The Saudi-led attempts to stem the prevalence of political Islam and seemingly an idea of moderation towards electoral modes of government undid a possible route to reinvigorate the political legitimacy of the Arab regimes. Even if the Muslim Brotherhood movements appeared disorganized, far from inclusive and displayed authoritarian and repressive traits in government, they could have evolved into a third way between the defunct regimes of Arab strongmen and the reactionary alternative of radical extremism. While the Saudis managed to accommodate this dichotomy at home by co-opting the Islamists for Saudi causes, particularly after the coronation of King Salman in January 2015, they have been less cautious in handling political challenges in Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere. The resultant disorder put further strain on Saudi Arabia’s regional commitments and has been far from exemplary in empowering the Saudi case for regional stability.

Overall, rival sources of Islamism continue to be the foremost challenge against the Gulf political regimes. Having suffocated the political alternatives, the Saudi-led Gulf political order—likewise the Islamic world as a whole—would have to face the radical and radicalized movements. The rise of the Islamic State might have been initially welcomed by certain Saudi circles because of the anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite worldview, but it quickly became clear to the Saudi administration that they posed even a more immediate threat than Al Qaeda. First, the Islamic State did not make a differentiation between the near enemy and far enemy. Therefore, they prioritized “conquering” the Islamic lands and categorically delegitimized the rule of pro-Western Arab monarchies. Second, the ideological tone and purist message of Islamic State, which again defied modernism of any sort beyond the traditional sources of Islam, has proven to have an appeal across the Arab countries, especially in the Gulf countries. In extrapolation, the siphoning off of the extremists to war zones does in no way guarantee the end of extremist challenge in the Gulf countries. Third, the Islamic State’s call to fight for the Sunni rights and military activism has offered an alternative route to address Sunni disenfranchisement even if doomed to failure from the beginning. All in all, the rise of the Islamic State pointed to the void in the Islamic world—even if the Islamic States fell far from qualified to fill it—for popular, indigenous, religious, legitimate, and independent source of political power to tackle Muslim grievances.

Beyond ideological concerns, the assumed Gulf unity against common challenges has been a delusion. Indeed, the Saudi relations with GCC countries were far from smooth and conflicts rose particularly from territorial disputes and political divergences. After decolonization, territorial disputes and border skirmishes became occasional with Saudi Arabia’s quest to have the upper hand in Gulf geopolitics, which was seen as its backyard. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s relative size and economic largesse as well as its key partnership with the United States fed into a self-assigned flag-bearer role for Gulf unity. Yet this did not stop countries like Qatar, Oman and up to a degree the UAE from seeking their independent course.

Again, the main issue driving a wedge between the GCC countries was dissensus on regional order. Qatar played a leading role in seeking an alternative role to advocate political Islam, even after the fall of Morsi in Egypt and subsequent royal succession in Doha. The problem with Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood movements and its overreach with involvement from Syria to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Palestine, Afghanistan and Sudan was seen by the Saudis and more aggressively by the Emiratis as stealing the show. Qatar’s Iran policy, even if magnified to put more pressure, was in any case more lenient and bendable as was seen in Qatar’s participation in the Yemen war against the Iran-backed Houthis. To Saudi Arabia, Qatar was far from a partner that should be consulted about regional developments, rather a juvenile that should be disciplined for disruptive behavior. For Qatar, it was, to all intents and purposes, independent foreign policy. On the other hand, Oman traditionally had a more pro-Iranian line, while Kuwait tried to uphold its role as an honest broker.

The UAE’s rising role to get support for its definitive goal to roll back political Islam stemmed largely from its double game vis-a-vis the Western powers and Saudi Arabia. In that, a major concern for the UAE was to neutralize the Qatari influence and its ties with Muslim Brotherhood movements from Egypt to Libya, Syria, Sudan and Somalia. As a result, the UAE unleashed a comprehensive campaign to name and shame Qatar in regional and global fora. The Gulf crisis in itself symbolized an Emirati coup de grace to bring Doha into line or otherwise suffocate its interests. In a more controversial approach, the UAE claimed to lead a secular and pro-Western front against the Qatari case for inclusion of political Islamists into mainstream politics. Moreover, the UAE military bases from Somaliland to Eritrea and Yemen, as well as its participation in military operations in Libya together with Egyptian forces, underlined a broader claim to manage regional developments. Overall, the UAE goal to isolate regional rivals, i.e. Qatar and Turkey, pointed to an overstretch given the mismatch between its relatively miniscule geopolitical power and its inflated moves to shape regional politics. Even the UAE’s recently vocal adversity to Iran to garner support for its regional goals sounds equivocal given its massive trade links with Iran, particularly the Emirate of Dubai’s special ties with Iran and Iranians.

King Salman made an attempt to overcome this lack of unity with a broader Islamic (Sunni) solidarity. Bringing together initially thirty-four Islamic nations, he established the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC). Even while the declared goal was to fight terrorism and coordination between Islamic countries, the exclusion of Iran underlined the Saudi goal to isolate its regional foe. An implicit motive was to stave off growing criticisms about the lack of Sunni powers’ commitment to fight back the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. On a balance sheet, the so-called “alliance” has shown both the ability of the Saudis to bring Sunni countries together and the inability to orient them towards common action.

The end of the Obama era was a relief for the Saudi concerns about U.S. concessions to Iranian expansionism. Saudi Arabia rebuked the Obaman idea of reintegrating Iran into regional “equilibrium” via the nuclear deal. This was largely because the missing element in the deal was that Iranians did not commit themselves to respect regional balance of power from Syria and Iraq to Yemen and Lebanon. Rather the Iranians utilized the negotiation window to maximize their gains in Syria and beyond, while America’s hands were tied to finalize “Obama’s legacy.” Even worse, Obama was expecting the Saudi-led Sunni powers to fight back the Islamic State and assume responsibility for the instability in Iraq and Syria. In a twist of the facts, the Americans were now dumping the ripple effects of 2003 Iraq operation on Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE.

Against this background, the election of President Trump was more than welcome for the Saudi-led coalition to win back Washington’s favor in support of their cause to roll back Iran and political Islam. The U.S. president’s first overseas visit to Saudi Arabia was unprecedented and symbolic, and mainly an anti-thesis of Obaman vision for the Middle East. Trump’s speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit during the visit underscored the U.S. call for the Arab nations taking the lead against terrorism and extremism, while the U.S. president tried to appease the Arab leaders against disruptive regime change and underscored “security through stability.” Trump was also vociferous against Iran, which he singled out as “responsible for so much instability in the region.”

Trump’s visit was construed as embracing the Saudi goals in the region. As a result, the Saudis enticed by the Emiratis moved to subdue the Qataris. The Gulf crisis symbolized a Saudi-Emirati attempt to solidify the anti-Iranian coalition and to penalize dealignment in the Gulf. President Trump, who called Qatar “a crucial strategic partner” a few days ago, joined the Saudi-Emirati line to condemn Qatari support for “radical ideology.” Apparently, the Saudi-led coalition was emboldened by Trump’s malleability, which paved the way for MBS’s emergence as the mover and shaker in regional politics.

The sustainability of the U.S.-Saudi relations in the age of Trump has been dubious at best. From the Saudis’ perspective there has been a major fallacy that Americans are back for the good old days of “oil (petrodollars) for security” and U.S. hegemonic pretensions. A more realistic assessment should take into account the fact that the U.S. foreign policy has prioritized minimizing U.S. commitment to Mideast security and seeks burden-sharing from regional partners. Even if the American thinking is not as isolationist as “America first” sounds, it would surely be limited, target-based, and would not come without a price tag. On Iran, the Trump administration has proven its willingness to maximize pressure, but still U.S. readiness to assume the cost of attritional confrontation in various regional theaters is highly unlikely. Again, the cost of confrontation with Iran would be paid directly or indirectly by regional countries. On Israel, the close association of MBS with Israeli interests has undermined the assumed Saudi role as the protector of Sunni interests. As a result, King Salman recently came to out to reiterate the Saudi ownership of the Palestinian cause and the status of Jerusalem. On Yemen, the Saudi-led operation to support the internationally recognized Hadi government not only fell short of the goal of political transition but also brought international condemnation for civilian deaths and humanitarian disasters. Three years into the war, the spillover of the conflict deep into Saudi territories with continuous missile attacks from Yemen as well as the recent news about the growing divergences with the UAE on transitional goals indicate more trouble for the Saudi security objectives. There were also questions about the sustainability of the MBS’s reform agenda and foreign-policy activism in Washington, which ran the risk of further tarnishing the U.S. reputation in the region.