The attempted overthrow of Mikhail Gorbachev by a coalition of Soviet hardliners in August has heightened unease in the West about the control of Soviet nuclear weapons.  This unease has centered on two issues: 1. the possibility that the coup leaders could have ordered the launching of nuclear missiles, and 2. the prospect that growing ethnic turmoil could result in the seizure and use of nuclear weapons in outlying republics.

Anxiety about these matters is understandable.  The United States has an obvious stake in ensuring that Soviet nuclear weapons are not launched by unauthorized personnel.  Since the beginning of last year,  the [cm;1]cia[cm;0] has even been offering detailed advice on nuclear weapons security to [cm;1]kgb[cm;0] officials.  No doubt, those exchanges will increase now that the political climate in the Soviet Union has taken a decisive turn for the better.

Nevertheless, it is still worth asking whether most of the fears about the security of Soviet nuclear weapons are warranted.  Prudent concern is one thing; but undue alarm is quite another.

Soviet nuclear command practices have long included certain authorization codes to put weapons on higher alert, and a separate set of codes to initiate the launching, firing, and detonation.  Some of these codes reside with the national command authority, and another set are controlled by the Defense Ministry.  (The [cm;1]kgb[cm;0] traditionally served as a backup.)  Unless both sets of codes are implemented together in stages by authorized commanders, no weapons can be used.  At every stage, unauthorized actions will be thwarted either by technological safeguards or by the numerous officers responsible for carrying out the full procedures.  The mere possession of codes does not confer on the possessor either the authority or the ability to use nuclear weapons.

It is true that during the abortive coup, Soviet nuclear command authority was briefly confused, as certain authorization codes were apparently removed from Gorbachev's vicinity.  Nevertheless, contrary to some Western press reports, this confusion did not increase the risk of an unauthorized nuclear launch; just the opposite.  Because Soviet launching procedures are so complex and require such a precise sequence of combined actions, anything that would have disrupted those procedures would make it more, not less, difficult for the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons.  Thus, the removal of the codes actually decreased the likelihood that Soviet missiles could be launched under any circumstances (even for such "authorized" purposes as retaliation against foreign attack).  It is not surprising that at no time during the crisis was there the slightest hint that any of the participants even remotely contemplated, much less attempted, the use of nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration confirmed that there "was never any concern about a nuclear threat of any kind" during the abortive coup, but the administration has been more circumspect about the notion that ethnic insurgents or breakaway republic governments could obtain a nuclear capability.  When William Webster stepped down as head of the [cm;1]cia[cm;0] in May, he warned that if events deteriorate further, the Soviet Union could dissolve into a group of nuclear powers.  Webster urged the U.S. intelligence community to "pay a lot of attention to the possibility that the central [Soviet] government will lose its control" over nuclear missiles in "areas of ethnic violence and rivalry."  This same threat has been cited by numerous other officials in both Washington and Moscow.

In reality, however, concerns about the emergence of "fifteen nuclear powers" are unwarranted.  Not only are most of these concerns technically ill-founded, but they have played into the hands of those within the Soviet Union who are determined to retain forcible control over independence-minded nationalities.

Indeed, the concern expressed by U.S. officials has done more harm than good.  Soviet military officers and Communist Party functionaries scoffed at these Western fears until they realized that the specter of nuclear proliferation could be used against ethnic minorities seeking independence.  Accordingly, even before the coup, hardline forces in Moscow took up the "fifteen nuclear powers" argument with gusto.  Last spring, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov (who was later arrested for his part in the coup) referred ominously to "voices that are being raised for the transfer of nuclear weapons to individual republics."  The commander-in-chief of the Soviet Union's strategic missile forces, General Yuri Maksimov, issued dire warnings about the "unprecedented danger" that would ensue if the non-Slavic republics became independent.

In the same way, Soviet officials who tried to obtain many billions of dollars from the West earlier this year used the nuclear scenario to spur their prospective creditors into action.  Gorbachev conveyed this message in his pleas for economic assistance from the West, arguing that without aid, perestroika could collapse and bring "chaos" to the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which would be "a catastrophe not just for our country but for the whole world."  Similarly, in an article published in International Economy, Soviet economist Grigori Yavlinsky and one of Gorbachev's top advisers, Yevgeni Primakov, warned that if the West failed to provide large-scale subsidies, "dangerous  geopolitical problems" would ensue, including "a reduction of control over one of the world's largest nuclear potentials."

All these Soviet warnings were little more than disingenuous attempts to exploit the anxieties--and pocketbooks--of Western governments and publics.  There are real dangers stemming from instability in the Soviet Union, but the emergence of "fifteen nuclear powers" is not one of them.  The likelihood that a separatist group would ever capture a nuclear weapon is virtually zero; and the possibility that such a group, if it could capture a nuclear weapon, would actually be able to use it is, for all practical purposes, non-existent.

The Lay of the Land

Until recently, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, totaling some 33,000 weapons, was scattered among all fifteen republics.  But the geographical distribution of these weapons was always uneven.  Except for two [cm;1]ss[cm;0]-18 missile fields located in northern Kazakhstan, all Soviet long-range strategic missiles have been based entirely in the three Slavic republics--Russia, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine.  None of these republics has yet been the site of violent ethnic unrest.  Although the Ukraine has now embarked on the road to independence, republic officials have indicated that they have no intention of laying claim to the nuclear weapons on their soil.  Instead, all such weapons will either be eliminated or transferred to Russian territory.  As for Kazakhstan, the area around the missile fields is inhabited mainly by ethnic Russians, and most of the [cm;1]ss-[cm;0]18s in that republic are due to be eliminated under the newly completed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Nuclear munitions based in the other non-Slavic republics, where unrest has often flared up, have been deployed either on bombers or on short-range, tactical weapons, not on strategic missiles that can strike the United States.  The distinction between the two types of weapons is important.  Soviet strategic missiles are maintained at a high level of combat readiness, and are therefore always deployed with operational nuclear warheads.  Soviet tactical weapons, by contrast, are normally maintained at a low level of readiness, and can be deployed without their nuclear payloads if necessary.  The warheads, in that case, are stored separately at secure locations until needed during a severe crisis or in wartime.

If nuclear warheads were actually still present on Soviet tactical weapons, the capture of one or more of these weapons by insurgents would be of some propaganda value (though how much is uncertain).  Reports surfaced in January 1990 that a group of Azerbaijani nationalists had attacked a Soviet nuclear depot near Baku, and that the assault had been swiftly rebuffed.  Whether these reports were accurate is as yet unclear, but even if they were, the important thing is that the attempted seizure was easily thwarted.

Since that time, Soviet leaders have been acutely aware of the risk that another, better-armed group of separatists might try to attack a nuclear weapons site.  As a result, numerous steps have been taken to ensure that the danger never materializes.  In the spring of 1990, Soviet troops began removing nuclear munitions from the most turbulent republics--the Baltics and the Transcaucasus--and keeping them under very close guard on Russian territory.  The Soviet government also has significantly bolstered the size and weaponry of elite [cm;1]kgb[cm;0] units that protect all remaining nuclear weapon installations.  The chance that a tactical nuclear weapon could be captured by insurgents is now virtually nil--the warheads have been removed from the areas of greatest concern and the weapons left are heavily guarded and could easily and quickly be transported out.

The relocation of nuclear warheads would be reason enough for skepticism about predictions that Soviet nuclear weapons will "end up in the hands of rebels."  But for the sake of argument, suppose that--unlikely though it may be--something went wrong and a separatist group did capture a nuclear weapon.  Would they be able to use it?

Precise information about Soviet nuclear weapon design practices is unavailable, so the answer to this question cannot be absolute.  (Once upon a time, the best means of keeping track of Soviet design practices was through detailed analysis of fallout and debris from Soviet nuclear tests; but that has been impossible since 1963, when atmospheric nuclear testing was proscribed by the Limited Test Ban Treaty.)  Nevertheless, based on what we do know about Soviet weapons design--which is more than most people suspect--the answer is overwhelmingly no.

Western knowledge of security and safety features on Soviet nuclear weapons comes from a variety of sources.  A few key details have emerged from exchanges of data that nuclear weapons experts in the two countries have conducted.  As far back as the Kennedy administration, U.S. officials recognized the benefit of ensuring that Soviet military planners and weapon designers were abreast of technological developments that would bolster the security of nuclear weapons.  But until recently, Soviet experts had been disinclined to say much during these exchanges.  Often the American participants simply presented their views without eliciting more than a perfunctory response.  Since early 1990, however, when contacts on the matter increased, Soviet officials have been more willing to discuss the precautions they have taken against an unauthorized or accidental launch.

Other information comes from specialized Soviet publications and statements in the Soviet press.  Although Soviet officials almost never speak openly about particular aspects of nuclear warhead design, their general references to weapon features can shed a good deal of light for well-trained Western observers.  Moreover, on a few occasions Soviet experts have made specific mention of weapon security devices, as in May 1990 when a high-ranking military officer, General Geli Batenin, discussed these features at considerable length.

Finally, some information comes from technical inference and analysis.  For example, Western observers who know the size and yield of Soviet warheads (through overhead reconnaissance, interception of telemetry, and seismological measurement) can estimate, with considerable accuracy, whether the weapons are equipped with one of the most important safety features, insensitive high explosives.  Similarly, changes in Soviet deployment and handling procedures--such as the mating of delivery vehicles and warheads in the mid-1960s--can often reveal the presence (or absence) of security and safety features.

Based on these sources of information, there is every reason to believe that Soviet nuclear weapons, particularly long-range missiles that are on permanent combat alert, are equipped with a variety of "negative" and "positive" features that would prevent unauthorized use.  "Negative" security mechanisms, such as permissive-action links ([cm;1]pal[cm;0]s) and other use-denial features, physically prevent a nuclear weapon from being used until unique authorization codes are received from the national command and the requisite firing procedures are implemented.  Insurgent groups would have no access to the codes needed to initiate a missile launch or a nuclear explosion.

Soviet weapons also have been equipped with anti-diversion membranes and sensors, which are designed to render a weapon inert (by disrupting the fissile material and other components) if any unauthorized disturbance occurs.  Such devices are particularly useful for weapons that cannot be fully safeguarded by standard means (e.g. nuclear land mines).  Furthermore, even if the [cm;1]pal[cm;0]s, anti-diversion mechanisms, and other features were not enough, Soviet leaders could rely on command-disable devices to prevent weapons from being used.  The command-disable features permit stored weapons to be remotely neutralized in an emergency.  All these devices, in combination, would pose an insuperable barrier to the most technologically sophisticated intruder.

Thus, even in the highly unlikely event that a band of insurgents captured a nuclear weapon, the weapon would be physically unusable and could be rendered inert (and therefore unrecyclable).  No separatist groups would be able to resort to nuclear warfare to settle their grievances.

It would behoove the United States to avoid giving the Soviet (or Russian) regime an unwarranted pretext for demanding aid and for retaining control over the non-Slavic regions.  The Soviet government has just as much interest as the United States in ensuring that Soviet nuclear weapons remain secure.  That is precisely why Soviet leaders, to their credit, long ago began taking measures to bolster the security of their weapons.  Even the hardliners who tried to oust Gorbachev had no intention of doing anything that would risk a nuclear conflagration.

This is not to say that American officials should be complacent about the dangers of instability in the Soviet Union or should dismiss the nuclear threat out of hand.  If massive violent unrest were to erupt in the Ukraine before independence, there would certainly be a threat to the nuclear missiles still located in that republic (though even then, it is inconceivable that Ukrainian insurgents would actually be able to fire any weapons they might capture).

More important, as the Russian government increasingly overshadows the central Soviet government, a stable transfer of command authority will have to be arranged.  The remote possibility that some sort of danger will arise during this transfer should worry, though by no means preoccupy, American leaders.  There is little the United States can do to reduce that hypothetical threat, aside from offering advice about weapons security.  Obviously, the U.S. government should continue, and expand, its policy of cooperating with Soviet (and Russian) experts to make weapons more secure.  But what the United States should not be doing is lending credence to outdated claims whose main purpose was to justify the provision of Western aid or to guarantee that the non-Slavic republics would never become independent.

Mark Kramer is a research fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University and a fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center.