Upon taking office in 1957 in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, British Prime Minister Harold McMillan was asked what was his biggest foreign policy challenge. He famously replied, “Events, dear boy, events.” Regardless of official national security strategies, more often than not, much of an administration’s foreign policy tends to be reactions to events, Ukraine and Gaza being two prominent, modern examples.

In pondering what sort of North Korean policy to expect from a Kamala Harris administration, one of mostly continuity with President Joe Biden’s strategic patience approach would be a safe bet, all other things being equal. Absent a major provocation, a seventh nuclear test, or another attack on disputed South Korean islands, a Harris administration would like to focus on bigger fish to fry.  

Why? 

Several obvious reasons, both globally and Korea-specific: wars in Ukraine and Gaza are more likely to escalate than be resolved, and persisting tensions in the South China Sea are another candidate for escalation. These alone would offer a reasonable case for keeping North Korea on the back burner. 

But the most compelling rationale for a cautious approach may be the stark reality on the Korean Peninsula. Since diplomacy with North Korea began in 1992, a fundamental obstacle has been a profound mutual distrust. This deepened after the failed Six-Party Talks in 2005 and appears to have hit a breaking point after the unsuccessful Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit in 2019.  

In 2021 a humiliated Kim Jong-un made a strategic choice to abandon Pyongyang’s longstanding strategic goal of normalizing ties to the United States; define itself as a nuclear state, enshrining this fact in its constitution; and accelerate efforts to qualitatively and quantitatively improve its nuclear and missile programs. It has obtained solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United States, as well as multi-warhead missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons that have changed the strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula.  

Kim’s nuclear investments and stated intent strongly suggest there is no obvious path to serious, renewed denuclearization talks. The Biden administration still maintains that denuclearization is its long-term goal, though recently it added a new wrinkle, hinting that still vague interim steps may be possible. But the current U.S.-North Korea dynamic appears moving in a more confrontational direction. 

While the Biden administration has consistently offered unconditional talks with Pyongyang, Kim has ignored the offers, continuing to ramp up his nuclear and missile programs. The focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea has been strengthening deterrence, seeking to reassure the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, and concentrating on building a U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral alliance and defense cooperation, showcased at the Camp David summit in August 2023. 

A Harris administration would almost certainly seek to build on this success by enhancing alliances seeking new areas of trilateral cooperation and eschewing denuclearization diplomacy. To be fair, it is difficult to envision any U.S. policy initiative that would persuade Kim to trust U.S. offers instead of his nukes. Americans tend to think all problems have solutions if only the right policy is applied. But some wicked problems can only be managed. 

Nonetheless, there are those unpredictable events. As if to tease both presidential candidates, Pyongyang launched a barrage of short-range ballistic missile tests, and Kim pledged to make his nuclear force ready for combat with the United States. But most curiously, North Korean media published a rare photo of Kim inspecting a top-secret uranium enrichment plant and promising to build more nuclear weapons.  

This may be a prelude to the next crisis. Pyongyang has been increasingly belligerent in disputing the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the maritime border between North and South, carved out by the United Nations Command at the time of the 1953 armistice. Pyongyang disputes the NLL and has attacked islands controlled by South Korea several times. 

In 2010, Pyongyang fired on Yeonpyeong, one of the five islands, known as the Northwest Islands, which the NLL defines as South Korean, killing two ROK Marines, and also sinking a South Korean ship. North Korea fired 200 artillery shells at the island earlier this year. A larger assault and a South Korean military response is a plausible event that could precipitate a crisis challenging the Harris administration’s preferred policy. Stay tuned. 

About the Author: Robert A. Manning 

Robert A. Manning is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center and is in Strategic Foresight and China programs. He previously served as senior counselor to the undersecretary of State for global affairs, as a member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, on the National Intelligence Council Strategic Futures Group, and was also Senior advisor at the DNI Counter-Proliferation Center. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.

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