The White House released a twelve-page summary report on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan with little fanfare ahead of the Easter holiday. This low-key approach is unsurprising, given that America’s longest war ended in what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley described as a “strategic failure,” and that the national security apparatus has moved on to strategic competition with China and the war in Ukraine.

Yet while the report ostensibly provides context for a series of disastrous decisions that culminated in the deaths of thirteen U.S. service members at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August 2021, it is also notable for what it doesn’t mention: what informed the decision to remove U.S. contractors as part of the operational retrograde. This is especially important considering the Biden administration’s plan relied on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to secure the country during the U.S. withdrawal and beyond.

Where Was the Air Support?

The February 2023 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) report, titled “Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed,” notes that many Afghans thought the bilateral U.S.-Taliban peace agreement was “an act of bad faith and a signal that the U.S. was handing over Afghanistan to the enemy as it rushed to exit the country.” Despite intelligence estimates about when the Afghan government would fall ranging from two years, to somewhere between six to eighteen months, to a month after the U.S. withdrawal, Milley noted that “There are no reports that I am aware of that predicted a security force of 300,000 would evaporate in 11 days.” That is how quickly the Taliban insurgency rapidly took over villages, then provinces, and eventually Kabul itself, as the ANDSF unexpectedly collapsed and the troops melted away. If there was a window to stop or at least slow the Taliban’s advance, it was in those eleven days.

It is here that questions should begin, because, in addition to a sizeable advantage in troop strength over the 80,000 Taliban fighters, the White House report includes the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in its overall assessment of ANDSF capabilities. Unfortunately, the AAF deteriorated before the United States completed the withdrawal and its demise was a predictable (and predicted) outcome not reflected in these intelligence estimates.

Former Afghan Army commander and three-star general Sami Sadat authored a blistering New York Times opinion essay expressing his anger over the peace agreement that cut off contractor support for the fledgling AAF attack and support aircraft fleet when it was critically needed to halt the Taliban offensive. In addition to military forces, the agreement specified that the United States would withdraw “all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel.” Accordingly, Sadat proclaimed that most of the 17,000 contractors were withdrawn by July 2021, “taking their proprietary software and weapons systems with them.” Consequently, the Afghan military lost its “superiority to the Taliban when our air support dried up and our ammunition ran out.”

The SIGAR report corroborates Sadat’s arguments and frustrations. Specifically, it states the AAF “was the greatest advantage the force had over the Taliban” but was not projected to be self-sufficient until at least 2030. The report also explains that the “decision to withdraw on-site contract maintenance from Afghanistan in May 2021 reduced the availability of operational aircraft and removed maintenance instruction at key regional airfields…As a result, ANDSF units complained that they lacked enough ammunition, food, water, and other military equipment to sustain military engagements against the Taliban.”

The SIGAR report concludes that the reduction of U.S. support “destroyed the morale of Afghan soldiers and police.” As demonstrated by Ukraine’s armed forces defending their homeland against a Russian aggressor more than a year after many analysts (wrongly) predicted the government would fall within days or weeks, morale and the will to fight can offset numeric superiority.

Questions to be Asked, Lessons to be Learned

If withdrawing contractors from the AAF was the seminal event described in the SIGAR report and by Sami Sadat, then these decisions warrant greater analysis and consideration going forward. The risk of prematurely cutting off contractor support should concern the Pentagon and policymakers. The demand for contractor support in efforts to advance U.S. national interests is unlikely to abate anytime soon. Moreover, some argue that such contractors have become a permanent element of the U.S. military force structure. If true, it behooves senior leaders in Washington to learn the right lessons from the Afghanistan experience and clarify policy going forward. The U.S. House’s various committees that provide oversight and perform investigations can positively contribute to these efforts by accessing classified reports and calling witnesses to provide a more robust analysis of the situation and the decisions made by military commanders and senior officials.

While one can criticize the United States for setting up the ANDSF for failure by providing an air force that is “too technologically advanced for its native country to sustain,” this risk was known to senior leaders before the withdrawal announcement. The White House summary report notes that President Joe Biden “took the advice of his military commanders on the tactical decisions regarding the operational retrograde of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, including the dates they closed facilities, and he regularly asked them if there was anything else they needed.” The House committees should summon these commanders to Capitol Hill and query them about these conversations and the impact of withdrawing AAF contractors. For example, there were legitimate concerns about force protection requirements for contractors in Afghanistan during the retrograde. What were the discussions regarding risk and was there a mitigation plan? Were there any deliberations about continuing AAF contractor work outside of the country?

In June 2021, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that “we should encourage the Afghan government to retain or engage contractor support for the Afghan Air Force and other key logistical and operational elements of the Afghan security forces – and we should pay for that support (including private security to protect those contractors).” Such an arrangement would allow American and other foreign contractors to remain in Afghanistan and maintain the AAF throughout the U.S. withdrawal and possibly beyond. House committees should inquire whether the Biden administration ever seriously considered such proposals.

Previously, I personally lauded the Biden administration for applying lessons learned from the botched Afghanistan withdrawal to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, I appreciated the extensive consultations and diplomatic efforts to rally NATO and lead a broader international coalition focused on countering Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ambitions and upholding the international order. That said, the “train, advise, assist” approach to build and sustain security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is not applicable to the Ukraine case because the United States does not have military troops conducting these activities in the country. Instead, training the Ukrainian Armed Forces is occurring in Europe and the United States. The contractor support issue will be interesting to watch as Ukraine receives and employs more Western equipment on the battlefield.

While I supported President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and am sympathetic to the constraints and deadlines inherited from his predecessor, he had agency for the withdrawal debacle that occurred on his watch. He should answer questions about whether his administration truly planned “for all contingencies – including a rapid deterioration of the security situation” as described in the summary report. Despite the political theater all too common in Washington these days, House committees should view the White House summary report as an opportunity for sober and bipartisan oversight to find out exactly what transpired, determine appropriate accountability, and codify lessons learned that can be applied in future operations.

Jim Cook is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own.

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