Defense planners should accordingly account for these political vulnerabilities in their defensive and offensive preparations. In defensive terms, planners should no longer assume a united and stable domestic front. A strike on U.S. forces may not result in a “Pearl Harbor” moment of national unity but merely exacerbate acute and intractable political divisions, much like the COVID-19 pandemic did. Planners must ensure sufficient resources are allocated to control the peril of organized domestic violence. Military operations must also be scaled to what a perpetually fragile state of public support can endure. For offensive operations, China’s vulnerabilities will likely pose lucrative targets. Perpetually discontented minority regions, potential fractures between the central government and powerful regional powerholders, and simmering discontent across the country could combust under the pressures of war. Any attack on China’s domestic security would, of course, invite retaliation in kind. Where the war could escalate from that point cannot be predicted, but in all likelihood, serious domestic threats for both sides would persist so long as the war endures.

Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher with the RAND Corporation.

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