It wasn’t at all surprising that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate Donald Trump on his election win, calling it a “huge victory.” In a congratulatory statement, Netanyahu made little effort to hide his preference for Trump, “Your historic return to the White House offers a new beginning for America and a powerful recommitment to the great alliance between Israel and America.”

Indeed, other Israeli officials hailed Trump’s victory as a win for their country, reflecting on his record of strong support for Israel during his first term in office, when he reversed decades of American policy in the Middle East by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the U.S. embassy to the city. Netanyahu then praised Trump for the move, comparing him to President Harry Truman, British foreign secretary Lord Balfour, and Persian emperor Cyrus the Great.

At the same time, polls showed Israelis massively favored Trump over his Democratic opponent, Vice President Kamala Harris, in the U.S. election. Many Israelis were concerned over the growing criticism of Israel among Democrats in contrast to the Republicans’ enthusiastic support for the Jewish State.

Trump 1.0: Make Israel Great Again

President Trump strongly backed Israel during his first term as president. In addition to recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the first Trump administration became the first country in the world to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the long-disputed Golan Heights.

Also, in 2018, the Trump administration cut off funding to the UNRWA, the UN agency that assists millions of Palestinian refugees (which Israel has accused of aiding Hamas’ terrorism).

Trump’s support for Israel reflected his personal attachment to the Jewish State, including family ties through an ardent Zionist son-in-law, Jared Kushner, with business interests in Israel who joined his administration as a top advisor, well as a history of close friendship with Netanyahu.

At the same time, Trump’s championing of Israel’s cause is in line with the Republican Party’s traditional support for the Jewish State, driven in part by the connection that Evangelical conservatives have with Israel. On the personnel level, Trump’s two top foreign policy advisors during his first term, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton, were enthusiastic supporters of Israel, as was Vice President Mike Pence.

Moreover, support for Israel didn’t project only Trump’s personal and political views. It is also aligned with his strategic perspective that sees Israel as a key non-NATO ally that shares interests in containing the threat of radical regional players and helps maintain American hegemony in the Middle East.

Trump did criticize U.S. military interventions in the Middle East, and in particular the Iraq War, during his earlier election campaign, which reflected the more inward-looking public opinion.

But after coming to office, Trump didn’t propose disengaging from the region, and, in fact, he seemed to promote an activist U.S. agenda in the region under which Washington joined Israel and the Arab Gulf States in fighting Iran—as long as it did not require direct U.S. military intervention. Hence, he did not take military action after the Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019.

However, the geostrategic and regional environment made it cost-effective to support Israel at that juncture. The United States didn’t face any serious challenge from outside global powers in the region while the Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, were seeking American guarantees to their security vis-à-vis Tehran, including by establishing ties with Israel.

During Trump’s first term in office, the number of Arab states that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel went from two to six. The Abraham Accords of 2020, which the Trump administration helped negotiate, brought Bahrain and the UAE into the fold. Morocco and Sudan joined later.

At the same time, President Trump unveiled his Middle East peace plan, produced with the help of Kushner, which gave Israel most of what it wanted while offering the Palestinians the possibility of a state but with limited sovereignty.

“My vision presents a win-win opportunity for both sides, a realistic two-state solution that resolves the risk of Palestinian statehood to Israel’s security,” the president said at a White House ceremony in which he unveiled the plan.

But embracing a realpolitik approach that placed issues of human rights on the bottom of his agenda, the Trump administration refrained from criticizing Israel’s handling of the occupation of the West Bank, or for that matter, from expressing any sympathy for major Palestinian concerns that did not affect U.S. interests. That attitude clearly seemed to be in line with the interests of Israel, whose government insisted that the Palestinian issue should not be placed on the top of the international agenda. 

Moreover, under the first Trump administration, there was a clear strategic alignment between the United States and Israel when it came to Iran and its nuclear program and aggressive regional conduct. Hence, President Trump ditched the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear deal signed in 2015, and promised to negotiate a better one by applying “maximum pressure” on the Islamic Republic through punishing diplomatic and economic sanctions.

President Trump’s tough approach toward Iran was demonstrated in his decision to order the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian major general and commander of the Quds Force, one of five branches of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In addition to battering Iran’s economy, the first Trump administration attempted to isolate the country by building closer ties between its main Arab adversaries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The indications at that time were that the Saudis would agree to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic ties with it even without Israeli commitment to establish an independent state.

From that perspective, the Abraham Accords were part of that U.S. strategy. Indeed, at the time, Trump administration officials said that they had hoped that Saudi Arabia would eventually sign the accords and recognize Israel. The Biden administration eventually embraced this approach without much success.

Trump 2.0: A Changing Strategic Environment

As President Trump begins his second term in office, it is clear that when it comes to the Middle East, the Middle East’s balance of power in the Middle East has shifted, as have American global and regional priorities. That means Trump 2.0’s Middle East policy will have to adjust to the new realities and cannot simply repeat that of the first term.

On a geostrategic level, while Trump was away, a Second Cold War commenced with Russia’s attack on Ukraine. An alliance of convenience between Moscow and Beijing was formed, to which North Korea and Iran have linked their interests in what is referred to as the “axis of upheaval,” the “quartet of chaos,” the “CRINKs,” or the “CRANKs.”

Against the backdrop of the contest with China, two regional wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the challenges posed to the United States and Western interests by the CRINKs and their satellites, America is now diplomatically and militarily overstretched. It has spread its resources thin on three fronts: East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. And as Trump warned during the election campaign, it may be drawn into “World War Three.”

From that perspective, the October 7 attacks against Israel should be seen not only as just another chapter in the history of the region’s tribal wars but also as part of an orchestrated attempt by Iran through Hamas and Hezbollah to devastate Israel’s deterrence power, and in the process challenge the regional hegemony by its patron, the United States. At the same time, growing military ties between Russia and Iran and expanding Chinese involvement in the Middle East, through its economic ties with Riyadh and Tehran and diplomatic action, suggest that unlike during the first Trump administration, the United States is now facing real competitors in the region.

The war in Gaza and Israel’s growing isolation in the international community has also exposed growing differences between the United States and its European allies over Middle East policy. European attitudes toward Israel tend to be more critical, suggesting to some that “Israel will split the Western alliance.”

Washington’s ability to maintain its Pax Americana in the Middle East is, therefore, eroding just as its geostrategic power is being tested in Ukraine by Russia and the South China Sea.

Israel’s response to the October 7 attack has weakened the ability of Iran to assert its position in the Middle East. In the short run, while relying on U.S. support (including $18 billion in military aid), Israel has succeeded in diminishing the power of both Hamas and Hezbollah. In doing so, it has emerged as the leading military power in the Levant and has responded effectively to Iran’s attack against it.

However, the October 7 attack and its aftermath exposed the reality of American military overstretch. For example, the U.S. Navy had to move its team of aircraft carriers from East Asia to the Middle East and back.

Moreover, while Iran may have failed to overwhelm Israel, its show of force and that of her regional proxies through the threat that Yemen’s Houthis posed to international shipping shattered the sense of American hegemony in the region.

The bottom line is that the Iranian leaders recognize that public and congressional opposition to the idea of another direct military intervention in the Middle East would make it difficult for the United States to use military force against Tehran and certainly close to impossible to orchestrate regime change there.

But then, as Iran continues its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the question is whether the United States would be forced to use its military power against Iran’s nuclear installations or give the green light to Israel to do so.

On another level, Iran and its Palestinian allies did achieve a major diplomatic win as a result of the attack on Israel. The notion that the Palestinian issue could be relegated to the bottom of the agenda has been challenged, producing an international consensus that no stability can be achieved in the Middle East without the resolution of the Palestinian problem.

That, in turn, meant that the Saudi Kingdom, as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman put it, would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without a clear commitment on the part of Israel to the creation of “an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital,” raising doubts about the American quest for a Saudi-Israeli détente.

Israel First vs America First

Running for his second term in office, Trump encouraged Israel to complete its military mission in Gaza and criticized the Biden administration for its attempts to impede the Israeli operation.

And, indeed, President-elect Trump’s proposed nominations and appointments have included Republicans with long track records of staunch support for Israel and hawkish views on Iran, suggesting that Netanyahu’s bet on Trump appeared to pay off.

Marco Rubio, Trump’s choice for secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, national security advisor-designate, are long-time supporters of Israel and, like Trump, were critical of the Biden administration’s attempts to inhibit Israel’s military’s moves in Gaza and against Hezbollah. Trump has named another champion of Israel, Representative Elise Stefanik (R-NY), as his pick for ambassador to the United Nations. 

He also announced he had tapped former Arkansas governor and two-time candidate for the Republican Party presidential nomination Mike Huckabee as his ambassador to Israel. Huckabee has also made several public comments supporting Israeli expansion into the occupied West Bank, refusing to say the Palestinian territory is under “occupation.” “There are certain words I refuse to use. There is no such thing as a West Bank. It’s Judea and Samaria. There’s no such thing as a settlement. They’re communities. They’re neighborhoods. They’re cities.” While Huckabee has insisted, “I won’t make the policy, I will carry out the policy of the president” as envoy to Israel, some believe his selection indicates the second Trump administration might end the long U.S. pursuit of a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

One of the president-elect’s first staffing decisions was to appoint Steve Witkoff, who, like Huckabee, is also a strong supporter of Israel with limited foreign policy expertise.

The conventional wisdom in Washington and Middle Eastern capitals is that unlike Biden, who projected occasional displeasure with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and its conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, the Trump administration is unlikely to object to any Israeli violations on the ground. That policy would be in line with that of Netanyahu and his right-wing government in Jerusalem. Some of these scenarios envision the Trump administration accepting Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

But then Trump also vowed to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, suggesting that he may be impatient with the financial costs of war for the United States and the risk of possible American casualties. Three American soldiers have died in connection with the fighting in the Middle East. There is also the concern that continuing will divert attention from Trump’s other domestic and foreign policy priorities, including shifting military resources to East Asia.

This, indeed, would raise an interesting dilemma for the new Trump administration: how to balance the goal of preserving American domination in the Middle East and supporting Israel with containing the military and geo-economic challenge from China? 

When it comes to Iran, the expectation is that Trump appeared prepared to push Iran even harder than he did during his first term, lining his cabinet with similarly minded Iran hawks like Rubio Waltz. Indeed, the two have vowed to ratchet up economic pressure on Tehran once again, suggesting that the new administration will likely exert far less restraint than the Biden administration on Israel’s campaign to degrade Iran and its proxies’ capabilities.

However, the administration may have trouble replicating the success of its first sanctions campaign, which relied on the willingness of major powers such as Russia and China to abide by them. This time around, the two powers are likely to be opposed to sanctioning Iran and may even support Tehran in its clash with the United States.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states have been pursuing a policy of détente with Iran. Consequently, they are opposed to toughening the U.S. position vis-à-vis Tehran, which might lead to instability in the region and threaten their interests. Also, it may not be in Israel’s interest to press the Americans to take military action against Iran or to create conditions in which such an action would be necessary. If that happens, Israel would then be blamed for dragging the United States into another costly Middle East War.

Trump has promised during the campaign not to allow Iran to build a nuclear bomb but seemed unenthusiastic about a war with Iran. “I don’t want to do damage to Iran,” he said in November, adding that it wanted Iran to be a “successful country.” In an interview in October, Vice President-elect JD Vance explained that Israel and the United States may sometimes have divergent interests, “and our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran.” Project 2025, a conservative blueprint for Trump’s second term, calls for sanctions on Iran but stops short of recommending military action. Instead, it exhorts America’s Arab allies to do more to protect themselves from Iranian threats.

Hence, contrary to the expectation that the new Trump administration may adopt an “Israel First” agenda regarding annexation and Iran, President Trump may decide to press the Israelis to agree to commit themselves to the two-state solution.

Considering that the peace plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace that Trump unveiled in his first term does include a commitment to the two-state solution and that Washington and Jerusalem could bridge over their differences on the issue, it’s not inconceivable that Trump 2.0 could move in that direction with the help of his adviser on Arab affairs, his Lebanese-American in-law Massad Boulos.

That might actually increase the chances for an Israeli-Saudi détente and the realization of the first Trump administration’s goal of establishing an axis of Arab states and Israel that would help contain Iran in addition to taking steps to stabilize and reconstruct the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, Trump may decide that since his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran didn’t work in Trump 1.0, perhaps he would consider a new Iran policy in Trump 2.0 that could lead perhaps to a deal, the kind that Trump likes to make.

As The Economist magazine has proposed, Trump could apply stronger pressure on Iran, including holding the option of a sustained campaign of bombing to destroy the country’s nuclear program, but with a negotiating path and more ambitious goals.

Dr. Leon Hadar is a contributing editor with The National Interest, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and a former research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger with Haaretz (Israel) and Washington correspondent for the Business Times of Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post.

Image: Noam Galai / Shutterstock.com.