Thus, in any direct, broad-scope, conventional confrontation, it is difficult to believe that the United States’ unique and large combination of lethal, networked systems and platforms, with a panoply of strike and defensive systems, would not be dominant. Moreover, U.S. economic power should not be dismissed from the equation. Building a large, robust conventional-warfare capability is prohibitively expensive, which is why so few countries even try.

It may be, as several of our military leaders have stated, that the United States has reduced its force structure and readiness to the point where it is stretched thin. There also may be discrete contingencies, as there always have been, where our offset is less significant than in others. But on balance, against even a near-peer competitor, the United States still has an overwhelming advantage, qualitatively and numerically. And, as Stalin said, “quantity has a quality of its own.”

In sum, assessing the degree of U.S. military dominance is more art than science. The next administration undoubtedly will shape its own approach to defense planning, with its own assumptions about what threats are reasonably foreseeable, what capabilities our budgets can bear and, ultimately, how to define dominance. Nevertheless, whatever approach is selected, there is no reasonable basis to assume U.S. military superiority is substantially eroding.

II. The Role of “Game-Changing” Offsets in Modern Warfare and Innovation

Both the nature of warfare and the innovative process suggest that the quest for an offset—central game changers that can sustain our military leadership for a generation—is more myth than reality.

A. Game Changers are Few Between and Fleeting in Warfare

Historically, true technological revolutions in military affairs are few and far between. The use of the horse, the development of the composite bow, and the introduction of iron weapons, firearms and nuclear weapons: all these represent true step discontinuities that changed the face of warfare in profound ways. Almost all other military innovations have been largely incremental in nature.

In essence, warfare tends to follow a “punctuated equilibrium” model: long periods of stasis or gradual change, followed by short bursts of radical innovation. And, technological superiority only conveys transient advantages; a new technology rapidly proliferates, negating the initial advantage it conveyed.

The United States’ conventional dominance in the last quarter century is largely an historical aberration rather than a pattern likely to be repeated. The combination of the Reagan buildup, the collapse of the USSR, internal pressures on China and the unwillingness of most other countries to invest in military forces at a time of relative peace meant that the United States was, effectively, unchallenged. It is extraordinary that the United States has reduced its force structure to less than half of what it was at the end of the Cold War, and yet remains more powerful than the next largest military by an order of magnitude.

But history is unlikely to repeat itself, given the dynamics of the global security environment today. Viewed in historical context, the quest for a Third Offset “strategy” focused on one or several technologies or capabilities seems unrealistic.

The Multiplicity of Future Threats. In contrast to the Cold War, where we faced one central threat—to deter and, if necessary, blunt a Soviet thrust into West Germany—today we face a wide range of symmetric and asymmetric threats from a many potential adversaries possessing diverse technologies, organizational constructs and operational methods.

Thus, we certainly can and should drive for innovations that afford us comparative advantages in some key areas, but it is unreasonable to expect that we can develop one or even a handful of breakthroughs that apply across the board against all emerging threats, let alone afford us a sustained overmatch.

The Ephemeral Nature of Offsets. Moreover, any overmatch achieved will likely prove fleeting. Ironically, the very reasons that DoD cites for our apparent loss of an overmatch in the first place—notably, the proliferation of advanced technologies—make it unlikely we can obtain another sustainable broad spectrum overmatch in the future.

B. Directed Offsets as the Antithesis of the Messy Innovative Process

Meaningful defense innovation is not easy or necessarily quick; it’s not like squeezing toothpaste out of a tube. Unfortunately, there is no direct correlation between innovation “inputs” and “outputs.” There is a range of factors that may lead to innovation, including a proper legal enabling environment, a strong talent pool of innovators, financing, collaboration and other variables. But even if all the right inputs are in place, innovation is hard to achieve, unpredictable and may take considerable time, with trials and errors along the way.

The difficulty is compounded when the goal is to produce “game-changing” innovation or offsets. The notion that the United States can, in advance, identify and target a developmental area as an “offset” and then proceed to implement it runs contrary to the nature of the innovative process; it implies that innovation is top-down rather than bottom-up. While top-level decisions played a role in the development of the second offset, for the most part the process was more bottom-up in nature, disjointed and organic, with fractured programs and failures, and tended to originate with technical solutions to local operational requirements.

Technology Investments Are Risky, and Few Prove Out. To borrow an analogy from the investment world, there is a substantial difference between a diversified portfolio of potential investments and a large “bet” on a single stock. Perhaps Warren Buffet has the investment acumen to make one or even several bets and succeed, but history shows most people cannot. Indeed, venture capitalists know that for every bet they make on an early stage high tech start up, most will fail.

The Need for a Diversified Portfolio of R & D Investments. Thus, given the broad spectrum of threats we face and the range of technologies that could make a difference when used in various operational concepts, DoD ought to act like a prudent financial portfolio manager in making R & D investments in the future force.

Investment (security) risks should be spread or mitigated and overall returns (security benefits) maximized by maintaining a diversified portfolio of “equities” (R & D investments) that allocates funds among different elements of the portfolio. Of course, the allocation probably should not be equal; capabilities should be prioritized based on risk assessment, probability of return on investment, time horizons, applicability to a sensible operational concept and other relevant considerations.

III. Russia as a “Great-Power Threat”: Really?

The “Third Offset” is framed as a needed response to “a resurgent, revanchist Russia and a rising China,” countries Deputy Secretary Work views as emerging “great powers” with sufficient military assets to challenge the United States in an all-out conventional war and nuclear deterrents that could survive a first strike.

There is little doubt that China, a peer or near-peer competitor, is a long-term threat. Making significant, but selective investments in defense, China has focused on its naval, air, space and cyberspace capabilities, including a new generation of ballistic missiles, new attack and ballistic-missile submarines, a fifth-generation fighter, antisatellite weapons, hypersonic strike weapons, and a host of anti-carrier weapons.

The real debate centers on Russia, and whether its capabilities should be viewed as a threat relevant to shaping future U.S. forces and the Third Offset.

Certainly, Russia’s recent aggressive actions in Ukraine and Syria mark a sea change in approach. President Vladimir Putin is now far more willing to take a more assertive role in global affairs, using Russia’s military capabilities to support its perceived interests, even if it risks violating international norms and facing international sanctions or international condemnation.

There are any number of reasons for Russia’s new posture, including a desire to reclaim a leadership role on the world stage; opportunism (exploiting situations that have arisen to further its interests, as in Ukraine); the vacuum left by limited U.S. and Western engagement (especially in Syria); and the building of domestic support for the regime, in light of difficult economic difficulties resulting from the collapse of oil prices.

To be sure, there likely are boundaries on future Russian actions, which to date have been limited to traditional areas of Russian influence. Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that the Russian threat has grown, and that the United States and its allies should be better prepared for a range of hybrid contingencies. NATO is taking steps to fortify its eastern flank, including a U.S. armored brigade deployed on a rotating basis in Eastern European member states.

Yet it is important to distinguish between steps to address the Russian threat by: (1) enhancing the deployment, operations, readiness and training of our current and modernizing force (to ensure that we retain the skills and capability for high intensity warfare) and (2) creating a force of the future with an “overmatch.” Notwithstanding Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and Syria, it is difficult to view Russia, in the long term, as a resurgent great power that warrants significant consideration in shaping the future force and the Third Offset.

Russia’s Limited Resources and Declining Population. While it has some seven thousand nuclear weapons, Russia has an economy smaller than that of Italy and a rapidly aging and shrinking population. Moreover, with a heavily petrodollar-based economy, plummeting oil prices have resulted in significant reductions in Russian GDP over the last several years (negative 3 percent in 2015), with further contractions likely.