In the wake of the brutal attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel, it became imperative for Israel to employ its air forces to strike at defenses and capabilities in Gaza, setting the stage for a crucial ground operation aimed at dismantling Hamas. However, as the air campaign has stretched beyond three weeks, there is growing concern globally over its lack of precision and strategy, raising questions about its effectiveness and humanitarian implications.

It is imperative to underline that for air power to be effective, there must be a direct and well-articulated connection between aerial military operations and defined political objectives. Absence of such linkage drastically compromises the utility of air power, regardless of its capabilities. With the emergence of the airplane, there has been a debate in military circles on whether air power can secure victory independently or if it should be employed alongside land and, depending on the situation, naval forces.

Thomas C. Schelling defined coercion as using force to compel an adversary to yield, even when they have the means to resist. It is a subtle form of violence used in negotiations, operating under the principle that less force can be more effective. In contrast, brute force seeks complete domination and, in extreme cases, can result in the total annihilation of the adversary. When it comes to achieving air coercion, opinions have varied, particularly in terms of target selection. This ranges from direct attacks on civilian populations to more strategic approaches focused on infrastructure.

After World War I, air power theorists passionately believed that this emerging form of military capability was a game-changer, capable of preventing the stalemates and massive loss of life witnessed during the war. They saw air power as providing a more direct approach to conflict, circumventing the brutal trench warfare that characterized the war. Hugh Trenchard, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, was a strong advocate of this perspective, suggesting that air forces would be able to subdue an enemy nation without first having to defeat their armed forces.

In his writings, H.G. Wells popularized air power as capable of single-handedly winning wars by depicting its ability to deliver devastating blows and break the enemy’s morale. This imagery emerged with the abrupt end to the British sense of invulnerability, previously rooted in the natural defense offered by the sea. The German aerial bombing of Britain from 1914 to 1918 had led to the view of the airplane as supremely powerful —a notion that later came to be associated with nuclear weapons. This in turn led to the psychological impact of bombing, seen as capable of securing victory, and persisted into the late 20th century, emphasizing the strategic importance of air power.

The emerging potential of air power led to its institutional separation from other military branches, evident in the formation of the Royal Air Force and later the United States Air Force. These new military branches came to champion the idea of strategic bombing and offensive roles over support roles for ground or naval forces, which were seen as secondary or even obsolete. They saw air power as providing a more efficient and cost-effective means of national defense compared to traditional ground forces.

During World War I, many had felt that in ground combat, the defensive side usually held the upper hand due to the cost of offensive operations. However, this perspective was somewhat simplified, because innovations in tactics and technology, including the emergence of aviation, and the experience of the Ludendorff and Hundred Days Offensives, had begun to tip the balance in favor of offensive strategies by the end of the war.

In fact, before 1939, the offensive side in aerial combat had a significant advantage, given the lack of operational radar technology, which made intercepting an attack almost impossible. Bombers, in this context, were a significant threat, comparable to the fears that would later emerge around intercontinental ballistic missiles and their ability to deliver strikes directly to the political and societal heart of a nation.

Following this line of thought, the advantage in aerial combat was seen to lie with a first strike. Italian General Giulio Douhet was a key proponent of this principle, emphasizing the need for rapid and decisive action to establish air control, primarily through targeted attacks on enemy air bases—a strategy that would find application in later conflicts such as World War II and the Six-Day War.

Giulio Douhet was a notable advocate for targeting civilian populations, even supporting the use of chemical weapons to induce surrender through terror. Basil Liddell Hart and John C. Fuller also leaned towards this approach but aimed to minimize its destructiveness. Hart, for example, proposed using non-lethal gases to subdue cities without causing mass casualties or property damage. These diverse perspectives and discussions highlight the range of views held by early air power theorists on the capabilities and potential of air warfare, setting the stage for the development and application of air power strategies in the decades that followed.

But Douhet, in particular, developed the idea that urban centers should be primary targets, though not the sole focus of an air campaign. First, air supremacy needed to be established with a balanced force of bombers and fighters, targeting the enemy’s airstrips and aviation factories. In these initial stages, air interdiction attacks should also disrupt the enemy’s military mobilization. However, the key element in Douhet’s strategy was the bombing of major urban areas to undermine the enemy’s physical and moral strength.

Douhet was establishing what was to be a philosophical guiding principle in undermining the importance of supporting ground forces with air power, deeming it an inefficient use of resources. Similarly, William Mitchell, profoundly influenced by the experience of trench warfare during WWI, also relegated ground forces to a secondary role, placing even less emphasis on naval power. Both American and British strategic approaches during this time predominantly valued strategic bombing as an autonomous means of exerting pressure on the enemy.

Contrastingly, John Slessor, who would become the Chief of the Air Staff of the RAF after WWII, was among the few British voices advocating for the integration of air power with ground forces. Yet, as even he cautioned in his book "Air Power and Armies", about the excessive reliance on close air support, noting its reactive nature and the intricate coordination it required with ground units. Slessor did not view air power as being subservient to ground forces; instead, he emphasized the need for ground operation plans to seamlessly integrate air power as a crucial component.

Despite Slessor's unconventional stance, it is crucial to acknowledge that, in practical terms, both the RAF and the USAAF eventually offered support to ground forces during the North African and European campaigns of World War II. This collaboration came about despite initial challenges in integrating combined arms tactics, which were partly due to the financial strains the Great Depression placed on the U.S. military and a lack of doctrinal support.

Operation Cobra started with a potent aerial assault, strategically targeting German defenses and communication routes to facilitate the advance of armored divisions and infantry. Fighter-bombers, in coordination with ground observers, efficiently delayed German reinforcements, maintaining the Allies' tactical advantage. Following the aerial strikes, armored forces, notably the M4 Sherman tanks, exploited the weakened German defenses, navigating Normandy’s challenging bocage terrain with ease. Reconnaissance planes provided real-time updates, guiding tanks to avoid strongholds and target the German rear.

Supporting the armored push, infantry secured areas and maintained communication between the armored units and aerial forces. A key innovation was the inclusion of Forward Air Controllers within infantry ranks, enabling precise air strikes and timely aerial support. This integrated approach proved effective on July 27, when reconnaissance identified a major German armor assembly preparing for a counterattack. Information was swiftly relayed, leading to a coordinated air and ground assault that decimated the German forces.

Operation Cobra exemplifies the effective integration of air power, armored strength, and infantry capabilities, crucial in accelerating the liberation of France. But the Germans had preceded this approach in military thinking, as General von Seeckt, who had led the army between 1920 and 1926, viewed air power as a supplementary tool for future ground operations.

von Seekt envisioned a strategy where achieving air supremacy at the outset of conflict was crucial, followed by targeting the enemy’s mobilization and transportation systems. Concurrently, ground forces were expected to break through and encircle the adversary, now crippled by aerial assaults. This integrated approach to combat, emphasizing combined arms, had deep roots in German military doctrine, dating back to the strategies of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.

However, the German stance on air power was speculative to an extent, given that the Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from having an air force. Under von Seeckt’s leadership, Germany began collaborating with the USSR to circumvent these restrictions. Once the Luftwaffe was reestablished under Nazi rule, there were considerations for strategic bombing of cities. Nonetheless, this strategy did not gain much traction, with the belief that it could potentially fortify, rather than weaken, the enemy’s resolve.

In the lead-up to the war, the Luftwaffe maintained a balance between strategic bombing, interdiction, and close air support missions. General Walther Wever was a key theorist during this period. Both Germany and the Soviet Union—until the latter’s military leadership was decimated by Stalin's purges—viewed air power as an integral component of combined arms and what the Soviets referred to as deep battle. This orientation towards achieving air supremacy and supporting ground forces with interdiction and close air support missions proved to be effective in early German campaigns and the initial stages of the invasion of Russia. The Soviet forces mirrored this approach in their counter-offensives later in the war.

Despite the indispensable roles of interdiction missions and close air support in American military endeavors in North Africa and Western Europe from 1942 to 1945, the USAAF leadership and the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), firmly believed that strategic bombing of Germany was their primary contribution to the war effort. This stance was mirrored by their counterparts in the British Bomber Command, who were disheartened by the allocation of their aircraft for the preparation and support of the Normandy landings.

However, by the late 1960s, the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles began to eclipse the importance of strategic bombers. The Vietnam War also posed a paradox with B-52 bombers, initially designed for nuclear strikes, being used for conventional bombing, often in interdiction missions. Tactical aviation grew in prominence during this time, changing the composition of USAF leadership and giving rise to the "fighter mafia," contrasting with the older "bomber mafia."

The Six-Day War of 1967, dependent on the element of surprise and sustainability, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, exposing the vulnerability to advanced air defenses, demonstrated the limitations of air power. The United States, drawing lessons from these conflicts, especially the Yom Kippur War, developed the Air-Land Battle doctrine in the early 1980s, emphasizing operational-level maneuver warfare. The USAF was deemed essential for interdiction to neutralize a potential Soviet offensive, echoing ideas from earlier theorists like Slessor, Wever, and Russian theorist Tukhachevsky.

In the lead-up to the Gulf War, Colonel John A. Warden III offered a plan that would aim to incapacitate Saddam Hussein's regime after a week of intense bombing. His proposal sought Iraqi surrender without having to face their ground forces. The theory centered on breaking the enemy’s will through partial or total paralysis of their systems, achieved by attacking the centers of gravity from inside out and conducting simultaneous attacks to overwhelm their response capabilities.

This idea of strategic paralysis drew inspiration from John Boyd’s OODA Loop, seeing all organizations as systems with five concentric circles, each having its own center of gravity. Effective attacks required understanding these systems and their interconnectedness, emphasizing the political dimension, and targeting high-level decision-makers. This in turn goes back to Basil Liddell Hart and John C. Fuller. However, Warden's plan was eventually modified, demonstrating the ongoing debate and adaptation in the use of airpower. The proposal that the Pentagon finally presented to the White House included a prolonged attrition bombing against the Iraqi forces in anticipation of a ground campaign.

Warden's theoretical framework was overly rigid and prescriptive in nature. This approach was reminiscent of the early 19th-century military thought founded by Antoine-Henri de Jomini, that suggests military strategy and the art of war can be distilled into a set of principles and general rules. However, this overlooks the inherent uncertainties of war, its unpredictable character, and the potential responses from the adversary—a perspective emphasized by Clausewitz in the same era.

Warden's ideas continue to hold relevance among some military strategists. The issue is that for them to be successful, they require a comprehensive understanding of the enemy's systems and the ability to precisely measure the impacts of an air campaign as it unfolds. Achieving a deep comprehension of the adversary's workings and accurately assessing the ramifications of bombing campaigns is an incredibly challenging task. They also assume a passive opponent, neglecting the historical evidence that adversaries are capable of adaptation, reaction, and possessing sufficient redundancy to circumvent systemic collapse.

The operational effectiveness of strategic bombing has been questionable in conflicts post-World War II. The Vietnam War and more recent Middle Eastern conflicts have shown that relying heavily on air power can lead to strategic failure, especially when civilian casualties mount. The negative repercussions are not just moral but also strategic; they diminish local and global support, complicate diplomatic relations, and can radicalize populations against foreign intervention.

NATO's air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 reignited discussions, misleadingly validating the arguments in favor of air power’s standalone coercive capability. But while the operation did result in the Milosevic regime’s surrender, attributing this outcome solely to the air campaign overlooks the intricate play of ground threats and geopolitical shifts. Factors such as the threat of a ground intervention, the strengthening of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Russia's shifting stance, notwithstanding their failed double cross at Pristina, played significant roles.

The initial choice to prioritize a counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, over a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, serves as another stark illustration of the perils associated with excessive reliance on aerial capabilities. This choice was influenced by a misinterpretation of the political and military dynamics of the Soviet-Afghan War.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they were intervening to prop up a regime that had already lost the favor of much of the Afghan population. The government, led by President Mohammed Daoud Khan, was fragile, and its relationship with the rural areas of the country was strained. The modernization policies of Daoud and the secular project of his successor, Nur Muhammad Taraki, conflicted sharply with Islamic traditions and practices, fueling a surge in fundamentalism.

These fundamentalist movements, gathering strength across the region during the 1970s, became particularly potent in Afghanistan in reaction to the government’s secularism. The mullahs had declared jihad against them, and insurgencies were burgeoning throughout the country. These groups had been active for over a decade, initially resisting Daoud and later, the Afghan Communist Party. When Taraki sought Soviet assistance following the insurrection in Herat, he confessed to the Soviet Politburo that the government had lost the support of the people.

This background is crucial for understanding the flawed assumptions that underpinned the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan post-9/11. The Bush administration misread the lessons of the Soviet-Afghan War, assuming that a large foreign military presence would inevitably drive the population toward insurgency. They attributed the Soviet failure to their overwhelming troop presence, believing this alienated the populace. The Soviet strategy faltered not because of the size of their forces, but because their counterinsurgency strategy concentrated on urban centers, neglecting the rural heartlands where the insurgency thrived.

When the U.S. finally pivoted to a counterinsurgency model, the transition was hampered by impractical timelines and a lack of political will, further restricting military operations. The 2009 deployment of 30,000 troops, meant to be a decisive surge, was hindered by a predetermined 2011 withdrawal date and a misallocation of forces to Helmand province. Instead, troops needed to be distributed to secure vital rural and urban routes that bridged different provinces, therefore cutting off the Taliban and providing stability throughout the country. This disjointed strategy, combined with restrictive rules of engagement and a lack of a unified NATO strategy, with some countries dedicated only to reconstruction work, limited the coalition’s ground effectiveness, allowing the Taliban to endure and eventually resurge.

In this context, the importance of reevaluating the role of air power in modern military strategy becomes clearer. While air power has its place, relying on it exclusively or predominantly—especially when it results in high civilian casualties—can erode the legitimacy of military operations and jeopardize strategic objectives.

A balanced, synergistic approach that integrates air power with ground forces, political and diplomatic efforts is crucial for achieving lasting success in complex conflict environments. 

Carlo J.V. Caro is a political and military analyst. He has a graduate degree from Columbia University.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Shutterstock.