What does this all mean for President el-Sisi? The short answer is that his counterterrorism strategy was designed to deal with the terrorist threat of yesterday, and if he does not update it to match new changes in the security environment, it will fail. Egypt will be beset by persistent low-level terrorist attacks in Sinai and major urban areas, including Cairo, with the omnipresent possibility for a cataclysmic one just over the horizon. In this situation, el-Sisi’s popular support will continuously suffer. Despite the apparent success of the recent Egypt Economic Development Conference, Egypt’s economic growth will stagnate in the face of political instability. If terrorism continues, then tourism will suffer, international companies could see vulnerable infrastructural and other commercial ventures as prohibitively risky investments, and foreign financial backers might distance themselves from Egypt in order to avoid political backlash. And, as President el-Sisi heightens censorship, increases surveillance, and widens his dragnets for arrests in order to deal with ongoing terrorism, he will alienate more and more Egyptians. As these Egyptians come to recognize the inefficacy of his rule, they will look for alternatives.

This outcome bodes terribly for the United States, as well. For better or worse, America relies on consistent leadership in Egypt to protect a number of core regional interests. President el-Sisi has provided exactly that form of leadership since he took the country’s helm. His continued commitment to us assures our ships’—military and commercial—safe passage through the critically located Suez Canal. His military also actively facilitates our regional counterterrorism mission, providing intelligence and overflight rights to support operations. Moreover, President el-Sisi has upheld Egypt’s traditional role as a moderating influence region-wide. It was President el-Sisi who pushed through the ceasefire that ended the 2014 Israel-Gaza crisis. He is also a vocal proponent of regional nonproliferation.

To be fair, if el-Sisi were ousted, the Egyptian “deep state”—or, the military elites working far from the public eye to maintain the status quo in the country—would likely replace him with another U.S.-friendly president. But, that outcome is not assured, no matter how entrenched the deep state is. And, even if el-Sisi were replaced by a U.S.-friendly president, the transition period would inject uncertainty into U.S.-Egypt relations at a time when President el-Sisi has already demonstrated his willingness and ability to secure U.S. interests vis-à-vis Egypt.

Thus, it behooves both President el-Sisi and his American partners to devise a better counterterrorism strategy moving forward. Since he cannot singlehandedly silence ISIL, stabilize Libya, or undo the democratization of information, he must stop trying to defeat them head-on. He should try something different. He should bring the Muslim Brotherhood back into the political fold.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the partner that President el-Sisi needs because it has both the moderate outlook that he can work with and the depth of popular support required to dissuade Islamists from violence. The Brotherhood has been moderate for decades, having first renounced violence during Anwar al-Sadat’s rule. This commitment to peace has withstood great pressures, including the latest crackdown. Only last month, the Muslim Brotherhood’s media spokesman said, “Our established position continues to be a total rejection of all acts of violence.” While there are certainly fringe elements of the group that call for violence, the Brotherhood’s commitment to peace is so established it that has earned criticism from Islamic terrorism’s leading voices. Ayman al-Zawahiri famously derided the Brotherhood for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections…instead of into the lines of jihad.”

Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood has the depth of influence needed to steer Islamists towards peace. It boasts hundreds of thousands of members and millions of supporters—more than any other Islamist group in Egypt. Moreover, its roots run deep. The Brotherhood’s long-standing commitment to providing social services, political advocacy, and religious education means that its members are deeply embedded in local communities. They are individuals to whom citizens have long gone whether in need of food or spiritual guidance. They are trusted voices.

The Muslim Brotherhood can be used to guide Islamists towards peace—but only if President el-Sisi allows it to. If the Brotherhood’s leadership continues to be persecuted and publicly humiliated, then no Islamists will follow its lead. They will see it as weak. In contrast, by reintroducing the Muslim Brotherhood into Egyptian politics, el-Sisi would send a resounding message to Egyptian Islamists that they can achieve political change through peaceful means—that violence is not the only way to make their voices heard.

Furthermore, there is ample historical reason to expect that the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership would accept el-Sisi’s offer to return to Egyptian politics. After intense crackdowns by former Egyptian Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood made concessions—recommitting to peaceful participation in Egyptian politics—and leveraged the weight of both its domestic following and international opinion in order to be allowed to resume its grassroots social services operations. For decades, the Brotherhood’s strategic outlook has consistently been that it can best achieve its long-term goals by doing whatever it takes to re-enter the political fold.

To be sure, given the strength of his anti-Muslim Brotherhood narrative, bringing the Brotherhood back into the fold would be politically costly. President el-Sisi would have to roll back his anti-Brotherhood narrative at home and assuage his allies in the region. But, President el-Sisi’s domestic and regional support remain strong enough to make those costs bearable, and both Egyptians and neighboring regimes would be quick to forgive him when the violence finally abates.

By bringing the Muslim Brotherhood back into the fold, President el-Sisi would gain an essential partner in his fight against Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, his approach would set an example for other governments in the region, like Yemen, and Africa who are slowly learning that—far more often than not—repression promotes terrorism. This is especially true in countries where extremist messaging is persuasive to the local population, borders are fluid, and access to information is widespread. To defeat this threat in Egypt and preserve his rule, President el-Sisi must offer a political outlet to disaffected Islamists. There is no better choice for an outlet than the Muslim Brotherhood.

Alexander Velez-Green is a researcher at Center for a New American Security.

Image: Wikimedia/Essam Sharaf