The United States is preparing to withdraw troops from Syria, which would be an unprecedented reversal for U.S. policy. Just two days before President Donald Trump made the momentous announcement, U.S. Syria envoy James Jeffrey described Syria as relatively peaceful and noted that the lull in tension provided the United States with a brief opportunity for diplomacy to work its magic. Jeffrey, the Special Representative for Syria Engagement, is entering his fifth month on the job as Washington’s main problem solver for Syria—particularly the unprecedented role that the United States is playing in eastern Syria. A few days prior to Jeffrey’s public musings over peace and diplomacy in Syria, President Donald Trump called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to try to prevent Turkey from launching an offensive into eastern Syria—one that would create a major crisis with key Kurdish partner forces. It now appears that during that phone call Trump decided to end the U.S. involvement in eastern Syria, casting doubt on Jeffrey’s mission and statements.

As American troops withdraw and Trump attempts to coordinate his policy with Ankara, it is possible to examine the changing Washington policy in eastern Syria by concentrating specifically on Jeffrey’s developing role. For example, Jeffrey, speaking at the Atlantic Council on December 17, sought to articulate how the United States is balancing its relations with Turkey amid Ankara’s accusations that the United States is working with “terrorists” in Syria. At the time of his talk, it didn’t appear he had been briefed on President Trump’s changing views on U.S. involvement in Syria and the president’s subsequent decision to withdraw.

He pointed to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a key component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as the Syrian version of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on December 18 that Ankara would not allow a “terror corridor” to be established along its border. Fifteen thousand Syrian rebels that had originally signed on to oppose the Bashar al-Assad regime now say that they would back a Turkish offensive into eastern Syria where U.S. forces are present. Jeffrey said that the SDF, like some of the United States’ previous partners who opposed Saddam Hussein in Iraq, is a tactical and transactional relationship. His description of the relationship indicates that the United States had a temporary partnership with forces in Syria that have played the major role in defeating ISIS. As the United States walks away from that partnership, it could appear as if it is betraying a group that helped it to destroy ISIS, which would harm the already strained image of the United States in the Middle East region.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tapped Jeffrey, a thirty-five-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service, in August and asked him to lead U.S. diplomatic efforts in Syria. Jeffrey was ambassador to Iraq from 2010 to 2012 and ambassador to Turkey 2008 to 2010, so he has unique knowledge of the region and its leaders. Jeffrey was tasked with addressing the growing U.S. commitment to eastern Syria and ensuring that the region is stabilized once the Islamic State has been defeated. Such an undertaking would involve working with Syria’s neighbors and promoting peace as envisioned by the Geneva peace process and UN Resolution 2254.

The appointment appeared to bifurcate the work that the United States was doing in Syria. U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition Against ISIS Brett McGurk would continue his work on the anti-ISIS agenda and concentrate on Iraq while Jeffrey took up more of the Syria portfolio. McGurk resigned as the anti-ISIS envoy after Trump’s announcement and after U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis resigned on December 20. However, back in September, the changing roles of the two policymakers came in the context of the September 11 launch of the final phase of Operation Roundup, which aimed to defeat ISIS in the Euphrates valley around Hajin. The operation cost ISIS control of most of Hajin—a success that was hailed by the media in the second week of December.

“Jeffrey will work closely with the under secretary of state for political affairs, once confirmed, as well as the Near Eastern and European bureaus on this issue. Given all the countries and the issues involved, from terrorism to refugees, these matters obviously cut across geographic bureaus, and therefore this requires a high level of coordination,” said State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert.

The problem with America’s Syria policy is that it had too many different agendas and some of them are contradictory. For instance, the Trump administration wanted to stabilize eastern Syria after ISIS has been defeated. That would require training local security forces. These forces are linked to the SDF, which Turkey has described as a “terror army.” Turkey vowed to “crush” these stabilization forces in January 2018 on the eve of Ankara’s offensive into Afrin and remove the YPG from the border. Afrin, a Kurdish region in northwest Syria where the United States is not present, was a test case for Ankara and provided valuable experience that will help it to accomplish its goals in eastern Syria.

Jeffrey had to immediately juggle these threats while focusing on the role of Russia and Iran in Syria. He traveled to Israel and met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with whom he discussed the importance of “maintaining Israel’s security while countering Iran’s destabilizing activity throughout the region.” Then he and Joel Rayburn, Israel’s deputy assistant secretary of state for Levant affairs and special envoy for Syria, visited Jordan and Turkey. In September the State Department was trying to prevent a Syrian regime offensive in Idlib that could create a wave of refugees flooding into Turkey. Turkey signed a deal in mid-September with Russia to prevent the offensive. As part of the deal, extremists in Idlib would withdraw heavy weapons and Turkey would increase its presence. Problem solved, for Turkey.

In Ankara, the American diplomats underscored “the importance of continued U.S.-Turkish cooperation in resolving the Syrian conflict in a manner consistent with UNSCR 2254,” according to a statement by the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Turkey. Jeffrey spelled out U.S. opposition to the Syrian regime’s threats against Idlib. “He commended the Turkish Government and people for their continued compassion for those affected by the Syrian conflict,” according to the statement. But Jeffrey appears to have missed an opportunity to discuss eastern Syria. In late October he traveled to Manbij in northern Syria and met the local SDF-linked military council. The United States has conducted patrols around Manbij to prevent any escalation with Turkey or Syrian rebel groups. This came as Saudi Arabia sent its first $100 million of support for stabilization in Syria. At the same time U.S. Army Gen. Joseph Votel said U.S.-Turkish joint military patrols would begin around Manbij. Turkey appeared to hope these joint patrols would be a prelude to greater Turkish involvement.

“What we’re looking for is the enduring defeat of ISIS, a reinvigorated and irreversible political process in Syria led by the Syrian people and facilitated by the UN, and de-escalation of the conflict that will include all Iranian-commanded forces departing from the entirety of Syria,” Jeffrey said in Washington in November. He also indicated that the United States saw its mission against ISIS as indirectly supporting “other goals,” and that affecting Iran’s “malign activities” was one of them. Washington has been describing a growing strategy in eastern Syria based on military and economic tools. “On getting Iran out, that is basically part of a process. It’s not a military goal of the United States, it’s not a mission of U.S. military forces; rather, we see this as the outcome of process that would end the internal conflict and provide guarantees to the Syrian people and the neighbors towards their security,” he said. Jeffrey said there were now “three strategic goals in Syria. We don’t see why it is in the interest of anyone to have Iranian forces, particularly power-projection forces—long-range missiles and other systems that can threaten other countries—present in Syria if we have resolved the underlying conflict. And it’s our job to convince everybody, including the Russians, that that’s the best way to secure a peaceful result and stability and security, not just in Syria but in the region, and we’ll keep on working until we achieve that.”

The crisis in December between the United States and Turkey developed out of a growing collision course between Washington and Ankara over eastern Syria. On December 12 Erdogan asserted that there was no longer a threat from ISIS while the United States and its SDF partners continued fighting ISIS in Hajin. Turkey has shelled the border area and the SDF has said it will halt operations if the United States cannot prevent Turkey from shelling SDF and YPG positions. To placate Turkey, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Palmer announced a $5 million bounty for the leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, and multi-million dollar bounties for two other leaders. Jeffrey also said that the PYD, the political wing of the YPG, was the Syrian branch of the PKK. Jeffrey was intimately aware of past U.S. cooperation with Turkey, providing Ankara with actionable real-time intelligence to strike at the PKK in the past. So he understood Ankara’s concerns and emphasized the importance of Turkish-American cooperation. But Washington has not found a formula to deter Turkey’s actions.

This occurred in the context of the U.S. administration being distracted by other issues, either the murder of Jamal Khashoggi or the midterm elections and their aftermath. Ankara appears laser-focused on Syria, perhaps for its own populist reasons, while Washington is distracted. Turkish officials say eastern Syria and the YPG top the agenda. Meanwhile, Turkey is also working with Iran and Russia to discuss a constitution committee for Syria—while not including the United States. Jeffrey openly opposed the Turkey-Iran-Russia track and called on the trio of countries should “pull the plug” on their Astana process. Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was nonplussed and said that the U.S. views were “very unfortunate.” Trump has now pulled the plug on U.S. involvement.

Up until Trump’s decision, Jeffrey was still working to thread the needle on Turkey’s criticism of Washington. He traveled to Turkey in early December under this cloud where he discussed cooperation with Turkey and “issues facing the Syrian diaspora and the necessity for a Syrian-led and -owned political process under U.N. Security Council resolution 2254,” the State Department said. Four days later, Erdogan warned that Turkey would launch an operation in eastern Syria and return it to its “true owners.” Trump had to call Erdogan to prevent the operation from happening. It raised tensions with the U.S.-led coalition as well.

Turkey postponed its operation, but it continues to push on other fronts. Ankara met with Iran and Russia, two countries that oppose the U.S. presence in Syria, to discuss a Syrian constitution. Washington keeps saying that the Geneva track is the only way forward, but none of the other major players in Syria are siding with the United States on this track. Instead, they are siding with each other. These three countries increasingly have more in common in opposing the U.S. role in the Middle East. This is clear with the warming relations between Turkey and Russia, which has included an offer from Ankara to purchase the S-400 missile system and work on a gas pipeline. Turkish and Iranian officials show this warmth publicly. They did so at the recent Doha Forum, and Turkey got an exemption from Iran sanctions. Rouhani came to Ankara on December 20^th and press in Iran sometimes refers to Turkey as “brothers.”

America’s partners, the Syrian Kurds and other members of the SDF, feel increasingly isolated. The United States had set up observation posts along the Syrian border with Turkey and suggested manning them with the Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga who live in Iraq. Theoretically, these Peshmerga would serve as a kind of buffer between the YPG and Turkey. Still, Turkey’s media continues to accuse the United States of working with “terrorists.” The SDF have reached out to France, Russia and the Syrian regime in the aftermath of Trump’s decision.

Washington had plans to stabilize eastern Syria. It also wanted to leverage its presence to push Iran out of Syria. Unfortunately, the Turkish partner the United States thought would oppose the Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies is the partner that most opposes the U.S. role in eastern Syria. Turkey’s assertion that ISIS is not a threat and its desire to invade the area must be taken seriously.

Turkey’s two other major military operations in Syria, Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch in Afrin, were designed to frustrate and expel the YPG. Turkey might not have troops in northern Syria today if it were not for that issue. Additionally, Turkey has been trying to get the Syrian rebels to focus on fighting the YPG by describing the rebel groups, which mostly consist of Sunni-Arabs, as the “true owners” and promising that refugees will be able to return to eastern Syria after a successful operation. This is Turkey’s way of distracting the Syrian opposition from its war with Assad and refocusing its attention on the United States and its partners. Erdogan promised to hand over Afrin to its “true owners” in January 2018. He made a similar promise about Manbij in March. This is now the rhetoric for eastern Syria.

It should be noted that Turkey, Iran and Russia have outmaneuvered the United States on the issue of Syria’s constitutional committee. Washington was excluded from essential meetings, such as the one in Geneva on December 19. The trio has expressed optimism about moving forward. That means America’s local Syrian partners have been frozen out of discussions about the future of eastern Syria. Jeffrey has indicated that the SDF and other parties in eastern Syria should play a role in the fabric of the future Syrian state; but if the United States and its partners are not at the same table with Russia, Turkey, or Iran when discussing the future of Syria, then how can America’s Syrian partners be a part of the process? Also problematic is a pending withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria. This drawdown plan will undermine confidence in U.S. policy, and it will harm U.S. partners in eastern Syria who helped America defeat ISIS. This illustrates how the U.S. State Department has failed to pursue a consistent and confident strategy in concert with the Pentagon and White House. Thus, the window of opportunity to address the crisis in Syria is closing amid a barrage of contradictory U.S. statements.

Trump administration officials have said that they see a chance for diplomacy amid the winding down of the war with ISIS. But for the United States to make diplomacy work, it has to assert its goals in Syria. Trying to balance too many agendas has led to one crisis after another.

Seth J. Frantzman is a Jerusalem-based journalist who holds a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and a writing fellow at Middle East Forum. He is writing a book on the Middle East after ISIS. Follow him on Twitter at @sfrantzman .

Image: Reuters.