The most radical Southern position suddenly became dominant. With that sense of rapid reversal of fortune, moderates in the South were quickly shunted aside by radical voices. Southerners now saw a threat to their political and economic existence, with secession the only way out. This existential crisis that led to secession, in turn, posed an existential threat to the Union and the North’s commitment to it. Fort Sumter became a symbol of the South’s claim of the right to secede and the Union’s will to resist. Secretary of State William Seward’s attempt to find a compromise failed. South Carolina, under orders from Jefferson Davis, fired on the fort, and many were surprised at Lincoln’s subsequent resolve. Once the secession process and fighting began, even moderate states like Virginia were under unbearable pressure to join their neighboring states in the Deep South. Four border states, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri, stayed in the Union primarily as a result of federal occupation.

THIS THREE-stage analysis of the causes of the Civil War reveals accelerating deterioration in relations between North and South until reconciliation became impossible. For an extended period during the first stage, systemic conditions were inherently unstable but not spiraling inexorably toward war. The Constitution, the established federal-state political order, strong national leadership, and a willingness to find common ground enabled this instability to be managed. A series of compromises reassured Southerners that remaining part of the United States could be compatible with the continuation of slavery.

In the next stage during the 1850s, soaring cotton profits had made the South vitally dependent on slavery and the increasingly inhuman treatment of slaves stoked the demand for abolition in the North. Sectarian violence increased dramatically and the ability to compromise declined. But because political trends still favored the South, they continued to believe their livelihood and way of life were relatively secure within the federal union. This fragile stage ended abruptly in 1860 with a single event, the election of Lincoln, which precipitated an existential crisis for the South, secession, Union resolve to resist, and rapid decline into war.

Today’s America echoes some of this tragic history. 

The United States is beyond Stage 1 today. During the past several decades, the United States has already passed through a period with similarities to Stage 1. The nation during this period was increasingly divided on an array of issues but compromise was still possible as it was in the pre-1850 period. Compared with Stage 1 of the buildup to the Civil War, there is today no one overwhelming catalytic question like slavery that divides the nation. But issues like abortion rights, immigration, police reform, COVID-19 mandates, voting rights, gay rights, gun control, federal versus states’ rights, and teaching critical race theory in schools are differentiated primarily by political party, education, and geographic plus urban/rural divisions. These issues, taken together, do indicate sharp differences based on economic status and political philosophy. A telling example of this is that with the recent Supreme Court decision overturning Roe v. Wade, the expectation is that most Red states will ban or severely limit abortion while Blue states will continue to permit it. Although Red vs. Blue states are not as tightly aligned geographically as the South and North were in the nineteenth century, there are deep forces that point increasingly to a division.

As with Stage 1 in the first half of the nineteenth century, much of the division today rests on differing economic predicates. Beginning around 1980, the digital revolution led to two transformations with profound repercussions. The first was the acceleration of corporate operations and investments abroad, mainly to take advantage of cheaper labor. This gave impetus to the negotiation of a more open global trading system. The effect for the U.S. economy as a whole was positive in the medium term: curbing inflation, maintaining low interest rates, and giving consumers more choice and value. However, as with any demolition of market barriers, this one would dislocate large segments of the American labor force, especially in high-cost, low-skilled sectors, like manufacturing. The second effect of digitization was automation, which corporations targeted especially on the high-cost, low-skilled work—the same socioeconomic group that was already hit hard by global trade. Again, this was good for most Americans but very bad for some.

Then the 2008 recession hit the entire country hard, with the white male middle-lower class being hit particularly hard. The U.S. manufacturing sector lost some 5 million jobs since 2000, more than two-thirds of whom were men. About a third of American men were out of the labor force. The combined effects of these phenomena were increased unemployment, underemployment, digital divide, disaffection, opioid use, suicides, and the placement of blame on foreign workers (e.g., Chinese) and immigrants (e.g., Central Americans). Several administrations of both parties failed to recognize the problem and provide necessary economic adjustment programs.

While many white working-class voters cast ballots for Barack Obama in 2008, because of the lingering recession their economic situation did not improve enough during his two terms in office. This opened the door for Donald Trump to make extreme claims in 2016 that attracted many in this neglected population away from the Democratic Party. But Trump’s campaign also stoked an increased degree of racism in the nation.

Since at least the year 2000, electoral results have revealed a growing chasm between Blue states and Red states, leaving only about a dozen swing states to be political (as well as socioeconomic) battlegrounds. Red states exist primarily in the old cotton belt of the Confederacy plus much of the old Louisiana Purchase area, and some of the midwest. Blue states are primarily in the old Union area, the West Coast, some of the Southwest, and increasingly some southern states with shifting demographics like Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia. Unlike Blue states, Red states are geographically more contiguous. What is different from 1860 is a corresponding divergence in views within these states between rural and urban Americans, leaving the suburbs also as battlegrounds. Still, disputes were addressed—if often left unsettled—within the established political order.

The nation was able to pass through this contemporary Stage 1 without much violence because several unifying factors mitigated against national disunion. While political divisions mounted, legislators were still willing to compromise on at least some issues. The bloody history of the Civil War remained a sobering reminder to most Americans of the cost of insurrection and secession. The sixteen decades that have passed since the Civil War have generally strengthened national bonds, with various civic and recreational associations acting as unifying factors—look no further than national sports organizations as an example. Geographic mobility across states over the decades has also tended to modify extreme concentrations of radical belief and to homogenize American culture. Allegiances to states rather than the nation as a whole are certainly less today than in 1860. The U.S. military and other national security institutions remain completely loyal to the federal government and have demonstrated a willingness to act lawfully against insurgencies.

The United States is in Stage 2 today. In fact, the United States has arguably been in Stage 2 for the past half-decade. As was the case in the decade before the Civil War, this period includes continued deepening political, economic, and cultural division: a greater willingness to use violence; greater vitriol against those with opposing views; less willingness to compromise on hot button issues; more loose talk about secession; and a media that fans these flames. But there is still continued adherence to the Union because those on the Right have seen that their interests could be protected by the federal government under Trump, a conservative Supreme Court, and under the power of state governments. Even with Trump’s defeat, the Supreme Court and Red state governments tend to protect their interests. This period also includes a dramatic reaction on the Left to both Trump’s policies and to recent Supreme Court rulings, much as the abolitionists reacted with indignation to Southern political victories in the 1850s.

Both political parties have found compromise very difficult for fear that such will help their opponents and find fault with their core constituencies. This trend began during Newt Gingrich’s tenure as House speaker in the 1990s but has accelerated during the most recent decade. As a result, Democrats with very slim Congressional majorities have relied on the reconciliation process to pass legislation without Republicans. Republicans, in turn, have used their power to block Democrats when possible, and in the process have substantially shifted the balance of the Supreme Court in their favor. Presidents from both parties have made liberal use of executive orders to implement policy changes, with Trump notably doing so at twice the rate of his predecessors.

As was the case in the 1850s, extreme media views have further polarized the nation. Each side has its own cable news and talk radio outlets and follows its own social media leaders. There are two national echo chambers. These media leaders hold their audiences by taking increasingly more extreme positions, which many of their followers adopt as gospel. Conspiracy theories abound.