Later in the war, unable to respond to the onslaught of Allied strategic bombing of German cities, Adolf Hitler pushed for a vengeance rocket program of cruise missiles (V-1) and ballistic rockets (A4/V-2), to be launched against Great Britain. Germany launched 23,172 V-1 cruise missiles (each costing 2 percent of a two-engined bomber) and 3,172 V-2 ballistic missiles (each costing 50 percent of a two-engined bomber). Together, both programs together half of the entire volume of explosives used by the German army in 1944. This was an enormously inefficient allocation of resources, given that only 16,000 persons, mostly civilians, were killed by these weapons. As a measure of resource expenditure, Germany’s rocket program ranked third after the Manhattan Project and the Anglo-American investment in radar research. Though the rocket attacks compelled a substantial diversion of Anglo-American aerial resources and urban evacuations in London and Antwerp to protect the morale of workers, their military impact was negligible. Because of the scale of the program, the opportunity cost likely shortened the war by several months.

Similarly, Russia is exposing itself to great strategic vulnerabilities once it nears the exhaustion of its SS-23 Iskander missile arsenal, which was originally designed to deliver tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Missiles are surprisingly more expensive and difficult to replace than the conventional or nuclear warheads they carry. The Soviet Union manufactured far more nuclear warheads, 55,000, than missiles, during the Cold War. Once Russia’s winter or spring offensive fails, it will have exhausted its theater missiles and be unable to conduct more than a few isolated strikes. It will have to depend on its unreliable air force to strike targets, use its poorly-tailored strategic weapons for isolated nuclear demonstrations, or concede defeat on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s success depends on Western support contingent primarily on battlefield victories that inflict unsustainable casualties on Russia. This will either lead to a negotiated solution with Vladimir Putin or his overthrow. To this end, democratic Ukraine can far better sustain the privation, losses, and brutal atrocities than Russia can. Kyiv should emphasize passive defenses like air raid shelters, despite the heart-breaking non-military devastation that will follow, and make the necessary sacrifices to focus on achieving battlefield victory. If Putin’s regime decides to make a dramatic display of power or pursue a strategy based on a shallow appreciation of Ukraine’s commitment to victory, then Kyiv should encourage these delusions as much as possible.

Attila Arslaner is a Master’s student studying Security and Defense at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. He has been invited to conferences at NORAD, and completed research contracts for the Department of National Defense. His research focus is on nuclear weapons and arms control.

Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University, and author of Militarization and War (2007) and of Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control, and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Egypt, and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer, 3 Field Engineer Regiment, from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11.

Image: Reuters.