In the lead-up to the war, the Luftwaffe maintained a balance between strategic bombing, interdiction, and close air support missions. General Walther Wever was a key theorist during this period. Both Germany and the Soviet Union—until the latter’s military leadership was decimated by Stalin's purges—viewed air power as an integral component of combined arms and what the Soviets referred to as deep battle. This orientation towards achieving air supremacy and supporting ground forces with interdiction and close air support missions proved to be effective in early German campaigns and the initial stages of the invasion of Russia. The Soviet forces mirrored this approach in their counter-offensives later in the war.

Despite the indispensable roles of interdiction missions and close air support in American military endeavors in North Africa and Western Europe from 1942 to 1945, the USAAF leadership and the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), firmly believed that strategic bombing of Germany was their primary contribution to the war effort. This stance was mirrored by their counterparts in the British Bomber Command, who were disheartened by the allocation of their aircraft for the preparation and support of the Normandy landings.

However, by the late 1960s, the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles began to eclipse the importance of strategic bombers. The Vietnam War also posed a paradox with B-52 bombers, initially designed for nuclear strikes, being used for conventional bombing, often in interdiction missions. Tactical aviation grew in prominence during this time, changing the composition of USAF leadership and giving rise to the "fighter mafia," contrasting with the older "bomber mafia."

The Six-Day War of 1967, dependent on the element of surprise and sustainability, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, exposing the vulnerability to advanced air defenses, demonstrated the limitations of air power. The United States, drawing lessons from these conflicts, especially the Yom Kippur War, developed the Air-Land Battle doctrine in the early 1980s, emphasizing operational-level maneuver warfare. The USAF was deemed essential for interdiction to neutralize a potential Soviet offensive, echoing ideas from earlier theorists like Slessor, Wever, and Russian theorist Tukhachevsky.

In the lead-up to the Gulf War, Colonel John A. Warden III offered a plan that would aim to incapacitate Saddam Hussein's regime after a week of intense bombing. His proposal sought Iraqi surrender without having to face their ground forces. The theory centered on breaking the enemy’s will through partial or total paralysis of their systems, achieved by attacking the centers of gravity from inside out and conducting simultaneous attacks to overwhelm their response capabilities.

This idea of strategic paralysis drew inspiration from John Boyd’s OODA Loop, seeing all organizations as systems with five concentric circles, each having its own center of gravity. Effective attacks required understanding these systems and their interconnectedness, emphasizing the political dimension, and targeting high-level decision-makers. This in turn goes back to Basil Liddell Hart and John C. Fuller. However, Warden's plan was eventually modified, demonstrating the ongoing debate and adaptation in the use of airpower. The proposal that the Pentagon finally presented to the White House included a prolonged attrition bombing against the Iraqi forces in anticipation of a ground campaign.

Warden's theoretical framework was overly rigid and prescriptive in nature. This approach was reminiscent of the early 19th-century military thought founded by Antoine-Henri de Jomini, that suggests military strategy and the art of war can be distilled into a set of principles and general rules. However, this overlooks the inherent uncertainties of war, its unpredictable character, and the potential responses from the adversary—a perspective emphasized by Clausewitz in the same era.

Warden's ideas continue to hold relevance among some military strategists. The issue is that for them to be successful, they require a comprehensive understanding of the enemy's systems and the ability to precisely measure the impacts of an air campaign as it unfolds. Achieving a deep comprehension of the adversary's workings and accurately assessing the ramifications of bombing campaigns is an incredibly challenging task. They also assume a passive opponent, neglecting the historical evidence that adversaries are capable of adaptation, reaction, and possessing sufficient redundancy to circumvent systemic collapse.

The operational effectiveness of strategic bombing has been questionable in conflicts post-World War II. The Vietnam War and more recent Middle Eastern conflicts have shown that relying heavily on air power can lead to strategic failure, especially when civilian casualties mount. The negative repercussions are not just moral but also strategic; they diminish local and global support, complicate diplomatic relations, and can radicalize populations against foreign intervention.

NATO's air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 reignited discussions, misleadingly validating the arguments in favor of air power’s standalone coercive capability. But while the operation did result in the Milosevic regime’s surrender, attributing this outcome solely to the air campaign overlooks the intricate play of ground threats and geopolitical shifts. Factors such as the threat of a ground intervention, the strengthening of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Russia's shifting stance, notwithstanding their failed double cross at Pristina, played significant roles.

The initial choice to prioritize a counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, over a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, serves as another stark illustration of the perils associated with excessive reliance on aerial capabilities. This choice was influenced by a misinterpretation of the political and military dynamics of the Soviet-Afghan War.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they were intervening to prop up a regime that had already lost the favor of much of the Afghan population. The government, led by President Mohammed Daoud Khan, was fragile, and its relationship with the rural areas of the country was strained. The modernization policies of Daoud and the secular project of his successor, Nur Muhammad Taraki, conflicted sharply with Islamic traditions and practices, fueling a surge in fundamentalism.

These fundamentalist movements, gathering strength across the region during the 1970s, became particularly potent in Afghanistan in reaction to the government’s secularism. The mullahs had declared jihad against them, and insurgencies were burgeoning throughout the country. These groups had been active for over a decade, initially resisting Daoud and later, the Afghan Communist Party. When Taraki sought Soviet assistance following the insurrection in Herat, he confessed to the Soviet Politburo that the government had lost the support of the people.

This background is crucial for understanding the flawed assumptions that underpinned the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan post-9/11. The Bush administration misread the lessons of the Soviet-Afghan War, assuming that a large foreign military presence would inevitably drive the population toward insurgency. They attributed the Soviet failure to their overwhelming troop presence, believing this alienated the populace. The Soviet strategy faltered not because of the size of their forces, but because their counterinsurgency strategy concentrated on urban centers, neglecting the rural heartlands where the insurgency thrived.

When the U.S. finally pivoted to a counterinsurgency model, the transition was hampered by impractical timelines and a lack of political will, further restricting military operations. The 2009 deployment of 30,000 troops, meant to be a decisive surge, was hindered by a predetermined 2011 withdrawal date and a misallocation of forces to Helmand province. Instead, troops needed to be distributed to secure vital rural and urban routes that bridged different provinces, therefore cutting off the Taliban and providing stability throughout the country. This disjointed strategy, combined with restrictive rules of engagement and a lack of a unified NATO strategy, with some countries dedicated only to reconstruction work, limited the coalition’s ground effectiveness, allowing the Taliban to endure and eventually resurge.

In this context, the importance of reevaluating the role of air power in modern military strategy becomes clearer. While air power has its place, relying on it exclusively or predominantly—especially when it results in high civilian casualties—can erode the legitimacy of military operations and jeopardize strategic objectives.

A balanced, synergistic approach that integrates air power with ground forces, political and diplomatic efforts is crucial for achieving lasting success in complex conflict environments. 

Carlo J.V. Caro is a political and military analyst. He has a graduate degree from Columbia University.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Shutterstock.