According to Yaakov Amidror, Israel's former National Security Adviser, who in 1981 was a case officer in the Israeli intelligence corps, Menachem Begin’s thinking was guided by a belief that “Israel’s fate must not be gambled with” and that “any threat to Jewish existence should be firmly treated.”

The belief that Saddam Hussein may act irrationally to harm Israel was not unique to Begin’s government, and represents persistent views that are widespread in Israel. During the Gulf War of 1991, then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir often referred to Hussein as a “madman.” The Israeli Military's Chief Of Staff, Dan Shomron, argued that Saddam was an irrational player who “even thinks in terms of suicide.” He publicly stated that “Saddam Hussein is not deterred, not only by Israel but by a superpower such as the United States.”

Alarmist Realism

Although Israel's unwillingness to accept containment and nuclear parity may seem paranoid, documents seized by American forces in 2003 indicate that Israel’s reading of Iraq was not at all inaccurate. Recordings of Saddam's intimate strategy-planning meetings reveal a line of thinking which closely mirrors Israel's qualms. In the Spring of 1979, Saddam would tell his advisers: "We are willing to sit and refrain from using it... so that we can guarantee the long war that is destructive to [Israel], and take at our leisure each meter of land and drown the enemy with rivers of blood. We have no vision for a war that is any less than this."

This and other discussions paint a picture of Hussein’s two-stage plan: The first phase in it was to achieve nuclear parity with Israel; the second phase was to use nuclear deterrence to confront Israel on the conventional plain, a level in which Iraq and its allies would enjoy considerable advantages. In one discussion, Saddam explains that unless nuclear parity is reached, Israel would simply drop a bomb on Baghdad if it were to feel existentially threatened.

Despite accusations of alarmism, it turned out that in Iraq’s case, Israeli assessments were realistic in their understanding of Saddam's thinking. This does not mean that the same logic should automatically be applied to Tehran, of course, and even senior voices within Israel's security establishment argue that the Iranian leadership is "pragmatic". However, the Iraqi experience teaches us that alarmism does not necessarily exclude realism, and that in the Iranian case as well, Israel's pronounced fears should not be dismissed off-hand.

From Containment to Confinement

The risk that the positive American experience with containment will not repeat itself in the Middle East is great. Ironically, by opting for containment, America may increase the incentives for both Israel and Iran to take greater risks. For Americans who believe their national interest is better served by containment of a nuclear Iran than by its preemption, it would be prudent to adapt their strategy to the context of the Middle Eastern.

The geographical disparity between Israel and its rivals could be eliminated by stationing a permanent American military presence in Israel, backed by a nuclear umbrella. In the same vein, a reinforcement of Israel’s "second strike" capabilities would further eliminate disparities caused by the geographic and demographic gap. Another option would be to establish an American-Israeli security treaty, which would reduce the appeal to Iranian hardliners of forming a countering coalition against Israel.

In sum, those who call for containment of a nuclear Iran should think carefully on what a transition to such a reality might actually entail. If the ultimate American interest in the region is stability—and to avoid another Middle Eastern war—opting for an American policy of containment may, ironically, produce the diametrically opposed result.

Avner Golov is a researcher at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies. Uri Sadot is a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations’ program for Middle East Studies.

Image: Israel Defense Forces Flickr.