Since the visit of then-speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to Taiwan in August 2022, tensions between the United States and China over the island have continued to rise.

In a recent letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Representative Michelle Steel (R-CA,) a member of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, argued that recent incidents involving China’s aggression toward Taiwan, as well as the Philippines, are unacceptable and must be stopped. More significantly, in a recent article, Chinese Professor Jin Canrong, an advisor to China’s national legislature and several other government bodies, argues that peaceful options for uniting Taiwan are fading.

As the United States decides how to respond to this situation, I have been reminded of something that happened to me many years ago. In the summer of 1965, in what was supposed to be my last year on active duty as a naval flight officer, I was awakened in the middle of the night and told I was being transferred out of my patrol squadron (VP-1), which had just returned from a six-month deployment to the Pacific, to the staff of Patrol Force 7th Fleet homeported in Okinawa. When I asked my contact at the Bureau of Naval Personnel why this was happening, I was told it was because the war in Vietnam was going to heat up and that I probably would have my service extended.

In fact, as I was driving from my home base at the Naval Air station, Whidbey Island, Washington, to the Treasure Island naval base in San Francisco to arrange my flight to Okinawa, President Johnson announced the first of what would be several massive infusions of American combat forces into Vietnam.

When I landed in Okinawa, I immediately boarded a ship that was headed to Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam for my boss, the commander of the Patrol Force, to take charge of Operation Market Time, whose goal was to prevent North Vietnamese ships from supplying enemy forces in South Vietnam by sea, coasts, and rivers.

After joining the staff of the Patrol Force 7th Fleet, I was surprised to learn that in addition to commanding all of the Patrol Forces in the western Pacific, including Vietnam, my boss, a two-star admiral, was also in charge of the Taiwan Patrol Force. This was something I had not yet heard of, even though I had flown through the Taiwan straits several times during my recent deployment to the Pacific. Consequently, we not only supervised and commanded all the Taiwan patrols but also made several trips to Taiwan each year, and I came to recognize and appreciate the importance of Taiwan to U.S. security and the critical role that the Patrol Force played in protecting Taiwan and preventing China from taking the island by force. 

The Taiwan Patrol Force was established by President Truman in 1950 to prevent the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which we were fighting in Korea, from taking control of Taiwan. The force remained stationed until 1979 when the United States formally adopted the one-China policy. As Professor Bruce Elleman of the Navy War College has demonstrated in his comprehensive analysis of the operation, the Taiwan Patrol Force was not only one of the longest naval operations in history but also one of the most successful. In fact, as Elleman notes, it did its job so well that friction over the Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan did not escalate despite at least three major crises during the 50s and 60s. One of its commanders, Admiral George Anderson, went on to become the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).

In 1953, the Patrol Force became part of the Taiwan defense command, which was also commanded by an admiral and which, at one time, had as many as 30,000 troops from all the services stationed on the island. The U.S. Navy presence was confined to Kaohsiung and Keelung, on the southern and northern parts of the island, and supervised and scheduled the sea and air patrols that took place in the South China Sea between mainland China and Taiwan. 

As the United States considers what steps to take to respond to China’s increasingly aggressive military behavior in the Taiwan Straits and President Xi Jinping’s claims that reunifying Taiwan is a legacy issue for him, it needs to enhance deterrence by first re-establishing the Taiwan Patrol Force to coordinate and conduct continuous sea and air patrols in the straits and permanently station some naval people and repair facilities on Taiwan. 

But that will not be enough. We must also expedite the sale of military equipment that Taiwan has already purchased for the country. Taiwan is facing a $19.7 billion backlog in foreign military sales from the United States. This is a result of the cumbersome foreign military sales process we have. To deal with this situation, Taiwan should be designated a major non-NATO ally, receive the same priority for weapons deliveries as Ukraine now does, and immediately be provided with the weapons it has already ordered. 

Some will argue that these steps, especially the reconstitution of the Patrol Force, could provoke more aggression from China. Still, they have already become increasingly aggressive since Speaker Pelosi’s visit. For example, the Chinese are routinely crossing the median line between mainland China and Taiwan, including having their planes and ships conduct multiple sorties close to Taiwan, penetrating the Taiwan air defense identification zone, sending drones over Taiwan, and conducting live fire exercises over the island. Since Speaker Pelosi’s visit, the Chinese have ramped up sorties across the median line and into the air defense identification zone. 

With a revitalized Taiwan Patrol Force, the United States can conduct more frequent and more regular sea and air patrols through the straits. By stationing some personnel on the island, we would be better able to implement President Biden’s promise to defend Taiwan in case China tries to overthrow the government by force. Moreover, we already provide them with sophisticated military equipment. Re-establishing the Patrol Force and expediting the sale of more military equipment would greatly increase our ability to deter and, if necessary, better combat Chinese military action. 

Lawrence J. Korb, a retired Navy Captain, worked on foreign policy issues at several think tanks and was Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration.

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