There is no question that the American model of democratic capitalism is facing particularly stiff headwinds these days. That model might retain long-term comparative advantages—including its ability to self-correct; its openness to new people, ideas, and innovation; its ability to attract foreign direct investment in a way that promotes sustained development; and a historical track-record globally of being able to successfully transition into advanced economies. However, it is a model that is in need of upgrading to better serve the interests of developing countries in Asia in a way that promotes their long-term growth. China, however, has not been able to persuade countries in the region that the shortcomings of Western democracy mean that they should embrace the Chinese model—and in large part, this is because of the specific features of Chinese foreign policy that have alienated Asian publics.

Raising Our Game

This analysis is not meant to be a counsel of complacency. There is no question that long-term trends in the Asia-Pacific should be of great concern to the United States. This is true in the military realm, where U.S. military superiority is no longer assured. As China’s share of regional trade and investment grows relative to the United States, there is every reason to worry about declining U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, the instability and general sense of withdrawal conveyed by the Trump administration have created a window of opportunity for Beijing.

However, it has been remarkably difficult for the Chinese government to capitalize on this opportunity fully. Despite Trump walking away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a version of it has still been enacted. Meanwhile, Chinese economic initiatives such as Belt and Road Initiative and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership are viewed with great suspicion. Though the Trump administration has spurned and insulted allies, U.S. partners are asking for more, not less, engagement. By contrast, China is mistrusted and isolated throughout Asia as its foreign policies and attempts to interfere in domestic politics have prompted a backlash. China's military assets have grown but there has also been an increasing impetus to balance and network a number of large Asian militaries as a counterweight. Donald Trump has called into question the very durability of liberal democracy and yet Xi Jinping is not much more popular than he is.

In short, China is strong but not without serious weaknesses. At a time when one might reasonably expect that it would be sweeping the tables of power and influence in Asia, it has faced multiple striking difficulties and reversals. Countries' legitimate concerns about what their circumstances would be in an Asia dominated by China have led to active balancing by Japan, India, Australia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. With sustained focus and energy that leverages the historic strengths and principles of U.S. engagement with the region, these trends could be accelerated. Rather than accepting a creeping fatalism about regional trends, the United States should recognize that it has a window for action, but one that will not remain open indefinitely. China hasn't won yet—all the United States needs to do is raise its game.

(This is the second article of a two-part series, the first one can be read here.)

Charles Edel is Senior Fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and a former Member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff.

Image: Reuters