While some Americans may toy with secession, few really want the massive violence associated with civil war. There is still no sense of a single existential crisis at the state level. Few responsible senior political leaders have called for secession, and most condemned the violence. Republican minority leader Mitch McConnell eventually condemned the events of January 6 as an insurrection. Several of those who perpetrated violence on Capitol Hill are being charged by the Justice Department with “seditious conspiracy”—a notch beneath treason. Several of Trump’s senior officials are testifying against him at the January 6 Committee Hearings. And Trump himself is under threat of possible indictment for his role in the January 6 insurrection.

Trump’s rejection of the 2020 election results could have been an opening event of some version of Stage 3. The nation was spared that by a few state, federal, and judicial leaders that put nation before party and by a military loyal to the Constitution. But the fact that several elements of Stage 1 & 2 of the pre-Civil War period are roughly analogous to today’s America indicates that a major disruptive event could still hurl the United States towards some limited version of Stage 3.

Particularly worrisome, another failed and allegedly stolen Trump presidential attempt in 2024 could still have a loosely comparable effect as Lincoln’s 1860 election. Whether denied his party’s nomination or, if nominated, denied electoral victory, Trump could issue a call to arms. A large segment of his base has a cult-like quality and will accept his word even if contradicted by factual reality.

BY ANALYZING these three-stage narratives of the run-up to the Civil War of 1861–1865 and today’s upheaval, one can find both some important similarities and differences. First the similarities.

Our nation has already passed through uncomfortable similarities with Stage 1 of the buildup to the Civil War. These have been evident for several decades. Systemic conditions based on economic and cultural differences have divided the nation into roughly two camps. While there is no one divisive issue like slavery, there are multiple issues that generally relate to different approaches to moral values, personal freedom, and the common good. Divisions often fall along class, educational, geographic, and racial lines. The Red states are loosely contiguous. The history of the Civil War teaches us that systemic differences such as these can be managed for extended periods of time in this first stage if leaders of good faith on both sides seek compromise and urge reconciliation.

During the past decade, these divisions have magnified and there are now growing similarities to Stage 2 of the buildup to the Civil War. The election of Donald Trump did give conservatives a feeling that their interests could be protected, or at least their problems addressed, by the federal government. Yet underneath this sense of confidence in Trump, other troubling trends accelerated. Public willingness to support state secession is on the rise, especially among Republicans in former Confederate states. The willingness to compromise or seek reconciliation either in Congress or among the broader population is in marked decline. The willingness and ability to use violence is also on the rise. Armed groups, though relatively small, are becoming more active. Both cable news and social media have amplified these differing views and give extremists a bully pulpit. Ironically, the COVID-19 pandemic has further divided rather than united the nation based on differing attitudes towards mask and vaccine mandates and personal freedoms. Civil War history also teaches that during this stage the weaker, more aggrieved, and more vulnerable party can become acutely defensive, politically and psychologically. Members may see themselves as heroic champions of a mortally threatened way of life. We see these phenomena today as well.

Most troubling in this assessment of similarities is the rejection by former President Trump of the 2020 election results. It was the election of Lincoln and its subsequent rejection by the South that led to a tragic tipping point in 1860, what we have called Stage 3. The reaction of many Trump supporters was a similar rejection of a sudden turn of fortune, with the most extreme reactions on display on January 6, 2021. At this tipping point in the case of the Civil War, moderates were silenced, violent events trigger more violent ones, miscalculations were made, red lines were created and crossed, and bluffs were called. Today, moderates in both parties are also too often silent. And yet luckily today the United States has looked out over this Stage 3 precipice and thus far recoiled. Why?

Despite several similarities in all three stages, there are important safeguards and mitigating factors that are likely to spare the nation a second violent civil war among organized states.

Most importantly, while there are deep differences on specific issues today, even taken together, for most Americans they do not rise to near the existential level that they did for the South in 1861.

Despite regional differences, the degree of national assimilation and social cohesion is also much greater today than sixteen decades ago. While there are still pronounced regional differences, they were mitigated by social and geographic mobility and by national patriotism. Those advocating violent insurrection exist primarily in small geographic pockets. Urban-rural divisions are as great as divisions among states.

Related to this, despite some of the public’s flirtation with secession, no serious political leader today has called for state secession. The lessons of the bloody Civil War have been absorbed by most. In 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Texas v. White that states could not unilaterally secede from the Union. While some advocate secession as a fantasy, very few would welcome another violent struggle akin to the Civil War to attain it. Should large-scale civil insurrection arise, state secession is unlikely to be a major part of that insurrection.

America’s national institutions, both official and unofficial, have been weakened but still remain relatively strong compared to 1860. Many political differences are settled at the state level. The courts still remain a validated arbitrator on critical differences between states and the federal government. And the vast majority of those who command the armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities today are squarely behind the established order.

Next, while many political leaders on the Right are afraid to oppose Trump outright, very few of them have endorsed political violence or directly advocate state secession. Recall that in 1860, most Southern political leaders favored secession in Stage 3.

Lastly, though bristling with weapons, today’s Far Right militants are not well-organized or led, in contrast to the large numbers of experienced military officers who supported secession and could organize and lead rebel armies. Nonetheless, they could gain access to dangerous technologies and could start to control insurgencies. 

So, while a review of these three stages indicates that greater sectoral violence is quite possible today, secession by states and open civil war similar to 1861–1865 remains remote. Despite several similarities in conditions in the pre-Civil War period, there are now mitigating factors and safeguards that are likely to prevent a national split. Nonetheless, militant groups require careful and continuous monitoring. 

If—still, a big “if”—large-scale anti-government violence breaks out as a result of a triggering event, it would more plausibly be in loosely coordinated pockets of, say, hundreds of heavily armed and angry individuals led by one or another militant group. It would be most dangerous if supported by some extremist national leaders. This hard core is extremely well armed with combat-standard weaponry, and could readily accumulate high explosives or worse. The capacity for widespread significant violence is undeniable. January 6, 2021, could prove to be a rehearsal for coordinated attacks on federal symbols and properties, Blue state capitals, and minority assemblages. Should such violence break out, these groups would need to be disarmed. Quite possibly, assuming these circumstances, regular U.S. military forces might have to intervene, which could either squelch or stoke further insurrection.”

In conclusion, while civil war between two halves of the United States is highly improbable today, geographically scattered, loosely coordinated paramilitary violence by the Far Right and “replacement” militants cannot be deemed improbable.

This prognosis of loosely organized though dangerous civil strife and its possible escalation beyond that can be avoided if American leaders of both parties clearly recognize the dangers exposed here, put nation above partisan politics, control their constituents, speak out against violence, and seize the opportunity to compromise on as many national issues as possible. Strong and balanced leadership is essential. The pre-Civil War period had its statesmen like Henry Clay who sought to preserve the union and peace through compromise. Such leaders are needed again today.

Hans Binnendijk is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was previously NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy, Acting Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and Director of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies.

David C. Gompert is on the faculty of the U.S. Naval Academy and a senior advisor to Ultratech Capital Partners. He was Principal Deputy Director and Acting Director of National Intelligence, 2009-2010.