In early August, northeast Syria experienced a major uptick in violence unseen since nearly identical fighting broke out between the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and local Arab tribes one year ago. The latest outbreak offers a crucial case study on a common dynamic in Syria after roughly thirteen years of conflict—namely, the frequent increase in violence stemming from unresolved issues in what many describe as a “frozen” conflict. Such dynamics inhibit efforts to end the crisis, leaving Syrians and international forces in the country trapped in what can only be described as a low-level quagmire for all involved—especially the 900 U.S. troops deployed to the country.

The latest round of hostilities between the SDF and regime-aligned Arab tribes began as early as August 6, with numerous tribal fighters crossing the regime-held eastern bank of the Euphrates River in Syria’s northeastern Deir Ezzor Governorate. The attack focused on many of the same towns as the year prior, spanning most of the governorate’s riverbank cities from Kobar to Al Bagouz, alongside fighting as far north as Sur. Heavy fighting concentrated on major towns in the central part of the governorate—specifically al-Sabhah, al-Busayrah, al-Shuhail, Dhiban, al-Tayyanah, Abu Hardoub, Abu Hammam, al-Kishkiyah, and Gharanij.

The SDF responded to the attacks by blockading regime-held security zones in Hassakeh and Qamishli—centers of power for the group, given the large Kurdish populations there. The decision to lay siege to these areas resembles similar SDF actions in the past when tensions escalated with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies. Such moves, alongside crossline trade closures, are designed to heap pressure on the regime for eventual negotiations to end disputes—tactics the regime replicates.

That siege ended on or around August 13 following Russian mediation between the groups, foreshadowing a broader Russia-mediated deal announced on August 15, ending the fighting in Deir Ezzor. However, while tribal elements led by regime-aligned Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hafl crossed back to the eastern bank of the Euphrates, fighting appeared to continue for days.

Local Telegram channels and other local sources evidenced this dynamic, even after the deal. In parallel, Iran-backed groups reportedly struck the U.S. base at the Conoco gas field around the time of the ceasefire announcement. Washington responded with airstrikes on locations suspected to be the origin of the attacks, marking another round of exchanges that increased in frequency at the time in connection to the Israel-Hamas war. Iran-aligned groups continue to pressure SDF and U.S. forces on the western bank to this day.

This series of events stems from Iranian and Syrian government interests in destabilizing northeast Syria with the goal of forcing a U.S. military withdrawal. Such efforts constitute the so-called Axis of Resistance’s long-running objective, given the importance of the Syria-Iraq border regions to weapons and personnel smuggling that stretches from Iran to Lebanon in support of Lebanese Hezbollah and other Palestinian militants. The U.S. presence in Syria’s northeast, which is a well-armed and capable SDF spearhead, complicates this dynamic and explains the true reason for the U.S. deployment.

Iran and its Axis allies have increased their efforts to aggravate pre-existing ethnic frustrations between Arab tribes and the SDF as a result. The SDF is largely dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)—which countries like Turkey argue is the Syrian arm of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization. Many Arab tribesmen also accuse the SDF of anti-Arab separatism, further harming relations.

While the SDF is a multi-ethnic force with significant support from Arab tribes across northeast Syria, Syria’s tribal makeup has fractured since the 2011 revolution. Consequently, the door opened for Tehran and its allies to advance their interests long ago.

Local frustrations with the SDF are largely economic and political. Syria faces drastic economic conditions, and suffering is widespread—a situation the SDF and its administrative wing, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES; formerly AANES), has struggled to alleviate in its territories. Politically difficult security conditions justify repressive policies from the SDF’s perspective—including arbitrary arrests and detention, forced conscription, free speech restrictions, and public protest limitations—to retain stability.

Ultimately, fighting failed to address any of these concerns, just as international efforts to prop up the SDF/DAANES have not drastically improved governing capabilities or the economic situation, let alone rights concerns. As a result, the underlying issues destabilizing northeast Syria will continue to fester without broader shifts within the country. Those shifts do not appear imminent, let alone medium-term realities, suggesting the recent fighting will continue to ebb and flow.

This context presents serious risks for the international coalition fighting remnants of the Islamic State, which largely consists of U.S. troops in small, highly exposed bases throughout northeast Syria. The deployments have faced an onslaught of Iran-backed militia attacks since the Hamas assault of October 7 on Israel, which only exacerbated instability in an already destabilized operating environment. As such, increasing alignment between local Arab tribes and Iran and its militias in Deir Ezzor should raise eyebrows in Washington.

Understanding this reality, U.S. officials will need to assess the value of leaving roughly 900 troops highly exposed in Syria to hostile actors in a conflict that has nothing to do with the United States. The benefits of this deployment—namely, to prevent Iranian smuggling in support of broader regional security—do not outweigh the long-running illegality of the U.S. presence in Syria that presents serious threats to the constitution’s separation of powers clause or the risks troops face. Indeed, these troops are a springboard for Iranian attacks and risk a wider war that is not in the interest of the United States. This assessment partly stems from the conclusion that the stated benefits of the deployment are already marginal at best, considering smuggling routes largely continue to function undeterred.

Ultimately, the deterrent value lost in a withdrawal would be marginal, especially considering Israel’s free reign in Syria and Washington’s ability to collect intelligence from countries like Jordan—actions the U.S. military already conducts. Indeed, responsibly withdrawing the troops can still achieve stated U.S. interests in the region without selling out the SDF/DAANES. The United States should instead adjust its commitments and outsource security responsibilities to regional actors. Given much of the context in Syria will not change any time soon, a shift that utilizes resources much more strategically and safely will go a long way toward sustainably achieving U.S. objectives.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Mohammed Bash / Shutterstock.com.