Over a shocking week, the brutal regime of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad has collapsed in Syria after nearly fourteen years of civil war. Yet while the fall of the Damascus government certainly marks a generational flashpoint for the region—the likes of which will reshape West Asia in unpredictable and likely unprecedented ways—the crisis itself is far from over.

Indeed, as Syria enters a new phase, international actors should cast aside geopolitical rivalries and grand visions of micromanaged state-building and let the Syrian people lead the way. The country’s revitalization should be a Syrian-owned, Syrian-led effort rather than an extension of the unhelpful policies that have prolonged the fighting.

The Fall of the Lion

Assad fled Damascus for political asylum in Moscow as opposition forces reached the gates of the city from the north and south, and every governorate erupted into a state of revolt. His flight decisively ended one of the oldest authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa—an outcome most analysts believed was completely out of the picture mere weeks ago.

Indeed, while many—including this analyst—predicted Assad’s allies would come to his defense at the strategic city of Homs, Iran and Russia established side deals with other key stakeholders inside and outside of the country to protect their interests. Ultimately, Moscow and Tehran assessed that there was no victory to be had this time around, given the former’s focus on its war on Ukraine and the latter’s inability to garner any serious wins against Israel in the last year amid major tactical and strategic losses in Palestine and Lebanon. Assad’s refusal to directly support the so-called “Axis of Resistance” likely did not earn him any points with Tehran.

Syrians erupted in jubilation upon the news that their national nightmare had at least partially ended. Videos of Syrians toppling statues of the Assads and liberating prisoners from the regime’s notorious dungeons abound, highlighting the joy of many who dreamed of a life without Assad.

Yet, even among celebrations, many questions remain. Ongoing fighting persists in the north between the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Large protests have erupted against the SDF and their administrative arm, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). For the first time, Israel has occupied the strategic Mount Hermon and other parts of southeast Syria’s Quneitra Governorate, conducting widespread airstrikes across the country to eliminate advanced conventional and chemical weapons hubs and create a “demilitarized zone” to buffer the illegally occupied Golan Heights. Rumors continue to persist of a renewed Islamic State resurgence in Syria’s eastern desert.

This says nothing of the deluge of armed groups roaming Damascus and the country. These groups do not fall under the same command structures and do not carry the same alliances. Southern militias from Daraa and Suwayda constitute the old southern front, HTS constitutes a pragmatic Islamist northern front, and multiple SNA groups constitute different ethnic and geographic loyalties across the country alongside their northern strongholds.

This situation is not just highly volatile—it is unsustainable. Multiple competing interests that were united in their fight against Assad can quickly turn to competition for state resources and power. This unfortunate reality has come to define much of the Syrian crisis and the opposition failings of the past. The Assad family baked this into Syria’s social fabric for decades through a classic divide-and-conquer strategy. Syria cannot advance unless its people address this reality head-on.

Building a Better Future for Syria

Cooperation among the plethora of stakeholders at the regional and international levels will be crucial. Any efforts to revitalize the Syrian state must have widespread buy-in at these levels as well—spanning the pro- and anti-Assad camps. This will likely require unpalatable but necessary concessions, considering conditions as they are and not as one wishes they would be.

Just as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) experienced one of its first great twenty-first-century failings in Syria, it must play a central role in revitalizing it. Such an effort is impossible without Russian and Chinese abstention, at minimum. What this likely includes is concessions for Moscow’s military bases in the country. Given Russian overtures to HTS and other opposition backers like Turkey, this endeavor may already be underway.

While frustrating, this effort paves the way for a UN-led political mission in Syria to institute UNSC Resolution 2254, which calls for a Syrian-owned, Syrian-led political transition. While imperfect, the United Nations is best suited for this job as it will honor the resolution by allowing Syrians to drive their national future, acting as an impartial stakeholder in the process. Key international players—namely the United States, Russia, and Turkey—could guarantee that process, given their sway over the major Syrian groups.

Once a UN- and key stakeholder-backed political process is established, a national dialogue can commence, possibly within or alongside a reformed Syrian Constitutional Committee—if it better represents all key Syrian groups. At present, major Kurdish elements are excluded from the currently defunct mechanism—an unacceptable reality enforced by Ankara, given their disdain for the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) aligned People’s Protection Units (YPG), the main component of the SDF.

The official opposition and regime previously discussed many of the major theoretical points underpinning any new constitution in Syria, but that conversation should restart to include previously excluded voices. If HTS’s supposed support for an inclusive governing system is genuine, it should be possible to bring in Kurdish Syrians, affording them some autonomy in northeast Syria.

Kurdish autonomy will require a grand bargain between Turkey and the United States, given the former’s rejection of any such outcome in Syria. These talks will be necessary, however, to ensure Washington’s Syrian partners are protected and represented. More crucially, it will allow the United States to withdraw its troops from northeast Syria—a critical and necessary point for both the country’s future and American rightsizing of its military commitments in the region.

A massive reconstruction effort must accompany any political process to avoid repeating similar mistakes in other post-Arab Spring states. Ultimately, for any new governance process to succeed, it requires the buy-in of its people. If those people see a flailing government run by a motley crew of former warlords as their lives fail to improve, counter-revolutionary forces will succeed.

This outcome occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. Tunisians did not realize the material gains of their revolution and reverted to an authoritarian governance model led by a charismatic political outsider. In Egypt and Sudan, former regime officials and aligned militias simply outwaited the revolutionaries, building up power to eventually overthrow young and weak democratic forces. The leaders of these counter-revolutionary forces received substantial backing from regional powers—namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—a threat that persists today when observing Sudan.

Finally, an intensive localized peacebuilding effort must immediately take effect across Syria. The country’s dividing lines remain strong after nearly fourteen years of conflict, with a significant lack of trust permeating along traditional ethno-sectarian lines. Western powers like the United States already support such efforts through international development contracts and grants—a low-cost tool for stabilizing the country. Without local efforts to build social cohesion that gradually scales up to the national level in parallel with the political process, renewed fighting or the balkanization of the country could spell Syria’s end.

Ultimately, it is in the national interest of the United States, Russia, Turkey, and all regional states to commit to a framework that ensures Syria’s stability, territorial continuity, and political transition. This cannot and should not mean micromanaged nation-building projects—with which Washington has a miserable track record. Rather, a smart policy that ensures sustainable stability in the heart of the Middle East is the key. Ignoring the situation risks renewed fighting that harms the foreign policy priorities of these major states. This says nothing of the importance and low cost of ensuring Syrians can develop their political system.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Mohammad Bash / Shutterstock.com.