Finally, Washington’s support for Israel’s right to defend itself against the terrorist attacks by Hamas, although wholly appropriate, sidesteps the issue of the nature and scope of Jerusalem’s “over the top” response. More importantly, it avoids the possibility that, or the extent to which, the Hamas attacks had their origins in decades of Israeli policies of occupation and control that have constrained or deprived Palestinians while delaying indefinitely their hopes for their own state—and which, from a Palestinian perspective, have been facilitated by U.S. support for Israel.

Washington thus bears some accountability for the historical origins of what has been happening in these three places. The United States, of course, must push back forcefully against Putin’s barbarism, Xi’s saber-rattling, and Hamas’ terrorism. Yet, pursuing long-term solutions to the predicaments that are playing out in Ukraine, Taiwan, and Gaza—or even finding ways to de-escalate and manage them—will require acknowledging and confronting their multiple sources. And those sources include the role played by the United States in contributing to each situation.

Moreover, Washington’s denial—or revisionism—about U.S. policies that helped to fuel current or potential crises only makes them more intractable by ignoring a core element of each crisis and thus inhibiting an honest and objective understanding of its nature. This obstructs or closes off the potential for reassessing U.S. policies, which might be vital to identifying solutions. Washington, for example, could be reconsidering the idea of an alternative European security architecture that does not revive a new Cold War.

Even if Russia is defeated in Ukraine, it is not going to go away. Similarly, the United States could consider credible assurances to Beijing that restore confidence in the “one China” normalization agreements that sustained cross-Strait stability for decades. Beijing is not looking for an excuse to attack Taiwan; it is still asking for reasons not to. Finally, Washington could look at incentives for Israel to de-escalate the war in Gaza and its occupation of the West Bank and to resuscitate progress toward a two-state solution. Even if Hamas is defeated, the Palestinian issue is not going away.

In confronting all three foreign policy dilemmas, Washington needs to incorporate an understanding and acknowledgment of the things the United States has done that contributed to them. Reluctance to do so in the past has predictably led to our failure—or refusal—to see what was coming. Unless we overcome these willful blind spots, Washington will fail to see what is coming next—and then again blame it all on the bad guys.

About the Author 

Paul Heer is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).

Image: U.S. Navy Flickr.