Moreover, while Iran may have failed to overwhelm Israel, its show of force and that of her regional proxies through the threat that Yemen’s Houthis posed to international shipping shattered the sense of American hegemony in the region.

The bottom line is that the Iranian leaders recognize that public and congressional opposition to the idea of another direct military intervention in the Middle East would make it difficult for the United States to use military force against Tehran and certainly close to impossible to orchestrate regime change there.

But then, as Iran continues its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the question is whether the United States would be forced to use its military power against Iran’s nuclear installations or give the green light to Israel to do so.

On another level, Iran and its Palestinian allies did achieve a major diplomatic win as a result of the attack on Israel. The notion that the Palestinian issue could be relegated to the bottom of the agenda has been challenged, producing an international consensus that no stability can be achieved in the Middle East without the resolution of the Palestinian problem.

That, in turn, meant that the Saudi Kingdom, as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman put it, would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without a clear commitment on the part of Israel to the creation of “an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital,” raising doubts about the American quest for a Saudi-Israeli détente.

Israel First vs America First

Running for his second term in office, Trump encouraged Israel to complete its military mission in Gaza and criticized the Biden administration for its attempts to impede the Israeli operation.

And, indeed, President-elect Trump’s proposed nominations and appointments have included Republicans with long track records of staunch support for Israel and hawkish views on Iran, suggesting that Netanyahu’s bet on Trump appeared to pay off.

Marco Rubio, Trump’s choice for secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, national security advisor-designate, are long-time supporters of Israel and, like Trump, were critical of the Biden administration’s attempts to inhibit Israel’s military’s moves in Gaza and against Hezbollah. Trump has named another champion of Israel, Representative Elise Stefanik (R-NY), as his pick for ambassador to the United Nations. 

He also announced he had tapped former Arkansas governor and two-time candidate for the Republican Party presidential nomination Mike Huckabee as his ambassador to Israel. Huckabee has also made several public comments supporting Israeli expansion into the occupied West Bank, refusing to say the Palestinian territory is under “occupation.” “There are certain words I refuse to use. There is no such thing as a West Bank. It’s Judea and Samaria. There’s no such thing as a settlement. They’re communities. They’re neighborhoods. They’re cities.” While Huckabee has insisted, “I won’t make the policy, I will carry out the policy of the president” as envoy to Israel, some believe his selection indicates the second Trump administration might end the long U.S. pursuit of a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

One of the president-elect’s first staffing decisions was to appoint Steve Witkoff, who, like Huckabee, is also a strong supporter of Israel with limited foreign policy expertise.

The conventional wisdom in Washington and Middle Eastern capitals is that unlike Biden, who projected occasional displeasure with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and its conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, the Trump administration is unlikely to object to any Israeli violations on the ground. That policy would be in line with that of Netanyahu and his right-wing government in Jerusalem. Some of these scenarios envision the Trump administration accepting Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

But then Trump also vowed to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, suggesting that he may be impatient with the financial costs of war for the United States and the risk of possible American casualties. Three American soldiers have died in connection with the fighting in the Middle East. There is also the concern that continuing will divert attention from Trump’s other domestic and foreign policy priorities, including shifting military resources to East Asia.

This, indeed, would raise an interesting dilemma for the new Trump administration: how to balance the goal of preserving American domination in the Middle East and supporting Israel with containing the military and geo-economic challenge from China? 

When it comes to Iran, the expectation is that Trump appeared prepared to push Iran even harder than he did during his first term, lining his cabinet with similarly minded Iran hawks like Rubio Waltz. Indeed, the two have vowed to ratchet up economic pressure on Tehran once again, suggesting that the new administration will likely exert far less restraint than the Biden administration on Israel’s campaign to degrade Iran and its proxies’ capabilities.

However, the administration may have trouble replicating the success of its first sanctions campaign, which relied on the willingness of major powers such as Russia and China to abide by them. This time around, the two powers are likely to be opposed to sanctioning Iran and may even support Tehran in its clash with the United States.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states have been pursuing a policy of détente with Iran. Consequently, they are opposed to toughening the U.S. position vis-à-vis Tehran, which might lead to instability in the region and threaten their interests. Also, it may not be in Israel’s interest to press the Americans to take military action against Iran or to create conditions in which such an action would be necessary. If that happens, Israel would then be blamed for dragging the United States into another costly Middle East War.

Trump has promised during the campaign not to allow Iran to build a nuclear bomb but seemed unenthusiastic about a war with Iran. “I don’t want to do damage to Iran,” he said in November, adding that it wanted Iran to be a “successful country.” In an interview in October, Vice President-elect JD Vance explained that Israel and the United States may sometimes have divergent interests, “and our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran.” Project 2025, a conservative blueprint for Trump’s second term, calls for sanctions on Iran but stops short of recommending military action. Instead, it exhorts America’s Arab allies to do more to protect themselves from Iranian threats.

Hence, contrary to the expectation that the new Trump administration may adopt an “Israel First” agenda regarding annexation and Iran, President Trump may decide to press the Israelis to agree to commit themselves to the two-state solution.

Considering that the peace plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace that Trump unveiled in his first term does include a commitment to the two-state solution and that Washington and Jerusalem could bridge over their differences on the issue, it’s not inconceivable that Trump 2.0 could move in that direction with the help of his adviser on Arab affairs, his Lebanese-American in-law Massad Boulos.

That might actually increase the chances for an Israeli-Saudi détente and the realization of the first Trump administration’s goal of establishing an axis of Arab states and Israel that would help contain Iran in addition to taking steps to stabilize and reconstruct the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, Trump may decide that since his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran didn’t work in Trump 1.0, perhaps he would consider a new Iran policy in Trump 2.0 that could lead perhaps to a deal, the kind that Trump likes to make.

As The Economist magazine has proposed, Trump could apply stronger pressure on Iran, including holding the option of a sustained campaign of bombing to destroy the country’s nuclear program, but with a negotiating path and more ambitious goals.

Dr. Leon Hadar is a contributing editor with The National Interest, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and a former research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger with Haaretz (Israel) and Washington correspondent for the Business Times of Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post.

Image: Noam Galai / Shutterstock.com.