Elsewhere in his text, Hazony notes that empires tend to be built around a “core nation.” The theoretical difference between a nation state as a voluntary union of tribes and an empire as a number of tribes and other nations conquered by an expansionist core is clear enough. What is less certain is how useful this conceptual distinction is when most examples of nation-formation and empire-building throughout history are mixtures of the two types. Consider the uk: is it a nation? Hazony refers to the Welsh as a new tribe “adopted” by the core English into “a broader British nation.” But Wales was conquered by England, as Hazony himself notes in an earlier passage in which he describes England in imperialistic terms. Did an English empire become a British nation? Arguably, that is exactly what historically happened. But it poses some difficulties for a theory that rests upon sharp distinctions between empire and nation.

The historical and conceptual cracks in Hazony’s argument matter because they extend all the way into the argument he makes today. He sees the nation state, on the model of the Protestant construction, as jeopardized by a new liberal moral universalism that is wedded to empire-building projects in the form of international institutions such as the European Union. So far, so good, and the idea that the EU is a reincarnation of the Roman Empire or the Holy Roman Empire can be set aside as unnecessary to the case. Where the history becomes important, however, is in the search for a remedy. Hazony seems to believe that Protestantism is less susceptible to universalistic schemes than Catholic Christianity is. Reminding nations like the United States and uk of their biblical, Protestant roots thus holds the key to checking liberal imperialism. The United States, particularly under a leader like Donald Trump; the UK in the aftermath of Brexit; and Hazony’s own Israel are three biblical nations allied in the struggle against liberal domination.

Alas, the battle lines are not quite so clear: it’s hard to miss the fact that the most aggressive forms of liberal ideology in the modern world come, as it happens, from the great historically Protestant nations: from America itself, whose own tendencies toward Middle East empire-building Hazony criticizes; and from Germany, the driving force of the European integration. Britain is not really an exception—the British elite opposed Brexit have sabotaged its implementation. Rather than a Catholic-Protestant divide, the cultural parallel for the division between imperialists and nationalists should be drawn between rulers and ruled. In Catholic and Protestant countries alike, the elites favor integration and empire, and the public is relatively nationalistic.

At times, Hazony seems to imagine that Protestantism is strictly a faith of the Hebrew Bible, but it is not. Quite the contrary. Protestants have the New Testament as well, and the Christ of the Protestant Bible is every bit as much a universal Messiah as the Christ of the Vatican. Why Protestantism, rather than Catholicism, historically gives rise to liberalism is a complicated question, but part of the answer may lie in the fact that a Protestantism stripped of belief in Christ becomes ideological, while Catholicism is so heavily attached to its institutional structure that it is less apt to become utopian.

Hazony presents a vigorous case for nationalism and its virtues—he never fails to illuminate the vital questions, even when his answers miss the mark. His book should cause liberals to rethink their repugnance toward nationalism, and it should prompt nationalists to reflect more deeply on the roots of their convictions. This is a virtuous, if imperfect, book.

Daniel McCarthy is the editor of Modern Age: A Conservative Review.