Today, Venezuelans head to the polls for the country’s most consequential election of the last twenty-five years. But, while the focus will be on election day and the results, the next challenge will come in the days and weeks that follow. For the United States, the challenge is to seize the opportunity to shape incentives among ruling party elites and the opposition that advance negotiations and further lay the groundwork for the restoration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions—regardless of the outcome on election day.

Earlier this month, the Atlantic Council partnered with the Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute to organize a day-long scenario planning exercise that gamed out what might happen today and the weeks that followed it. A newly published policy memo explains what was learned. Most importantly, there was broad agreement that, independent of the results of the election, both the Maduro government and the Venezuelan opposition would face incentives to negotiate the terms of governability, avoid a deepening of the crisis, and prevent the restart of another cycle of unrest and repression. 

In Venezuela, polls currently show opposition challenger Edmundo González with at least a 20 percentage point lead over incumbent Nicolás Maduro. An opposition win, however, hinges on a massive turnout. The ruling party is counting on higher-than-average abstention and a general demoralization and intimidation of the opposition base in order to eke out a win. Despite obstacles like censorship of independent digital media and detentions of campaign workers, the recent wave of massive rallies across the country suggests the opposition base is clearly excited at the prospect of an election victory within reach. 

Even if Maduro manages to win—or is declared the winner despite evidence of fraud—Maduro will have to convince his coalition that his government can keep the country stable enough and the economy growing enough to preserve their interests and continue down the path of international integration. Governing a country in flames, plagued by widespread protests and economic instability, is not a viable option. Even a triumphant Maduro will need to engage in meaningful negotiations with the opposition, demonstrating a willingness to make significant concessions to ensure continued stability and international legitimacy.

Conversely, if opposition candidate González manages to capitalize on the massive discontent with Maduro and his win is recognized by Venezuelan authorities, his coalition will face its own set of challenges. The opposition, having been out of power for over two decades, will need substantial support to navigate governance issues and ensure a smooth transition of power. To be able to govern effectively, González will have to engage in complex talks with the ruling party on institutional reforms, transitional justice, the release of political prisoners, and electoral conditions for the upcoming legislative and regional elections. It is difficult to imagine Maduro ceding power without ironclad guarantees from the opposition and the international community regarding his and his inner circle’s safety, immunity, and influence. 

What Washington Should Do

The United States, along with key regional allies such as Colombia and Brazil, will play a pivotal role in supporting these negotiations. Since November 2022, the United States has offered some sanctions relief and normalization in exchange for electoral concessions. While these efforts have not yielded a major breakthrough, they have, against all expectations, set up a scenario in which Maduro and those around him can see real incentives to keep the process of Venezuela’s global reintegration on track.

Negotiations between political factions will be needed no matter the election results. The question is how to ensure that the talks produce an opening and do not fail where previous rounds of dialogue have failed. The carrots must entice cooperation, while the sticks must be tough enough to deter spoilers. The key will be to avoid starting from zero. 

Any future negotiations should stem from the ongoing negotiation process that began with the 2021 Mexico City memorandum of understanding facilitated by Norway. This agreement set the agenda for the last few years of negotiations. It led to the signing of the October 2023 Barbados Agreement that laid the groundwork for the upcoming election but was unable to ensure Maduro would comply with the entirety of its framework. Untouched elements in the process include guarantees of political rights, the restoration of constitutional order, economic reforms, and transitional justice. This is a tall order, but by supporting achievable, incremental progress and deterring steps backward, the United States and its allies can help build momentum and trust, paving the way for more substantial reforms in the future.

Moreover, regional actors, particularly Colombia and Brazil, should be encouraged to take on more active roles in facilitating these negotiations. Their geographic proximity and shared interests in regional stability position them as key players in supporting a peaceful resolution to Venezuela’s crisis. The creation of a “Group of Friends,” as outlined in the 2021 memorandum of understanding, can formalize regional coordination and provide more structured negotiating channels with Venezuela.

In the long term, the United States must also consider the benefits of expanding its footprint in Venezuela. Specific licenses issued by the Treasury Department have already allowed Western energy companies to maintain operations in the country. Expanding this investment framework can promote greater transparency and help steer Venezuela away from deepening ties with authoritarian powers such as China and Russia. A balanced approach that acknowledges Venezuela’s role in global energy markets while prioritizing humanitarian needs and human rights will be crucial for ensuring long-term stability. At the end of the day, it is not in Washington’s interest to sit back and watch Caracas drift further into the orbit of Moscow and Beijing. Nor is it in the United States’ interest to see Venezuela descend further into authoritarianism. 

As Venezuela’s presidential election approaches, the United States has an important role to play in ensuring that meaningful negotiations restore the country’s institutional progress. By doing so, the United States can help advance the restoration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions and support a peaceful, democratic solution to the country’s ongoing crisis. 

To begin with, U.S. policymakers should wait for the official results and assessments from credible international observers before formulating a policy response. Hasty decisions based on incomplete or biased information could exacerbate tensions and derail diplomatic efforts completely. 

At the same time, the United States must act quickly if Maduro takes new, egregious actions to limit or prevent opposition participation in the elections. It should be made clear that the door to continued sanctions relief will slam shut if the United States receives intelligence of vote tampering, repression of peaceful protests, or other acts of violence. Additionally, any violence perpetrated by the Maduro government should be met with swift and coordinated condemnation. 

All eyes should be on the election results today, but those results will mark only the start of a process that will need to continue for weeks and months to come.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Jason Marczak is a Vice President and Senior Director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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