So, if the post-war liberal order that America built is passing away, what can we expect to take its place?

Four possible paths forward present themselves—each with its advantages and virtues as well as dangers and weaknesses.

The first is that we continue in the direction we are already headed toward the post-American world Fareed Zakaria envisaged in his 2011 bestselling book, The Post-American World. While Zakaria insisted that this world would not be the result of America’s decline but instead “the rise of the rest” (a theme echoed by President Obama in his discussion of world affairs), he acknowledged that the days of America’s unquestioned primacy in world affairs were over. However, he also acknowledged that a post-American world would pose “a new diplomatic challenge for America,” as pointed out in an interview with Ian Bremmer, requiring the United States to act as “more of a catalyst and broker than hegemon and arbiter….Let’s hope we’re up to it.”

Instead of the vibrant world order that Zakaria envisages, America’s slide into second-class power status has brought about a profoundly chaotic world scene as China emerges as the global bully. While Wall Street and others see a lucrative future in playing to China’s economic and strategic dominance, in the long term, the United States’ singular remaining economic advantage, our innovative edge (which China seeks to emulate and replace), is bound to erode steadily, as DEI and ESG cultural agendas play directly into Beijing’s hands. At the same time, as the U.S. ability to project power steadily diminishes in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East, other countries will be bound to look to Beijing and Moscow as more reliable allies.

Meanwhile, an open and chaotic southern border has become an ugly symbol of what the new post-nationalist America will really look like, instead of the hopeful picture Zakaria and others had forecast.

The second pathway has gained popularity in Republican circles, namely a “Fortress America” approach toward securing our border but also cutting back on our traditional global commitments, including even withdrawing from NATO. This is Trump’s America First policy on steroids, as expressed by public figures like Tucker Carlson and epitomized by members of the House Freedom Caucus. It has triggered a growing unwillingness among GOP lawmakers to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. Some have even cast doubt about the priority of aiding Israel versus securing the southern border. The very fact that these are seen as mutually exclusive options is a measure of the Fortress America mindset but also the erosion of Pax Americana as an issue where politics “stops at the water’s edge.”

If this pathway proves successful over the long term, it will mean a strategic posture focused more on hemispheric defense, starting with securing the southern border and defeating the Mexican drug cartels. Like the post-American version, however, this will mean largely abandoning the rest of the field to China and possibly Russia, especially in Eastern Europe (ironically the most active hub of NATO in the wake of the Ukraine invasion) and Central Asia.

On the bright side, an America First agenda could mean a stronger domestic economy, one protected by anti-Chinese tariffs and various Made In America initiatives meant to reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing and supply chains. It will also be committed to strengthening energy independence and rebuilding our defense industrial base—a cornerstone of the old Pax Americana.

But inevitably, a strategic retreat of this kind means losing out to China with traditional trading partners as European capitals and New Delhi adjust to a world order dominated by Beijing rather than Washington—one in which our own military may adopt a rigid Maginot Line-style defensive strategy rather than the confident flexible response that characterized its Pax Americana predecessor.

The third pathway would be an updated and refurbished version of the old Pax Americana, a “Cold War 2.0” approach to today’s geopolitical challenges much favored by many foreign policy experts, including in the Republican Party. It envisages reviving old commitments in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia together with a robust China containment strategy modeled on the strategy adopted to deal with Soviet power during the Cold War. It is also undaunted by the prospect of having to face Russia and China at the same time—a nightmare scenario for its America First rival.

However, like its America First counterpart (with whom it sharply disagrees when it comes to supporting Ukraine and possibly Taiwan and even Israel), the Cold War 2.0 approach would vigorously seek to reduce dependence on the Chinese economy and supply chains, especially those affecting our defense industrial base. It would also promote American energy dominance both for domestic reasons and as economic leverage in strengthening allies and weakening foes, especially depriving Russia and Iran of markets for their oil and natural gas.

Overall, however, the dynamics of the Cold War 2.0 model rest squarely on the original Cold War model, as adapted and adjusted for a series of Cold War-like confrontations versus China and its new allies. Like the original Pax Americana, it will demand an increased investment of government money and resources and expanded strategic commitments that the American public was willing to accept in the aftermath of World War II but may not want to undertake in today’s more somber economic and fiscal climate.

There may be, however, a fourth path available, one that essentially involves turning the original Pax Americana formula inside out.

Instead of American arms, productivity, and instrumentalities flowing outward to sustain and support allies and the global economy, the new Pax Americana relies on achieving a proper balance between American interests and those of our democratic allies in order to generate a more stable and equitable global system and confront the current and future threat from the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis.

This involves 1) boosting U.S. economic strength through reshoring and restoring our manufacturing and industrial base and 2) using U.S. technological innovation—which has been the critical source of our economic leadership—as the point of the spear in our military leadership in arming ourselves and allies, from AI and unmanned aircraft systems to cybersecurity and space exploration.

As noted in a previous National Interest article, there are many possibilities for such a “New Arsenal of Democracies,” i.e., a global network of countries and companies cooperating on developing the key components of future defense systems. According to a 2022 study done by Global Finance magazine, the United States and its fellow democracies—key players in a future arsenal of democracies—occupy eighteen of the top twenty slots of the world’s most advanced tech countries (the exceptions being the United Arab Emirates, a U.S. partner, and Hong Kong). China hovers around the thirty-second slot on the list, while Russia and Iran don’t even score.

Using the recent AUKUS model for trilateral and multilateral government-to-government agreements for advanced weapons systems, the next step in this high-tech alliance would be facilitating direct company-to-company co-development contracts that allow American, European, and Asian corporations to advance the high-tech frontier as part of a collective defense strategy.

Even further, a new arsenal of democracies can address one of the important sticking points in American relations with allies, i.e., measuring an ally’s contribution to the common defense burden by tracking its defense budget as a percentage of GDP. Instead, the contribution of German, French, Italian, and Japanese firms to specific programs can become the new metric for defense burden—sharing within NATO and beyond, as well as being a more accurate measure of who contributes what to the defense of democracy around the world, and global peace and stability.

As for the second component of a new Pax Americana—reshoring and restoring the U.S. manufacturing and industrial base—Claremont Institute fellow David Goldman has pointed out that America’s wealth, as well as its financial stability, all depend extensively on its technological leadership.

If, however, China assumes leadership in the critical areas of future economic growth—AI and the manipulation of metadata—then the result could be disastrous for the United States and the rest of the democratic world. As Goldman states:

The United States now imports almost $600 billion a year of Chinese goods, 25% more than in January 2018 when President Trump imposed punitive tariffs. That’s equal to about a quarter of US manufacturing GDP. Far from de-coupling from China, a widespread proposal during the COVID-19 pandemic, the US has coupled itself to China more closely than ever.

Such a scenario is not sustainable, either for the future of the U.S. economy or for the future of the liberal, U.S.-led world order. On the other hand, if the United States can once again become a master of its economic domain and bring its penchant for innovation forward into the next economic era, a properly reshored U.S. economy will serve as a firm base for a new Pax Americana.

A roadmap for rebuilding the industrial base involves certain vital reforms. One of those means establishing tax and regulatory conditions that foster manufacturing, as opposed to a tax regime that favors software-heavy Silicon Valley and its imitators.