“The Impending Crisis” exhibit portrays the South fearing a massive insurrection if the enslaved population were freed. Nat Turner’s bloody 1831 rebellion in Virginia and the earlier successful slave revolt in Haiti are highlighted. John Brown’s 1859 raid on Harpers Ferry touched a raw nerve as Southerners envisioned militias like Brown’s rampaging the South. Larson also stresses the daily concern among plantation owners that their families were constantly vulnerable to slave uprisings. 

Against that fear, Southerners had to weigh the risk of invasion from the North should they secede. While some Southerners like Jefferson Davis saw the conflict as inevitable, most in the South convinced themselves it was not. In 1858, Hammond claimed before the Senate that the North could not afford to attack the South because of its dependence on cotton for industrial production. If the North did seek to prevent secession by force, Britain’s dependency on cotton would surely bring that country into the war on the South’s side. Larson notes that many calculated that if only the Deep South seceded, the North might use force. But if all fifteen slave-holding states left the Union, Washington would not dare interfere. 

The Consequences of Lincoln’s Election

During the 1850s, the South was able to dominate American decision-making, with four presidents, the Senate, and the Supreme Court all sympathetic to the Southern cause. This period of Southern control came to an abrupt end in 1860 when the Democratic Party divided into sectional entities, and Lincoln managed to win enough electoral votes, with less than 40 percent of the popular vote. As Larson points out, Lincoln was a relative moderate who would probably not have used force to abolish slavery where it existed. However, Lincoln’s “House Divided” speech, highlighted in “The Impending Crisis,” alarmed the South about his true intentions. Lincoln’s diplomatic inaugural speech did nothing to assuage the South. Texas Senator Louis Wigfall telegraphed that the “inaugural means war.” 

Southerners felt their 1860 electoral loss was irreversible and existential. They were in despair. Larson describes how Southern crowds in Washington tried to disrupt the electoral college count in the Congress. General Winfield Scott and outgoing Vice President John Breckenridge saved the day. South Carolina seceded on December 20, 1860, well before Lincoln had a chance to set national policy. In Baltimore, an attempt to assassinate Lincoln on his way to Washington was avoided based on intelligence provided by Allan Pinkerton and others.

Delayed Presidential Leadership 

President James Buchanan, a Southern sympathizer from Pennsylvania, might have nipped secession in the bud had he behaved boldly as Andrew Jackson did during the Nullification Crisis. Instead, Buchanan attempted to appease the South and stalled, encouraging them to proceed. 

Once inaugurated, Lincoln was determined to take decisive action to protect federal facilities, reasoning that letting them go was tantamount to accepting secession. Despite a cabinet that initially favored abandoning Fort Sumter, Lincoln followed the advice of Captain Gustavus Fox, who assured him he could resupply Sumter’s garrison by sea. Storms and botched orders to the warship USS Powhatan undermined Fox’s effort. Secretary of State William Seward’s false assurances to Southern commissioners that Sumter would be abandoned further alienated Confederate leaders.

The Failure of Compromise

After Lincoln’s election and the secession of several states, further compromise became nearly impossible. Events took over. The December 1860 Crittenden Compromise and the February 1861 Peace Conference held at Washington’s Willard Hotel both failed to find a formula acceptable to both sides. A proposed Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment (guaranteeing that slavery would not be interfered with where it existed) fared better, but the ratification process was too slow. The Hall-Hayne mission from South Carolina to Washington ran aground as a result of what Larson called the “reef of mutual naïveté.” In the end, the compromisers were outflanked, and the fire eaters had their way.

The Fort Sumter Catalyst 

Larson details the actions of Major Robert Anderson, who was in command of the American fortifications in Charleston harbor. His decisions, made for local tactical reasons, had profound national consequences. After seceding from the Union, South Carolina demanded that those forts be turned over to them. Buchanan wanted Anderson to do nothing and gave him conflicting instructions. Lincoln, before he was inaugurated, had declared that he would fight to maintain control of all Federal installations. 

Left to his own devices, on Christmas Day 1860, Anderson secretly moved his small detachment from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. Moultrie was indefensible. Sumter was an offshore stronghold, and Anderson saw an attack coming. Larson notes that South Carolina’s secession and Anderson’s move to Fort Sumter “energized the advocates of disunion throughout the Deep South.” Anderson refused to abandon the fort or to fire on the town. However, subsequent Union efforts to resupply Sumter were seen as further threats to Charleston. Both sides began to mobilize. These events ultimately lead to the decision by Davis to fire upon the fort on April 12.

The Deep South smelled victory. Yet, the border states were not convinced that leaving the Union was in their best interest. Larson points out that on April 4, Virginia’s delegates voted ninety to forty-five against secession. The Virginia fire eater Edmund Ruffin was disgusted with his state. But once the conflict began, events took over. Lincoln had little choice but to call up troops to defend Washington and seek to retake Federal property. On April 15, Lincoln called upon the remaining states to muster militias totaling 75,000 troops to suppress the rebellion. Moderates in Virginia were finally swayed. The dominos fell. Faced with war, they could not abandon the other slave-holding states. Two days later, Virginia seceded. And Robert E. Lee made his choice.

Lessons for Today

The cascading impact of these factors led to war in 1861. Echoes of this past history are present in America today. There are deep cultural and political divisions, with most states identified as either Red or Blue. Some extremists tend towards violence, and plenty of weapons are available. A contentious election looms large. Yet, many of the conditions that led to war in 1861 are not present. 

Today, the federal government is prepared to deal with localized violence. Additionally, no single issue, such as slavery, is considered existential and animates all political activity. Despite the “Red-Blue divide,” there are binding ties across the nation that did not exist in 1861. There are profound differences within individual states based on rural and urban locations. The bitter experience of the Civil War should sober the very few who even contemplate a civil war today.

Hans Binnendijk is the former Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

David Gompert is the former Acting Director of National Intelligence.

Donald King is a retired partner at McGuireWoods LLP.

All three coauthors are on the Board of Directors of the American Civil War Museum.

Image: Popular Graphic Arts, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.