A final factor which played out in the German elections was what is known in Europe as the “democratic deficit,” the tendency of political and economic elites to fashion policies and futures for Europe’s peoples without much in the way of consultation. Indeed, elites sometimes tell voters to redo referenda when the first vote goes against EU preference or, as was recently the case in the Netherlands, simply ignore the outcome of a referendum in order to meet a supposed obligation to Brussels. Obviously, loss of legitimacy among elites is an international phenomenon. The Brexit vote represented a revulsion against London elites in the English Midlands by both Tory and Labour voters, while the failure of Hillary Clinton’s presidential aspirations was—if nothing else—a rejection of coastal elites by the American Heartland.

The anti-elite trend is very strong in Germany. The so-called “dieselgate” scandal has dominated front pages there for months, eroding the credibility of the masters of the most important industry in Germany, and a prominent source of national pride. Massive delays and cost overruns on a number of public building projects have cast doubt on the ability of German entities to manage public money in a responsible manner. The decline of German public education and transport infrastructure challenge German perceptions of what they thought were basic achievements of their country. Finally, the shambles of the refugee policy raised fundamental questions about the competence of the national administration, as neither local authorities nor other European governments were properly consulted nor coordinated. A big issue for the new government is “family reunification” of those migrants already received in Germany. If not tightly controlled (meaning, telling many migrants to go home), family reunification could multiply the migrant population, a prospect which the society simply will not tolerate and which could spark anti-foreigner violence.

Fortunately, Germany remains at its core a solid constitutional republic, with a resilient population and institutions. Its leaders did, however, lose touch with important societal frustrations; they ceased to listen to those who did not concur with their own priorities. Angela Merkel’s classic public justification for her policy choices is “there is no alternative.” The AfD was a grassroots rejection of that attitude. In this respect, the German election is on a par with the Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in America. When British and American publics rejected their respective elite programs, the world was shocked. Some might call it democracy in action, that horror of the true intellectual. For months, Germans have viewed British and American democratic choices with incredulity. Now, the shoe is on the other foot, and we will see if it fits.

E. Wayne Merry is senior fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

Image: Reuters

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