Throwing caution aside, President Biden decided to use the transition period to raise the war stakes in Ukraine. He sanctioned the U.S. military contractors to deploy inside the country, authorized the U.S.-made ATACMS missiles to strike deep into Russia, and transferred anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. The last act is not illegal since the United States never signed the Ottawa Convention, although it is still morally dubious. Altogether, the desire to maximize the U.S. support to its ally is clear so that Ukraine can hold on beyond Biden’s time in the White House. More aid is expected.

Militarily, ATACMS and UK-produced Storm Shadows are unlikely to be game-changers for Ukraine. The Russian military is familiar with them from the battle they fought and likely has moved their valuable assets out of the range of fire. Ukraine does not have large missile stocks, and its priority lies in defending its territory rather than keeping a foothold in Russia’s Kursk indefinitely. 

Moreover, if a navigation error makes a Western missile land on a Russian kindergarten, it will add to international reputation damage for the West. 

What appears obvious is that Joe Biden is determined to leave as complicated a foreign policy legacy to his successor as possible and disrupt Donald Trump’s ambitions to bring peace between Russia and Ukraine. The impression is that Russia is being provoked into a reckless response, making peace negotiations with Putin far too difficult—even for Trump. The upcoming president’s approach to the conflict is not based on Russia’s defeat, but it may be unable to withstand serious escalation. This is what Trump reportedly warned Putin against doing. 

Thus, the U.S.-sanctioned strikes on Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk regions on November 19 and 21 presented Moscow with a dilemma: respond strongly and abandon the hopes for peace or swallow its pride and wait for two months until the inauguration. Given that Putin thrives on the premise that he does what he says, he cannot let a blow pass. Otherwise, the image of Russian strength would be tarnished, and its threats to the West would lack credibility. Putin had to act, at least out of “self-respect.”

Moscow chose to respond on the existing battlefield rather than attack Western interests globally. Launching Oreshnik, an intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile without a nuclear warhead at an already thoroughly devastated Ukraine, served this purpose. The attack showed teeth without inflicting grave damage. Russia has shown that it has a weapon, previously unveiled, and was prepared to use it. 

The launch was a spectacular, if risky, experiment and success. The missile passed the combat conditions test, having reached its target destination of the Yuzhmash military production facility in Dnipro without interception. Encouragingly, the Russian–U.S. warning system proved to work: the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre issued a pre-notification signal to their American counterpart thirty minutes in advance so that the U.S. missile tracking system knew that such a launch was non-nuclear. 

An emboldened Putin warned that further test launches might follow, depending on how the West behaves, in an apparent reference to the calls by some European politicians to send their troops to Ukraine. 

These events have shown that the power transition in the United States is a most precarious period during which significant escalation is possible. It appears that the main safeguard against a major war is the presence of mind in Moscow rather than wisdom emanating from Washington. Is the art of defense diplomacy dead in the West? It is in high demand now. 

About the Author: 

Anna Matveeva is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at Russia Institute at King’s College London and the author of Through Times of Trouble (Lexington Books 2018). 

Image: Pingvin121674 / Shutterstock.