This equates engagement with a policy of regime change in China, which is not historically accurate, and which bypasses or denies the potential utility of engagement in pursuit of other bilateral or strategic goals. As a result, the Biden administration has relegated “engagement” with Beijing to the same category as “cooperation”: something Washington cannot advocate (at least not rhetorically) because public and/or Congressional opinion would not support it.

ANOTHER ASPECT of the Biden administration’s approach to China that reflects homegrown insecurity is, paradoxically, its repeated assertions that Washington must deal—and is dealing—with Beijing from a “position of strength.” Aside from the fact that the premise is highly debatable, given the combination of the United States’ internal disarray and its diminished international credibility, these assertions seem to belie a lack of confidence underlying them. Although the United States still exceeds China in virtually every measure of national strength, it is the narrowing of that gap and the current trajectories of the two sides that now frame the strategic dynamic, including and especially the calculations of other countries. In short, there is much global skepticism about whether the United States can convincingly maintain that it is approaching China from a “position of strength,” especially if this is meant to suggest that Washington has the upper hand and can thus dictate the terms of U.S.-China relations.

This is reflected in two recurring themes from the Biden administration: its call for “guardrails to ensure that [U.S.-China] competition does not veer into conflict,” and its pursuit of an international environment and international rules that are “favorable to our interests and our values.” The administration has not provided a clear explanation of the “guardrails” metaphor, but it appears to refer to setting boundaries on Chinese behavior, and thus reflects Washington’s efforts to set the terms of the relationship. This at least is how Beijing interprets it, as indicated by Chinese vice foreign minister Xie Feng immediately after the November 15 “virtual meeting” between Biden and Xi Jinping. Xie said that any setting of guardrails “should be done through consultation on an equal footing, agreed and adhered to by both sides, rather than one side imposing conditions on the other.” Similarly, the Biden administration’s emphasis on upholding a global order that is “favorable” to U.S. interests and values, although it sounds reasonable and even desirable, essentially retains the notion that the United States would continue to enjoy global primacy—which, as noted earlier, is probably historically obsolete.

Washington’s assertion (or assumption) that it retains the upper hand in the U.S.-China relationship, to whatever extent it conceals a fear that this may longer be correct, reflects further resistance to the idea that the United States’ global position has weakened. This defiance is accompanied by an apparent disinclination to acknowledge any U.S. role in contributing to the downturn in the relationship. Instead, Beijing is held wholly accountable on the grounds that it is China’s hegemonic ambitions, coercive diplomacy, predatory trade practices, and autocratic nature that have created the strategic competition between the two countries. China certainly merits ample blame—and for those reasons—but not exclusively. Moreover, the balance sheet is more symmetrical than is generally recognized. Washington routinely criticizes Beijing’s litany of grievances against the United States, notwithstanding the symmetry of Washington’s own regular list of grievances against China (on such issues as Taiwan, Hong Kong, trade, and human rights). Similarly, the U.S. side disparages Beijing’s perennial insistence that Washington “tied the knot and must untie it,” while asserting that Beijing bears the burden of repairing the relationship. Presumably, this is partly because U.S. domestic politics would not abide any acceptance of American blame or responsibility.

This is reflected in the U.S. approach to the highly contentious issue of Taiwan. Washington focuses inordinately on the potential threat of a Chinese military attack against the island, rather than address the possibility that Beijing’s escalating rhetoric and saber-rattling are a response (at least in part) to actions by Washington itself that arguably violate the historical U.S. commitment to a “one China policy.” Incremental upgrades in U.S. interactions with Taipei, and reinterpretations of Washington’s normalization commitments to Beijing, raise valid questions about what substance remains to that policy. As Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said to Secretary of State Antony Blinken in October 2021, Washington should “pursue a real one-China policy, instead of a fake one” and should “truly implement the one-China policy and put it into action, instead of saying one thing and doing the opposite.” Washington, however, has recalibrated its “one China policy” in response to domestic political pressure to adopt a harder line toward Beijing. The Biden administration is now captive to those pressures, because any flagging of rhetorical or substantive support for Taiwan would reinforce the notion that Biden is soft on China, or intimidated by it. As a result, Washington appears more inclined to inflate the imminent danger of Chinese aggression than to confront the dilemmas inherent in its own policy toward the Taiwan issue.

AMERICA’S SENSE of domestic vulnerability also exacerbates the ideological component of the U.S.-China competition. The Biden administration has repeatedly framed the contest as a struggle between autocracy and democracy. For its part, Beijing is obviously seeking to legitimize its governance model, and has even seized upon the claim that China’s model is proving superior to democracy in meeting the needs of the people governed. Indeed, this was the central theme of Beijing’s public criticism of Biden’s December 2021 “Summit for Democracy.” This would be an obviously ridiculous argument if democracy in the United States was not as compromised and at risk as it has become over the past several years. Indeed, the internal threats to American democracy are now more real and substantive than any threat posed by Chinese autocracy; and any threat from the latter exists only because of the currently exposed frailties of the former. Here again, domestic U.S. dysfunction is inflating both the threat from China and American vulnerability to that threat.

All of this is abundantly apparent to the rest of the world, including U.S. allies and partners. The Biden administration has highlighted the vital importance of working with like-minded countries in confronting the strategic competition from China. But to be like-minded, other countries would need to share Washington’s assessment of the nature and the scope of the Chinese challenge. U.S. allies and partners generally agree that Beijing is ruthless and predatory in its international behavior, and are troubled by its efforts to globally legitimize its autocratic system and its way of doing business. At the same time, many of them appear less convinced than Washington is that Beijing is seeking global hegemony, and more attentive to the reasons why China is scoring points against the United States internationally. Moreover, many U.S. allies and partners appear to be uncomfortable with elements of what they see as Washington’s overly confrontational approach to Beijing, refusal to acknowledge the relative diminution of American power and influence, and exaggerated fears of China—all of which they too probably attribute in part to America’s internal vulnerabilities. In sum, they almost certainly judge that Washington is not in a position to dictate the terms of either the U.S.-China relationship or China’s engagement with the rest of the world.

THIS DYNAMIC—in which U.S. domestic dysfunction is fueling inflated fears of China and, to some extent, being unduly blamed on China—carries two downside risks. To whatever extent America attributes its domestic problems to Beijing, this can only divert the United States from addressing the internal causes of those problems. It is easier to deflect responsibility than to accept and confront it. Second, it will be very difficult to manage U.S.-China relations as long as Washington is using an inaccurate assessment of Chinese motives and intentions as the basis for exaggerated threat perceptions. This essentially mirrors Beijing’s own flawed assessment that the United States seeks to contain China and overthrow its Communist regime.

These circumstances can only push U.S.-China relations further down an adversarial path. Washington’s inflation of Beijing’s strategic ambitions, insistence on exclusive Chinese responsibility for bilateral tensions, and avoidance of American vulnerabilities are reinforcing its hard line against China. Beijing is almost certain to respond in kind, as it sees in this U.S. approach a validation of its own presumptions that Washington has malign intentions toward China, expects to set the terms of the relationship, and is averse to cooperative coexistence. The United States’ domestic insecurities, and its external channeling of them, are thus contributing to an increasingly hostile U.S.-China relationship. And the polarization of American politics is hampering the pursuit of a more rational and constructive approach to Beijing.

Arresting and reversing this trend will require both Beijing and Washington to retreat to a more realistic and pragmatic posture toward each other. For their part, Chinese leaders will need to manage their own domestic political pressures to avoid appearing “soft” on the United States. They must similarly avoid overestimating China’s relative strength and leverage in the bilateral relationship. Washington, on the other hand, will need to recognize the new historical balance of power, the limits this imposes on U.S. leverage over China, and America’s own accountability for the economic and political vulnerabilities that have eroded U.S. strategic competitiveness. This includes recognizing the seriousness of both the United States’ domestic political crisis and the erosion of its international reputation.