Over the course of three Chinese Communist Party Congresses—the eighteenth in 2012, the nineteenth in 2017, and the twentieth in 2022—Xi Jinping has cemented his position atop the CCP pyramid, eschewing old norms and rules governing elite politics in favor of his preferences. Pundits and politicians alike have been left to grapple with myriad new questions regarding the future trajectory of the regime’s power dynamics, policy priorities, and its role on the global stage. The ripples of these changes extend far beyond the Great Wall, threatening to reshape the contours of great power competition in the years to come. 

A clear lesson from the nineteenth and twentieth Party Congresses is that personal loyalty to Xi is now a key factor—perhaps the weightiest factor—in the Party’s leadership ascension playbook, but even as personal allegiance has grown increasingly important, it has not completely supplanted the influence of legacy factors in leadership selection. Age, experience, and regional origins still play roles—to varying degrees—in determining who rises to the Party’s senior ranks. These long-standing criteria remain significant at more junior levels, even as loyalty takes center stage at the pinnacle of the CCP power structure. Aspiring leaders must navigate a complex terrain where demonstrating loyalty is crucial, but not at the expense of neglecting other, traditionally required qualifications.

Xi’s defiance of unwritten rules in personnel selection has become a hallmark of his leadership style. However, contrary to common belief, the CCP is still in a period of flux. Given Xi’s advanced age (seventy-one years old), mounting domestic and international challenges, ambitious up-and-comers, and a continuing evolution of elite politics from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Congress, there is as yet no new normal. Allegiance to Xi is an ephemeral qualification for elite advancement—in part because it’s unmeasurable. Moreover, Xi is mortal. The potential for a return to more familiar patterns of leadership succession and governance cannot be discounted. Another radical shift in the way power is shared, amassed, and wielded is possible.

The upcoming Twenty-First Party Congress in 2027 will be a critical juncture, with Xi’s performance and the prevailing power dynamics determining the extent to which he can shape the next generation of leaders. Over the next three years, observers should keep a particularly close eye on the evolution of factional politics within China.

Factional rivalry has long characterized Chinese politics. The two factions that had dominated the period between Deng’s passing and Xi’s ascendence—the Chinese Communist Youth League faction and the “Shanghai Gang”—are no longer major players. In their place, a handful of new factions have risen. However, unlike their predecessors, each of these new factions is loyal to the same senior leader: Xi Jinping. This may bind inter-factional competition in novel ways. Even though Xi has seized the helm of political decision-making, the intense focus on the general secretary himself—while necessary—has inadvertently exposed gaps in our understanding of the broader Chinese political system. What resources and prerogatives do these factions compete over? How do they compete? What role does Xi play in directing, managing, or channeling that competition? These are all open questions.

Behind the facade of Xi’s all-powerful rule, contemporary Chinese politics is as complex as it has ever been. Going forward, intelligence agencies and scholarly analysts alike should explore the functioning and interaction of these new factions, seeking to uncover how they define their interests, the nature of their competition, and why they may sometimes cooperate. Such efforts will illuminate how Xi shapes and navigates this political ecosystem and how that ecosystem may evolve without him.

Indeed, this new network of Xi-centered factions may have within it the seeds of future disorder. Eventually, Xi will depart the scene. With no one atop the superstructure to manage rivalries and with the old rules of elite politics long since jettisoned, vicious competition for control of the Party—and of China—may result. Before Xi, there was inherent stability in a two-faction system. But now, there is the possibility that a unipolar party may transform into a multipolar party virtually overnight.

In Communist China, the revolution has always eaten its own. In a post-Xi China, the revolution may find a feast fit for an emperor.

Michael Mazza is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute. 

Cathy Fang is an independent analyst.

Image: Alessia Pierdomenico / Shutterstock.com.