilities in the FY 2020 budget, and proactive posture decision that place the correct forces in Europe ahead of need, the United States can create an operational environment that permanently deters Russia, drives parallel NATO investments and restores alliance credibility.

Mark Montgomery most recently served as Policy Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Senator John McCain.

Image: Reuters