As Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, composes his cabinet, one position remains conspicuously vacant: Minister for Economic Cooperation with Russia. Moscow has noticed, with Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova saying plainly, “If Japan closes ties, we will look for other partners.” Ishiba’s move signals a continued, and potentially more assertive, departure from the brief period of improvement of relations that Tokyo and Moscow enjoyed under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the late 2010s. This has since been interrupted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The fact that Ishiba has been sanctioned by Moscow since 2022 does not help matters.

Created in 2016 under Abe, the Minister for Economic Cooperation with Russia has traditionally been held by Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry. It was occupied through Prime Minister Kishida’s tenure, despite calls from lawmakers in both Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and opposition parties to abolish the title. Although largely symbolic, the position’s inception rests in the broader eight-point plan of economic cooperation presented by Abe to Vladimir Putin during the 2016 Russia-Japan Summit in Sochi. The plan was a notable step toward improving relations that had been inflamed following Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This triggered a slew of retaliatory measures by Japan, including the freezing of agreements on investment, visas, and security.

Beyond moving to improve economic relations, the summit eased tensions surrounding Japan’s Northern Territories, the contested Kuril Islands claimed by Japan but administered by Russia since the Soviet occupation during World War II. The Russian program allowing visa-free access to the islands by its former Japanese residents was expanded, and more Japanese citizens were allowed access to visit the graves of their family members, a point of domestic political contention in Tokyo that Ishiba highlighted during his campaign.

The progress on the issue of the Northern Territories supported efforts for the establishment of a peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo, which would formally end post-World War II hostilities and settle the issue of the sovereignty of the islands. Although no treaty was signed as a result of Abe’s efforts, Russia-Japan trade and visits to the Northern Territories continued mostly unimpeded until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, despite several minor diplomatic rows.

Under Prime Minister Kishida, Japan joined the West’s sanctions regime against Russia, triggering a major diplomatic fallout between Moscow and Tokyo. Within a month of the invasion, Russia suspended all talks relating to a peace treaty with Japan. It halted visa-free access for former Japanese residents of the Northern Territories, alongside disruptions to trade due to sanctions and Japan’s downgrading of Russia’s ‘most favored nation’ status.

Although not wholly indicative of Russia’s diplomatic posture, former Russian president turned deputy chairman of Russia’s National Security Council Dmitry Medvedev proclaimed that the issue of the Northern Territories was “closed once and for all” and that those upset in Japan should “end their life in the traditional Japanese way, by committing seppuku.”

The growing division in Russia-Japan relations was accompanied by stronger bilateral relations between the United States and Japan, as the two countries pledged several new points of cooperation during Kishida’s state visit in April. Notably, both countries enhanced their defense partnership by agreeing to upgrade and modernize their Command and Control systems, including the long-awaited establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces Joint Operations Command. This new command structure aims to unify and oversee all SDF joint operations, complementing the restructured Joint Force Headquarters with US Forces Japan. The two countries also recently established the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment Forum, which enables U.S. and Japanese officials and business leaders to discuss areas for closer industrial cooperation.

In addition to stronger bilateral defense ties, Japan has also increased its multilateral engagement with NATO. Since the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, Kishida has participated in every successive NATO summit to identify areas of mutual security interests. Most recently, following the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC, NATO and Japan agreed to enhance cooperation in cyber defense, emerging technologies, maritime security, and resilience under the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme.

Ishiba took an aggressive posture toward Moscow during his campaign to become the leader of the LDP in September. He articulated his foreign policy vision in comments to the Hudson Institute, recognizing a growing partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow and emphasizing the need for new methods of deterrence against Russia, China, and North Korea. Additionally, in response to several incursions by Russian aircraft last week, Ishiba proposed amending Japanese law to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to fire on aircraft violating Japanese airspace.

During his security-heavy inaugural policy speech to the Japanese Diet this week, Ishiba referenced Russia’s airspace violation, calling it a “serious violation” of Japanese sovereignty. He also committed to continuing Japan’s sanctions regime against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, echoing earlier statements made by his newly appointed foreign minister.

While recognizing that Japan-Russia relations are tense, Ishiba pledged to continue aiming for a Russia-Japan peace treaty and to resolve the issue of the sovereignty of the Northern Territories. However, as Zakharova’s comments highlight, continued negotiations are unlikely to occur as long as Japan maintains sanctions.

With all indicators pointing to, at minimum, a continuation of the tense diplomatic status quo between Russia and Japan, Ishiba is unlikely to reverse the Kishida administration’s course as long as the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues. His aspirations for a stronger Japanese defense, including the implication of greater deterrence against Russia, indicate further agitation in Moscow as Japanese cooperation with the United States and NATO continues to grow.

Just days into his administration, Ishiba has already drawn the ire of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—and it likely will not be the last time.

Kareem Rifai is a graduate student in the Security Studies program at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, concentrating in Technology and Security.

Will Kielm is a Research Fellow at the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

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