Rather than treating ISIS fighters as cornered rats behind human shields as U.S. policy dictated, it might have been better overall to let them escape. Some escapees might have fought again, but many seem to have been thoroughly disillusioned and were anxious to flee the fractious, murderous, and pathological ISIS society. Fears at the time that foreign fighters would return home to commit terrorist attacks were understandable, and that did happen in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016. But there were few, if any, such events later; fears about returnees proved to be substantially unjustified.

The Future of “By, With, and Through”

Gordon’s contention that this “new way of war” has a future seems to be on solid ground. Although the book was in press when the war in Ukraine erupted, he suggested in later interviews that a version of the strategy is currently being applied by the United States and its allies in that conflict.

Although the United States and NATO had done some training and had sent military aid to Ukraine in recent years, they were wary and expected that, if a Russian invasion took place, the Ukrainians might well fold the way U.S.-trained forces had in Iraq in 2014, in Afghanistan in 2021, and in South Vietnam in 1975. They were especially concerned about supplying intelligence because Ukraine’s intelligence apparatus was shot through with Russian moles.

However, once the Ukrainians proved to be dedicated and effective at defending against a threat that seemed to threaten the existence of their state, the essential element in the “by, with, and through” strategy was established. This was bolstered by outrage at the Russian invasion, which inspired broad popular support in North America and Europe for a costly assistance effort.

Moreover, it seems likely that outside support for dedicated forces like those in Ukraine can be sustained because the “by, with, and through” strategy does not require that casualties be suffered by the supporters. Mounting U.S. casualties were the essential cause of the decline in popular support for wars like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not events in the war (which generally proved to have only a short-term effect) or the antics of anti-war demonstrators.

But if the conflict in Ukraine suggests that this “way of war” has a future, it is a limited one. As experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan attest, dedicated local forces cannot readily be fabricated by well-meaning outsiders, even after decades of effort and expense.

A test may come if China decides at some point to take over Taiwan by military force. If local forces resist effectively, as happened in Ukraine, it seems rather likely that the “by, with, and through” approach will be applied by the United States in much the same manner as in Ukraine. If Taiwan’s forces fold, however, outsiders are unlikely to try to rescue them on their own.

John Mueller is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. His most recent book is The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Image: DVIDS.