With Taiwan’s January elections giving a different result than mainland China had hoped for, the PRC has introduced a new scheme that has the potential to have disastrous international consequences: the change of routine air traffic control procedure. As a result, there is now passive-aggressive weaponization of civilian air traffic in the contested Taiwan Strait.

Any pilot or air traffic controller would find the Chinese changes concerning. Route M503 is the southbound route air traffic uses to fly to the left or west of the line separating Chinese and Taiwan airspace. M503 also feeds two right turns (W122 and W123) that go to Chinese mainland airports but almost fly over Matsu and Kinmen, two Taiwanese counties only thousands of feet off China’s coast. In a move of political escalation, China has now moved the M503 route right up against the line of separation in the Taiwan Straits. 

Re-routing M503 to skirt the center line benefits Chinese ambitions of dominating Taiwan by supporting potential “gray zone” operations. Now, the Taiwanese have significantly less time to react, challenge, and escort aircraft out of their airspace. Additionally, it’s cognitive warfare with China telling the Taiwanese, “There is no such thing as the ‘median line’ of the Taiwan Strait.”

On January 9, before the Taiwan Elections, China conducted a missile launch over the country, later explained as a civilian space launch. The move of M503 also helped create a larger Chinese buffer between Taiwan and its Matsu and Kinmen Counties, further isolating these counties and helping China keep Taiwanese re-enforcements at bay if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decides to do a soft invasion of Matsu and Kinmen. 

The danger is that civilian airliners are now being introduced as a tactic in the increasing tension between China and Taiwan. What if these airliners were filled with special operation troops who had to conduct a no-notice “emergency” landing on Matsu and Kinmen to seize these Taiwanese forward airfields? This gives only Taiwan minutes or even seconds to make critical decisions.

As the past has shown, introducing civil airliners to such situations can be fatal. KAL 007 was the Korean Airlines flight shot down by Soviet Interceptors in 1983 as it arced from Alaska to South Korea and strayed over Soviet territory. Shot down in a typically thuggish and brutal Soviet fashion, all 269 passengers perished despite Soviet interceptors having direct visual confirmation that it was a civilian airliner. The USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian aircraft that approached the ship in 1988 as it was engaged in a live battle with Iranian naval forces. Regardless of whether the routing and flight profile of the Iranian airliner were intentional or not, 290 were killed in that shootdown. 

The Chinese aviation authorities’ actions support the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) malign coercion activities. However, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act mentions support from the United States in case of coercive action directed at Taiwan. The Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also strongly condemned these actions while pointing out China’s violation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Regulations. The U.S. State Department has also been critical of this Chinese pressure campaign.

The current situation is both coercive and dangerous, with the possibility that civil airliners will be used as human shields for the CCP. The absurdity, opportunities for lethal mistakes, and high stakes of this situation call for the representation of Taiwan in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) proceedings.

John R. Mills is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and Former Director of Cybersecurity Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. John served over the last forty years, from the Cold War to the era of Great Power Competition. This service has been in uniform and as a senior civilian for the Department of Defense. John is a regular contributor to multiple print and broadcast media companies.

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