The ROK, the U.S., and Japan could also threaten Kim that if he launches an ICBM over the Pacific, they will constantly station one or more of their navy destroyers or cruisers in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) that will be ordered to shoot down any subsequent ICBMs Kim launches into the Pacific. They would need to publicly explain that such intercepts would be tests and could fail, but note that even failed intercepts would be useful in identifying and resolving potential problems with their missile defense systems against real North Korean missiles. And North Korea would be paying the cost of the targeted missile.

To balance the North’s continued nuclear weapon production the United States could threaten a four step escalating U.S. response to commit U.S. nuclear weapons for use in Korea as recently described in a RAND/Asan Institute report. 

Against any of these actions, North Korea could potentially escalate. Thus the ROK and the U.S. would need to include in their planning how they might respond to such escalations. And in some cases, they should be open about such retaliatory threats. Unless Kim concludes that the ROK and the U.S. are finally serious about reining in his provocations, threats, and nuclear weapon development, Kim might eventually establish a form of dominance on the Korean Peninsula or push the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear war that no one wants.

About the Author: Bruce W. Bennett

Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.

Main image is from KCNA/North Korean State Media. All others are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.